中国国有企业的独特作用:基于知识溢出的视角
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摘要
国有企业是政府解决市场失灵的工具。本文从知识溢出角度研究中国国有企业的作用。基于上市企业样本的分析发现:国有企业的知识溢出大于私有企业,国有企业的知识溢出对私有企业创新产出有显著正向影响,而私有企业则不具有这种作用。本文构建模型阐述国有企业和私有企业的研发行为、知识溢出及其影响差异。研究发现,不同所有权企业知识溢出和作用的不对称性,在于国有企业比私有企业从事了更多的基础性研究。基于四个基础研究代理变量的经验分析支持了理论模型的结论。因此,中国国有企业实现了政府弥补基础研发市场失灵的目标,对经济增长的影响是独特的。
Knowledge spillover—often generated unintentionally through innovation activities—is an important source of increasing returns to scale and long-run economic growth(Romer, 1986; Romer, 1990). The positive externality associated with knowledge spillover has rendered private incentives to innovate less than socially optimal. Knowledge spillover is more extensive for basic research than applied research(Akcigit et al., 2017). A priori, privately owned enterprises(POEs) should have even less incentive than state-owned enterprises(SOEs) to conduct basic research. In many countries, SOEs are an important means of overcoming the market's underinvestment in basic research. A less explored question is whether SOEs play a similar role in China. Most previous empirical studies have relied primarily on financial and patent quantity data, and found significantly lower R&D efficiency among Chinese SOEs compared with POEs, although SOEs often enjoy more lenient taxation, higher government subsidies, and generous financing. However, these studies provide no systematic evidence of the externalities associated with knowledge production or the contribution of knowledge spillover to enhancing the innovation output of other enterprises. We assess the contribution of SOE knowledge spillover to improving innovation efficiency in the Chinese economy using panel data on listed enterprises in China during 2007—2011. We measure knowledge spillover received by a focal firm as the sum of every other firm's lagged R&D expenditure weighted by the technology proximity index defined by Jaffe(1986). We find that the knowledge spillover of SOEs is significantly larger than that of POEs. Using a citation-weighted patent count as the measure of innovative output, and controlling for firm R&D expenditure, size, governmental subsidy, market characteristics, and firm and year fixed effects, we find that SOE knowledge spillover to POEs is significantly positively associated with POE innovation output, but not vice versa. We provide four alternative hypotheses to explore the above stylized facts:(1) SOEs are located in more economically prosperous regions than POEs;(2) research conducted by SOEs can generate greater spillover in a short time window;(3) POEs have a stronger absorption ability than do SOEs; and(4) research by SOEs is more basic than that of POEs. Our data are not consistent with the first three hypotheses.We introduce a duopoly competition model between one SOE and one POE with government intervention using the framework of implicit contract theory. Our key assumptions are that(1) the government holds the residual right to the SOE and maximizes the social level of innovation output;(2) basic research generates greater knowledge spillovers than applied research; and(3) knowledge spillover improves a firm's R&D efficiency(increased return to scale). The resulting Nash equilibrium is asymmetric, with the SOE conducting more basic research, generating more knowledge spillover, and contributing to the POE's innovation output and market profit. We test the above theoretical implications by comparing the extent of basic research conducted by SOEs vs. POEs in our sample. Without a direct measure for basic research, we resort to empirical proxies. At the patent level, we test whether patents produced by SOEs have higher originality, generality, and forward citations compared to those by POEs. At the firm level, we test whether SOEs are more likely than POEs to collaborate with universities. The empirical findings are consistent with the model's implications.The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we provide the first theoretical foundation for Chinese SOEs as a government instrument offsetting the market's failure to undertake basic research. Second, we provide the first empirical comparison between Chinese SOEs and POEs in conducting basic vs. applied research. Third, for the first time, knowledge spillover and its impact on Chinese enterprises is estimated at the firm level.
Knowledge spillover—often generated unintentionally through innovation activities—is an important source of increasing returns to scale and long-run economic growth(Romer, 1986; Romer, 1990). The positive externality associated with knowledge spillover has rendered private incentives to innovate less than socially optimal. Knowledge spillover is more extensive for basic research than applied research(Akcigit et al., 2017). A priori, privately owned enterprises(POEs) should have even less incentive than state-owned enterprises(SOEs) to conduct basic research. In many countries, SOEs are an important means of overcoming the market's underinvestment in basic research. A less explored question is whether SOEs play a similar role in China. Most previous empirical studies have relied primarily on financial and patent quantity data, and found significantly lower R&D efficiency among Chinese SOEs compared with POEs, although SOEs often enjoy more lenient taxation, higher government subsidies, and generous financing. However, these studies provide no systematic evidence of the externalities associated with knowledge production or the contribution of knowledge spillover to enhancing the innovation output of other enterprises. We assess the contribution of SOE knowledge spillover to improving innovation efficiency in the Chinese economy using panel data on listed enterprises in China during 2007—2011. We measure knowledge spillover received by a focal firm as the sum of every other firm's lagged R&D expenditure weighted by the technology proximity index defined by Jaffe(1986). We find that the knowledge spillover of SOEs is significantly larger than that of POEs. Using a citation-weighted patent count as the measure of innovative output, and controlling for firm R&D expenditure, size, governmental subsidy, market characteristics, and firm and year fixed effects, we find that SOE knowledge spillover to POEs is significantly positively associated with POE innovation output, but not vice versa. We provide four alternative hypotheses to explore the above stylized facts:(1) SOEs are located in more economically prosperous regions than POEs;(2) research conducted by SOEs can generate greater spillover in a short time window;(3) POEs have a stronger absorption ability than do SOEs; and(4) research by SOEs is more basic than that of POEs. Our data are not consistent with the first three hypotheses.We introduce a duopoly competition model between one SOE and one POE with government intervention using the framework of implicit contract theory. Our key assumptions are that(1) the government holds the residual right to the SOE and maximizes the social level of innovation output;(2) basic research generates greater knowledge spillovers than applied research; and(3) knowledge spillover improves a firm's R&D efficiency(increased return to scale). The resulting Nash equilibrium is asymmetric, with the SOE conducting more basic research, generating more knowledge spillover, and contributing to the POE's innovation output and market profit. We test the above theoretical implications by comparing the extent of basic research conducted by SOEs vs. POEs in our sample. Without a direct measure for basic research, we resort to empirical proxies. At the patent level, we test whether patents produced by SOEs have higher originality, generality, and forward citations compared to those by POEs. At the firm level, we test whether SOEs are more likely than POEs to collaborate with universities. The empirical findings are consistent with the model's implications.The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we provide the first theoretical foundation for Chinese SOEs as a government instrument offsetting the market's failure to undertake basic research. Second, we provide the first empirical comparison between Chinese SOEs and POEs in conducting basic vs. applied research. Third, for the first time, knowledge spillover and its impact on Chinese enterprises is estimated at the firm level.
引文
董晓庆、赵坚、袁朋伟,2014:《国有企业创新效率损失研究》,《中国工业经济》第2期。
金碚,2015:《技术创新离不开国有企业》,《中国质量》第7期。
克利斯·弗里曼、罗克·苏特,2004:《工业创新经济学》,中译本,北京大学出版社。
刘瑞明,2013:《中国的国有企业效率:一个文献综述》,《世界经济》第11期。
刘元春,2001:《国有企业宏观效率论——理论及其验证》,《中国社会科学》第5期。
吴延兵,2012:《国有企业的双重效率损失研究》,《经济研究》第3期。
Agrawal,A.,A.Galasso,and A.Oettl,2017,“Roads and Innovation”,Review of Economics and Statistics,99(3),417—434.
Akcigit,U.,D.Hanley,and N.Serrano-Velarde,2016,“Back to Basics:Basic Research Spillovers,Innovation Policy and Growth”,CEPR Discussion Paper,No.DP11707.
Atkinson,A.B.,and J.E.Stiglitz,1980,Lectures on Public Economics,Maidenhead:McGrow-Hill.
Bai,C.,J.Lu,and Z.Tao,2009,“How Does Privatization Work in China?”,Journal of Comparative Economics,37(3),453—470.
Bloom,N.,M.Schankerman,and J.Van Reenen,2013,“Identifying Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry”,Econometrica,81(4),1347—1393.
Bondt,R.D.,and I.Henriques,1995,“Strategic Investment with Asymmetric Spillovers”,Canadian Journal of Economics,28(3),656—674.
Cao,S.,Z.Lei,and B.Wright,2018,“Speed of Patent Protection,Rate of Technical Knowledge Obsolescence and Optimal Patenting Strategy”,Working Paper.
Chang,H.,A.Cheema,and L.Mises,2002,“Conditions for Successful Technology Policy in Developing Countries—Learning Rents,State Structures,and Institutions”,Economics of Innovation and New Technology,11(4—5),369—398.
Cohen,W.M.,2010,“Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and Performance”,Handbook of the Economics of Innovation,Vol.1,Elsevier:North-Holland.
Cohen,W.M.,and D.A.Levinthal,1990,“Absorptive Capacity:A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation”,Administrative Science Quarterly,128—152.
Denning,S.,2001,The Springboard:How Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowledge-Era Organizations,Published by Routledge.
Dong,X.,S.Zheng,and M.E.Kahn.,2018,“The Role of Transportation Speed in Facilitating High Skilled Teamwork”,NBER Working Papers.
Evenson,R.E.,and Y.Kislev,1976,“A Stochastic Model of Applied Research”,Journal of Political Economy,84(2),265—281.
Griliches,Z.,1979,“Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to Productivity Growth”,Bell Journal of Economics,10(1),92—116.
Grossman,S.J.,and O.D.Hart,1986,“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”,Journal of Political Economy,94(4),691—719.
Hall,B.H.,and R.H.Ziedonis,2001,“Patent Paradox Revisited:An Empirical Study of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry,1979—1995”,RAND Journal of Economics,32(1),101—128.
Hall,B.H.,A.B.Jaffe,and M.Trajtenberg,2001,“The NBER Patent Citation Data File:Lessons,Insights and Methodological Tools”,NBER Working Papers.
Hall,B.H.,and A.Maffioli,2008,“Evaluating the Impact of Technology Development Funds in Emerging Economies:Evidence from Latin America”,European Journal of Development Research,20(2),172—198.
Hart,O.,and J.Moore,1990,“Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”,Journal of Political Economy,98(6),1119—1158.
Hart,O.,A.Shleifer,and R.W.Vishny,1997,“The Proper Scope of Government:Theory and an Application to Prisons”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,112(4),1127—1161.
Hu,A.G.,and G.H.Jefferson,2009,“A Great Wall of Patents:What is behind China's Recent Patent Explosion?”,Journal of Development Economics,90(1),57—68.
Jaffe,A.B.,1986,“Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D:Evidence from Firms' Patents,Profits and Market Value”,American Economic Review,76(5),984—1001.
Jaffe,A.B.,1989,“Real Effects of Academic Research”,American Economic Review,79(5),957—970.
Jaffe,A.B.,M.Trajtenberg,and R.Henderson,1993,“Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations”,Quarterly journal of Economics,108(3),577—598.
Malla,S.,and R.Gray,2005,“The Crowding Effects of Basic and Applied Research:A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of an Agricultural Biotech Industry”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,87(2),423—438.
Mowery,D.,1983,“The Relationship between Intrafirm and Contractual Forms of Industrial Research in American Manufacturing,1900—1940”,Explorations in Economic History,20(4),351—374.
Nelson,R.,1982,“The Role of Knowledge in R&D Efficiency”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,97 (3),453—470.
Romer,P.M.,1986,“Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth”,Journal of Political Economy,94(5),1002—1037.
Romer,P.M.,1990,“Endogenous Technological Change”,Journal of Political Economy,98(5),S71—S102.
Rosen,R.J.,1991,“Research and Development with Asymmetric Firm Sizes”,RAND Journal of Economics,22 (3),411—429.
Trajtenberg,M.,A.B.Jaffe,and R.Henderson,1997,“University versus Corporate Patents:A Window on the Basicness of Inventions”,Economics of Innovation and New Technology,5(1),19—50.
Zhang,A.,Y.Zhang,and R.Zhao,2003,“A Study of the R&D Efficiency and Productivity of Chinese Firms”,Journal of Comparative Economics,31(3),444—464.
① 数据来自《中国统计年鉴》。
(1)毫无疑问,上市公司不能代表全部企业,但由于数据获得性的限制,本文只能以公开的上市公司为样本,因此把本文结论推广到非上市公司企业时要非常谨慎。
(2)限于篇幅,第三部分实证结果及经验分析等信息未列出,有兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
(3)由于数据局限,还无法对国有企业与私有企业的创新技术周期性的相同程度进行充分的实证检验。
(4)资料来源:http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind10/c4/c4s.htm#sb2。
(5)这一假设是为分析简单起见,事实上,即使像Bondt & Henriques(1995)一样假设应用研究也存在溢出效应,只要基础研究的溢出效应远大于应用研究的溢出效应,本文的结论依然成立。
(6)这是第二部分没有测算企业基础研究和应用研究投入的原因。
金碚,2015:《技术创新离不开国有企业》,《中国质量》第7期。
克利斯·弗里曼、罗克·苏特,2004:《工业创新经济学》,中译本,北京大学出版社。
刘瑞明,2013:《中国的国有企业效率:一个文献综述》,《世界经济》第11期。
刘元春,2001:《国有企业宏观效率论——理论及其验证》,《中国社会科学》第5期。
吴延兵,2012:《国有企业的双重效率损失研究》,《经济研究》第3期。
Agrawal,A.,A.Galasso,and A.Oettl,2017,“Roads and Innovation”,Review of Economics and Statistics,99(3),417—434.
Akcigit,U.,D.Hanley,and N.Serrano-Velarde,2016,“Back to Basics:Basic Research Spillovers,Innovation Policy and Growth”,CEPR Discussion Paper,No.DP11707.
Atkinson,A.B.,and J.E.Stiglitz,1980,Lectures on Public Economics,Maidenhead:McGrow-Hill.
Bai,C.,J.Lu,and Z.Tao,2009,“How Does Privatization Work in China?”,Journal of Comparative Economics,37(3),453—470.
Bloom,N.,M.Schankerman,and J.Van Reenen,2013,“Identifying Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry”,Econometrica,81(4),1347—1393.
Bondt,R.D.,and I.Henriques,1995,“Strategic Investment with Asymmetric Spillovers”,Canadian Journal of Economics,28(3),656—674.
Cao,S.,Z.Lei,and B.Wright,2018,“Speed of Patent Protection,Rate of Technical Knowledge Obsolescence and Optimal Patenting Strategy”,Working Paper.
Chang,H.,A.Cheema,and L.Mises,2002,“Conditions for Successful Technology Policy in Developing Countries—Learning Rents,State Structures,and Institutions”,Economics of Innovation and New Technology,11(4—5),369—398.
Cohen,W.M.,2010,“Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and Performance”,Handbook of the Economics of Innovation,Vol.1,Elsevier:North-Holland.
Cohen,W.M.,and D.A.Levinthal,1990,“Absorptive Capacity:A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation”,Administrative Science Quarterly,128—152.
Denning,S.,2001,The Springboard:How Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowledge-Era Organizations,Published by Routledge.
Dong,X.,S.Zheng,and M.E.Kahn.,2018,“The Role of Transportation Speed in Facilitating High Skilled Teamwork”,NBER Working Papers.
Evenson,R.E.,and Y.Kislev,1976,“A Stochastic Model of Applied Research”,Journal of Political Economy,84(2),265—281.
Griliches,Z.,1979,“Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to Productivity Growth”,Bell Journal of Economics,10(1),92—116.
Grossman,S.J.,and O.D.Hart,1986,“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”,Journal of Political Economy,94(4),691—719.
Hall,B.H.,and R.H.Ziedonis,2001,“Patent Paradox Revisited:An Empirical Study of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry,1979—1995”,RAND Journal of Economics,32(1),101—128.
Hall,B.H.,A.B.Jaffe,and M.Trajtenberg,2001,“The NBER Patent Citation Data File:Lessons,Insights and Methodological Tools”,NBER Working Papers.
Hall,B.H.,and A.Maffioli,2008,“Evaluating the Impact of Technology Development Funds in Emerging Economies:Evidence from Latin America”,European Journal of Development Research,20(2),172—198.
Hart,O.,and J.Moore,1990,“Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”,Journal of Political Economy,98(6),1119—1158.
Hart,O.,A.Shleifer,and R.W.Vishny,1997,“The Proper Scope of Government:Theory and an Application to Prisons”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,112(4),1127—1161.
Hu,A.G.,and G.H.Jefferson,2009,“A Great Wall of Patents:What is behind China's Recent Patent Explosion?”,Journal of Development Economics,90(1),57—68.
Jaffe,A.B.,1986,“Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D:Evidence from Firms' Patents,Profits and Market Value”,American Economic Review,76(5),984—1001.
Jaffe,A.B.,1989,“Real Effects of Academic Research”,American Economic Review,79(5),957—970.
Jaffe,A.B.,M.Trajtenberg,and R.Henderson,1993,“Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations”,Quarterly journal of Economics,108(3),577—598.
Malla,S.,and R.Gray,2005,“The Crowding Effects of Basic and Applied Research:A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of an Agricultural Biotech Industry”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,87(2),423—438.
Mowery,D.,1983,“The Relationship between Intrafirm and Contractual Forms of Industrial Research in American Manufacturing,1900—1940”,Explorations in Economic History,20(4),351—374.
Nelson,R.,1982,“The Role of Knowledge in R&D Efficiency”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,97 (3),453—470.
Romer,P.M.,1986,“Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth”,Journal of Political Economy,94(5),1002—1037.
Romer,P.M.,1990,“Endogenous Technological Change”,Journal of Political Economy,98(5),S71—S102.
Rosen,R.J.,1991,“Research and Development with Asymmetric Firm Sizes”,RAND Journal of Economics,22 (3),411—429.
Trajtenberg,M.,A.B.Jaffe,and R.Henderson,1997,“University versus Corporate Patents:A Window on the Basicness of Inventions”,Economics of Innovation and New Technology,5(1),19—50.
Zhang,A.,Y.Zhang,and R.Zhao,2003,“A Study of the R&D Efficiency and Productivity of Chinese Firms”,Journal of Comparative Economics,31(3),444—464.
① 数据来自《中国统计年鉴》。
(1)毫无疑问,上市公司不能代表全部企业,但由于数据获得性的限制,本文只能以公开的上市公司为样本,因此把本文结论推广到非上市公司企业时要非常谨慎。
(2)限于篇幅,第三部分实证结果及经验分析等信息未列出,有兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
(3)由于数据局限,还无法对国有企业与私有企业的创新技术周期性的相同程度进行充分的实证检验。
(4)资料来源:http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind10/c4/c4s.htm#sb2。
(5)这一假设是为分析简单起见,事实上,即使像Bondt & Henriques(1995)一样假设应用研究也存在溢出效应,只要基础研究的溢出效应远大于应用研究的溢出效应,本文的结论依然成立。
(6)这是第二部分没有测算企业基础研究和应用研究投入的原因。