审计功能、产权歧视与银行贷款担保
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摘要
银行贷款是非金融类企业外部融资的主要渠道。采用我国上市公司数据,考察不同情境下银行贷款担保决策中的审计功能及约束条件。研究表明:首先,作为审计结果输出的审计报告意见越差,银行要求企业贷款担保比例越高,即审计功能有效;其次,纳入产权性质,国企的政府隐性担保对审计功能具有高度替代效应,表现为银行贷款担保决策中"产权歧视"严重削弱了审计功能;然而,高水平的市场化发展只能部分缓解但无法消除这一替代效应。进一步研究表明,银行对审计师异质性特征具有"选择"敏感性,能够甄别不同事务所规模与任期、不同审计师个人任期情境下的审计报告增量信息并调整授信决策,但对审计师个人专长、职务角色等特征不敏感。本文基于审计视角拓展了银行贷款决策研究,为审计服务促进金融资源配置提供了经验证据与政策参考。
Bank loans are the main channel of external financing for non-financial enterprises. Audit, as a significant mechanism of enterprise external governance, should play an intermediary market role in banks' credit decisions-making. Based on the data of Listed Companies in China's stock market,this paper examines the audit function and the efficiency of bank loan guarantee under different circumstances. The results are as follows:First,the banks require higher proportion of loan guarantee for companies with modified audit opinions,which means the audit intermediary function is effective. Secondly,considering the property rights of enterprises,the implicit government guarantee of state-owned enterprises has a high substitution effect on audit function,in which the banks' property right discrimination seriously weakens the audit intermediary function. However, the market development can only alleviate but cannot eliminate this substitution effect. Furthermore, the banks have choice sensitivity to the heterogeneity characteristics of auditors,and they can identify the audit report increment information under different firm size and tenure,and different auditor individual tenure circumstances,and adjust credit decision-making. But they are not sensitive to the characteristics of the individual role and the expertise of auditors. This paper expands the research of bank behaviors from the perspective of auditing,and provides empirical evidence and policy reference for audit service to promote the development of financial market.
Bank loans are the main channel of external financing for non-financial enterprises. Audit, as a significant mechanism of enterprise external governance, should play an intermediary market role in banks' credit decisions-making. Based on the data of Listed Companies in China's stock market,this paper examines the audit function and the efficiency of bank loan guarantee under different circumstances. The results are as follows:First,the banks require higher proportion of loan guarantee for companies with modified audit opinions,which means the audit intermediary function is effective. Secondly,considering the property rights of enterprises,the implicit government guarantee of state-owned enterprises has a high substitution effect on audit function,in which the banks' property right discrimination seriously weakens the audit intermediary function. However, the market development can only alleviate but cannot eliminate this substitution effect. Furthermore, the banks have choice sensitivity to the heterogeneity characteristics of auditors,and they can identify the audit report increment information under different firm size and tenure,and different auditor individual tenure circumstances,and adjust credit decision-making. But they are not sensitive to the characteristics of the individual role and the expertise of auditors. This paper expands the research of bank behaviors from the perspective of auditing,and provides empirical evidence and policy reference for audit service to promote the development of financial market.
引文
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[14] 朱凯,陈信元. 金融发展、审计意见与上市公司融资约束[J]. 金融研究,2009,(7):66-80.
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[16] 周楷唐,麻志明,吴联生. 持续经营审计意见是否具有额外价值?——来自债务融资的证据[J]. 会计研究,2016,(8):81-88,97.
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[19] Blazy,R.,Weill,L..The Role of Collateral in French Bank Loans[J]. Revued Economie Politique,2005,(4):501-522.
[20] 黎凯,叶建芳. 财政分权下政府干预对债务融资的影响——基于转轨经济制度背景的实证分析[J]. 管理世界,2007,(8):23-34.
[21] 陈燕,廖冠民,吴育新. 关联交易、会计信息有用性与债务契约:基于贷款担保的实证分析[J]. 经济科学,2012,(6):91-102.
[22] 王小鲁,樊纲,于静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M]. 北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.32-42.
[23] 高雷,戴勇,张杰. 审计实务影响银行贷款政策吗?——基于上市公司面板数据的经验研究[J]. 金融研究,2010,(5):191-206.
[24] 薛爽,叶飞腾,付迟.行业专长、审计任期和审计质量——基于签字会计师水平的分析[J]. 中国会计与财务研究,2012,(3):109-159.
[2] Jensen,M.C.,Meckling,W. H.. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,4,(3):305-360.
[3] 袁淳,荆新,廖冠民. 国有公司的信贷优惠:信贷干预还是隐性担保?——基于信用贷款的实证检验[J]. 会计研究,2010,(8):49-54,96.
[4] 王艳艳,于李胜,王晓珂. 会计稳健性、贷款抵押与银企所有权模式[J]. 会计研究,2014,(12):11-17,95.
[5] 沈红波,廖冠民,曹军. 金融发展、产权性质与上市公司担保融资[J]. 中国工业经济,2011,(6):120-129.
[6] 张程,李文雯,张振新. 公司规模与资产负债率:来自上市公司的证据[J]. 财经问题研究,2010,(11):43-49.
[7] Brandt,L.,Li,H..Bank Discrimination in Transition Economics:Ideology,Information,or Incentives[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003,31,(3):387-413.
[8] Bhojraj,S.,Sengupta,P..Effect of Corporate Governance on Bond Ratings and Yields:The Role of Institutional Investors and the Outside Directors[J]. Journal of Business,2003,76,(3) :455-476.
[9] 蒋琰,陆正飞. 公司治理与股权融资成本——单一与综合机制的治理效应研究[J]. 数量经济技术研究,2009,(2):60-75.
[10] 刘运国,吴小蒙,蒋涛. 产权性质、债务融资与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 会计研究,2010,(1):43-50,95.
[11] 陆正飞,祝继高,樊铮. 银根紧缩、信贷歧视与民营上市公司投资者利益损失[J]. 金融研究,2009,(8):124-136.
[12] Dell' Ariccia G. ,Laeven L.,Suarez,G.. Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel from the United States[J]. Journal of Finance,2017,72,(2):613-654.
[13] Chen,P.F.,He,S.,Ma,Z.,Stice,D..TheInformation Role of Audit Opinions in Debt Contracting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2016,61,(1):121-144.
[14] 朱凯,陈信元. 金融发展、审计意见与上市公司融资约束[J]. 金融研究,2009,(7):66-80.
[15] Firth,M.,Mo,P.L.L.,Wong,R.N.K..Auditors' Organizational Form,LegalLiability,and Reporting Conservatism:Evidence from China[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2002,29,(1):57-93.
[16] 周楷唐,麻志明,吴联生. 持续经营审计意见是否具有额外价值?——来自债务融资的证据[J]. 会计研究,2016,(8):81-88,97.
[17] Dye,R.A..Auditing Standards,Legal Liability,and Auditor Wealth[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1993,10,(5):887-914.
[18] Ronen,J. PolicyReforms in the Aftermath of AccountingScandals[J]. Journal of Accounting and Policy,2002,21(4-5):281-286.
[19] Blazy,R.,Weill,L..The Role of Collateral in French Bank Loans[J]. Revued Economie Politique,2005,(4):501-522.
[20] 黎凯,叶建芳. 财政分权下政府干预对债务融资的影响——基于转轨经济制度背景的实证分析[J]. 管理世界,2007,(8):23-34.
[21] 陈燕,廖冠民,吴育新. 关联交易、会计信息有用性与债务契约:基于贷款担保的实证分析[J]. 经济科学,2012,(6):91-102.
[22] 王小鲁,樊纲,于静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M]. 北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.32-42.
[23] 高雷,戴勇,张杰. 审计实务影响银行贷款政策吗?——基于上市公司面板数据的经验研究[J]. 金融研究,2010,(5):191-206.
[24] 薛爽,叶飞腾,付迟.行业专长、审计任期和审计质量——基于签字会计师水平的分析[J]. 中国会计与财务研究,2012,(3):109-159.