政府补助、机构投资者增持与公司亏损逆转程度
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摘要
基于中国日益频繁出现的政府补助企业的现实背景,结合亏损上市公司在产权性质、公司规模等方面的特征、运用理论分析与实证分析相结合的方法,以2003年-2012年1 383家亏损上市公司为研究样本对机构投资者增持、政府补助与亏损逆转程度三者的关系展开较为深入的研究。结果发现,上市公司在亏损当年获得政府补助尽管会减轻当年的亏损额,但会抑制其在亏损后第一年的亏损逆转程度,而且获得的政府补助越多,这种抑制效应也越明显;机构投资者增持会增强政府补助对上市公司在亏损后第一年发生亏损逆转程度的抑制效应。本文的研究对于规范政府补助行为、加强机构投资者监督、提高证券监管部门对于亏损上市公司信息披露的监管力度等具有一定的指导意义。
Based on China's enterprise realistic background of increasingly frequent government subsidies and 1383 samples of 2002-2012,We start a more in-depth study of the relationship among the hold-ings of institutional investors,the extent of government subsidies and the reversal of the losses companies,combined with the characteristics of loss listed companies in the nature of ownership,and company size.This paper analyzes the impact of government subsidies to the reversing extent of losses listed companies,and then analyzes the interaction holdings of institutional investors and government grants to the reversing extent of losses listed companies.The results showed that,in the aspect of the degree of obtaining government subsidies,the state-owned,large-scale losses of listed companies more easier than the others;in the aspect of the amount of obtaining government subsidies,the stateowned,large-scale losses of listed companies bigger than the others;Although government subsidies can reduce the losses of the listed companies in the same year,it will enhance the extent of their losses in the first year after a loss,What's more,the more government subsidies received,the greater the loss produced.The increase of the institutional investors will strengthen the effect of holdings of government subsidies to increase the reversing extent of losses listed companies in the first year after a loss.The significance of this paper is to standardize the behavior of government subsidies,strengthen the monitor of institutional investors,improving the information disclosure strength of the securities regulatory authorities.
Based on China's enterprise realistic background of increasingly frequent government subsidies and 1383 samples of 2002-2012,We start a more in-depth study of the relationship among the hold-ings of institutional investors,the extent of government subsidies and the reversal of the losses companies,combined with the characteristics of loss listed companies in the nature of ownership,and company size.This paper analyzes the impact of government subsidies to the reversing extent of losses listed companies,and then analyzes the interaction holdings of institutional investors and government grants to the reversing extent of losses listed companies.The results showed that,in the aspect of the degree of obtaining government subsidies,the state-owned,large-scale losses of listed companies more easier than the others;in the aspect of the amount of obtaining government subsidies,the stateowned,large-scale losses of listed companies bigger than the others;Although government subsidies can reduce the losses of the listed companies in the same year,it will enhance the extent of their losses in the first year after a loss,What's more,the more government subsidies received,the greater the loss produced.The increase of the institutional investors will strengthen the effect of holdings of government subsidies to increase the reversing extent of losses listed companies in the first year after a loss.The significance of this paper is to standardize the behavior of government subsidies,strengthen the monitor of institutional investors,improving the information disclosure strength of the securities regulatory authorities.
引文
[1]肖兴志,王伊攀.战略性新兴产业政府补贴是否用在了“刀刃”上?——基于254家上市公司的数据[J].经济管理,2014(4):19-31.
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[8]任曙明,张静.补贴、寻租成本与加成率——基于中国装备制造企业的实证研究[J].管理世界,2013(10):118-129.
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[12]李向前.机构投资者、公司治理与资本市场稳定研究[J].南开经济研究,2002(2):69-73.
[13]潘爱玲,潘清.机构投资者持股对公司业绩的影响分析——基于2009-2011年沪深上市公司的实证检验[J].亚太经济,2013(3):101-104.
[14]HEALY P M,WAHLEN J M.A review of The Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting[J].Accounting Horizons,1999,13(4):365-383.
[15]BALL R,SHIVAKUMAR L.Earnings Quality At Initial Public Offerings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,45(2):324-349.
[16]COTTER J,NAJAH M M.Institutional Investor Influence on Global Climate Change Disclosure Practices[J].Australian Journal of Management,2012,39(1):5-34.
[17]程书强.机构投资者持股与上市公司会计盈余信息关系实证研究[J].管理世界,2006(9):129-136.
[18]杨海燕,韦德洪,孙健.机构投资者持股能提高上市公司会计信息质量吗?——兼论不同类型机构投资者的差异[J].会计研究,2012(9):16-23+96.
[19]RAJGOPAL S,VENKATACHALAM M,JIAMBALVO J J.Is Institutional Ownership Associated With Earnings Management and The Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings[N].Lancaster University Working Paper,1999,NO.163433.
[20]JIAMBALVO J,RAJGOPAL S,VENKATACHALAM M.Institutional Ownership and The Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2002,19(1):117-145.
[21]MITRA S,CREADY W M.2005,Institutional Stock Ownership,Accrual Management,and Information Environment[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2005,20(3):257-286.
[22]高雷,张杰.公司治理、机构投资者与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008(9):64-72+96.
[23]李延喜,杜瑞,高锐.机构投资者持股比例与上市公司盈余管理的实证研究[J].管理评论,2011(3):39-45+70.
[24]宋建波,高升好,关馨姣.机构投资者持股能提高上市公司盈余持续性吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2012(2):128-138.
[25]BAI C E,LIU Q,LU J,SONG F M,ZHANG J.Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2005,32(4):599-616.
[26]AJINKYA B,BHOJRAJ S,SENGUPTA P.The Association Between Outside Directors,Institutional Investors and The Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts[J].Journal of accounting Research,2005,43(3):343-376.
[27]BEASLEY M S.An Empirical Analysis of The Relation Between The Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud[J].Accounting Review,1999,71(4):443-465.
[28]PEASNELL K V,POPE P F,YOUNG S.Board Monitoring and Earnings Management:Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2005,32(7-8):1311-1346.
[29]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010(3):65-77.
[30]罗进辉.上市公司的信息报露质量为何摇摆不定?[J].投资研究,2014(1):134-152.
[31]辛宇,徐莉萍.投资者保护视角下治理环境与股改对价之间的关系研究[J].经济研究,2007(9):121-133.
[32]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5):40-51.
[33]刘志远,花贵如.政府控制、机构投资者持股与投资者权益保护[J].财经研究,2009(4):119-130.
[34]高群,黄谦.机构投资者持股对内部人控制与盈余管理关系的影响——基于中国上市公司的经验分析[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2010(2):52-57+67.
[2]邵敏,包群.地方政府补贴企业行为分析:扶持强者还是保护弱者[J].世界经济文汇,2011(1):56-72.
[3]耿强,胡睿昕.企业获得政府补贴的影响因素分析——基于工业企业数据库的实证研究[J].审计与经济研究,2013(6):80-90.
[4]唐清泉,罗党论.政府补贴动机及其效果的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007(6):149-163.
[5]邵敏,包群.政府补贴与企业生产率——基于我国工业企业的经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2012(7):70-82.
[6]步丹璐,王晓艳.政府补助、软约束与薪酬差距[J].南开管理评论,2014(2):23-33.
[7]许罡,朱卫东,孙慧倩.政府补助的政策效应研究——基于上市公司投资视角的检验[J].经济学动态,2014(6):87-95.
[8]任曙明,张静.补贴、寻租成本与加成率——基于中国装备制造企业的实证研究[J].管理世界,2013(10):118-129.
[9]SMITH M P.Shareholder Activism By Institutional Investors:Evidence From PERS[J].Journal of Finance,1996,51(1):227-252.
[10]BERTRAND M,MULLAINATHAN S.Are CEOs Rewarded For Luck?The Ones Without Principals Are,Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(03):901-932.
[11]BUSHEE B J,CARTER M E,GERAKOS J.Institutional Investor Preferences For Corporate Governance Mechanisms[J].Journal of Management Accounting Research,2013,26(02):123-149.
[12]李向前.机构投资者、公司治理与资本市场稳定研究[J].南开经济研究,2002(2):69-73.
[13]潘爱玲,潘清.机构投资者持股对公司业绩的影响分析——基于2009-2011年沪深上市公司的实证检验[J].亚太经济,2013(3):101-104.
[14]HEALY P M,WAHLEN J M.A review of The Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting[J].Accounting Horizons,1999,13(4):365-383.
[15]BALL R,SHIVAKUMAR L.Earnings Quality At Initial Public Offerings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,45(2):324-349.
[16]COTTER J,NAJAH M M.Institutional Investor Influence on Global Climate Change Disclosure Practices[J].Australian Journal of Management,2012,39(1):5-34.
[17]程书强.机构投资者持股与上市公司会计盈余信息关系实证研究[J].管理世界,2006(9):129-136.
[18]杨海燕,韦德洪,孙健.机构投资者持股能提高上市公司会计信息质量吗?——兼论不同类型机构投资者的差异[J].会计研究,2012(9):16-23+96.
[19]RAJGOPAL S,VENKATACHALAM M,JIAMBALVO J J.Is Institutional Ownership Associated With Earnings Management and The Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings[N].Lancaster University Working Paper,1999,NO.163433.
[20]JIAMBALVO J,RAJGOPAL S,VENKATACHALAM M.Institutional Ownership and The Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2002,19(1):117-145.
[21]MITRA S,CREADY W M.2005,Institutional Stock Ownership,Accrual Management,and Information Environment[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2005,20(3):257-286.
[22]高雷,张杰.公司治理、机构投资者与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008(9):64-72+96.
[23]李延喜,杜瑞,高锐.机构投资者持股比例与上市公司盈余管理的实证研究[J].管理评论,2011(3):39-45+70.
[24]宋建波,高升好,关馨姣.机构投资者持股能提高上市公司盈余持续性吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2012(2):128-138.
[25]BAI C E,LIU Q,LU J,SONG F M,ZHANG J.Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2005,32(4):599-616.
[26]AJINKYA B,BHOJRAJ S,SENGUPTA P.The Association Between Outside Directors,Institutional Investors and The Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts[J].Journal of accounting Research,2005,43(3):343-376.
[27]BEASLEY M S.An Empirical Analysis of The Relation Between The Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud[J].Accounting Review,1999,71(4):443-465.
[28]PEASNELL K V,POPE P F,YOUNG S.Board Monitoring and Earnings Management:Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2005,32(7-8):1311-1346.
[29]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010(3):65-77.
[30]罗进辉.上市公司的信息报露质量为何摇摆不定?[J].投资研究,2014(1):134-152.
[31]辛宇,徐莉萍.投资者保护视角下治理环境与股改对价之间的关系研究[J].经济研究,2007(9):121-133.
[32]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5):40-51.
[33]刘志远,花贵如.政府控制、机构投资者持股与投资者权益保护[J].财经研究,2009(4):119-130.
[34]高群,黄谦.机构投资者持股对内部人控制与盈余管理关系的影响——基于中国上市公司的经验分析[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2010(2):52-57+67.