机构投资者增持、高管激励与亏损公司未来业绩
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摘要
笔者选取沪深两市2003—2014年亏损上市公司作为研究样本,探究不同类型的机构投资者增持股票对亏损公司未来业绩的影响差异,以及高管激励对不同类型机构投资者增持股票影响亏损公司未来业绩产生的调节效应。研究发现,压力抵制型机构投资者增持股票对亏损公司未来业绩的正面影响比压力敏感型机构投资者增持股票更强;相对于压力抵制型机构投资者增持股票而言,高管激励会更加明显地减弱压力敏感型机构投资者增持股票对亏损公司未来业绩的正面影响。在此基础上,提出正确识别不同类型机构投资者增持股票动机、建立合理的高管激励体系、增强高管激励信息的透明度等政策建议。
This paper selects 2003 to 2014 a total of 12 years for all the loss listed companies as the research sample,using linear regression model to research the relationship of different types of institutional investors increased holdings,executive incentives and the loss company's future performance. The study finds that the positive impact of the pressure-resisting institutional investors increased holdings on the future performance of the loss-making companies is stronger than that of the pressure-sensitive institutional investors increased holdings. Relative to the pressure to resist institutional investors increased holdings,the level of executive incentives will significantly reduce the positive impact of pressure-sensitive institutional investors increased holdings on the future performance of the loss listed companies. And we further propose to identify the motivations of different types of institutional investors to increase their holdings,to establish a reasonable incentive system and improve the transparency of information on incentive policies.
This paper selects 2003 to 2014 a total of 12 years for all the loss listed companies as the research sample,using linear regression model to research the relationship of different types of institutional investors increased holdings,executive incentives and the loss company's future performance. The study finds that the positive impact of the pressure-resisting institutional investors increased holdings on the future performance of the loss-making companies is stronger than that of the pressure-sensitive institutional investors increased holdings. Relative to the pressure to resist institutional investors increased holdings,the level of executive incentives will significantly reduce the positive impact of pressure-sensitive institutional investors increased holdings on the future performance of the loss listed companies. And we further propose to identify the motivations of different types of institutional investors to increase their holdings,to establish a reasonable incentive system and improve the transparency of information on incentive policies.
引文
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[20]Ajinkya,B.,Bhojraj,S.,and Sengupta,P..The Association Between Outside Directors,Institutional Investors and The Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts[J].Journal of accounting Research,2005,43(3):343-376.
[21]Beasley,M.S..An Empirical Analysis of The Relation Between The Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud[J].Accounting Review,1999,71(4):443-465.
[22]Peasnell,K.V.,Pope,P.F.and Young,S..Board Monitoring and Earnings Management:Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2005,32(7-8):1311-1346.
[23]贺远琼,陈昀.不确定环境中高管团队规模与企业绩效关系的实证研究——基于中国制造业上市公司的证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2009,(2):123-128.
[24]覃家琦.高管规模、代理科层与公司业绩——模型及来自我国上市公司的证据[A].中国管理现代化研究会.第四届(2009)中国管理学年会——会计与财务分会场论文集[C].中国管理现代化研究会,2009:21.
[25]南晓莉,李芊卉.高管团队规模、薪酬差距与公司风险承担研究[J].会计之友,2017,(1):81-88.
[26]石大林,栗婧岩,徐新.高管薪酬、交互效应与公司绩效间的动态关系——基于动态内生性的经验研究[J].金融发展研究,2014,(3):3-10.
[27]盛明泉,车鑫.管理层权力、高管薪酬与公司绩效[J].中央财经大学学报,2016(5):97-104.
[28]祁雨佳.高管特征与公司绩效相关性研究——基于煤业上市公司的经验证据[J].中国市场,2017(1):136-137.
[29]李斌,郭剑桥.高管薪酬与公司绩效关系的实证研究[J].财经问题研究,2013,(11):115-121.
[30]巩娜.高管薪酬差距、控股股东与民营上市公司绩效关系实证分析[J].中央财经大学学报,2015,(7):64-73.
[31]罗华伟,宋侃,干胜道.高管薪酬外部公平性与企业绩效关联性研究——来自中国A股上市房地产公司的证据[J].软科学,2015(1):6-10.
[32]朱滔.董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司未来业绩:监督还是合谋?[J].会计研究,2015,(8):49-56+97.
[33]Demsetz H..The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Law&Economics,1983,26(2):375-390.
[34]Holderness&Sheehan D.P.Sheehan.The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations.[J].Journal of Financial Economies,1988,20:317-346.
[35]Morck R.Shleifer A.and R.W.Vishny.Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economies,1988,20(1-2):293-315.
[36]Mc Connell and H.Servas.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27(2):595-612.
[37]冯根福,蒋文定,黄建山.我国上市公司高管持股角色对公司绩效影响的实证分析[J].宏观经济研究,2012,(4):54-59.
[38]李维安,李汉军.股权结构、高管持股与公司绩效——来自民营上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2006,(5):4-10.
[39]宋建波,高升好,关馨姣.机构投资者持股能提高上市公司盈余持续性吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2012,(2):128-138..
[40]杜勇,刘龙峰,陈建英,叶鸿鸽.政府补助、机构投资者增持与公司亏损逆转程度[J].西南大学学报(社会科学版),2016,42(6):55-65.
[41]孔东民,王江元.机构投资者竞争与公司业绩[J].证券市场导报,2016,(3):11-16.
[42]彭利达,张文霞.机构投资者是现金分红的内生动力吗?——基于异质机构投资者的经验研究[J].财经问题研究,2016,(2):40-45.
[43]Cox P,Brammer S,Millington A..Pension Funds and Corporate Social Performance An Empirical Analysis[J].Business&Society,2007,47(2):213-241.
[44]彭利达.异质机构投资者与上市公司绩效——现金分红的中介作用[J].财经问题研究,2015,(8):50-55.
[45]高群,黄谦.机构投资者持股对内部人控制与盈余管理关系的影响——基于中国上市公司的经验分析[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2010,25(2):52-57.
[46]杨风,李卿云.股权结构与研发投资——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2016,(2):123-135.
[47]王亮.上市公司亏损的制度因素探析[J].管理现代化,2001,(4):47-51.
[48]李青原,刘惠,王红建.机构投资者持股、异质性与股价延迟度研究[J].证券市场导报,2013,(10):24-32.
[49]李争光,赵西卜,曹丰,刘向强.机构投资者异质性与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(3):111-121.
[50]Borokhovich K A,Harman Y S,Brunarski K,Parrino R.Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Stockholders[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2006,40(10):651-680.
[51]王琨,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,(2):27-33.
[52]凌志雄,陶诗慧.机构投资者异质性、公司治理和跨国并购绩效——基于代理成本视角[J].财会月刊,2016(6):27-31.
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[54]叶陈刚,裘丽,张立娟.公司治理结构、内部控制质量与企业财务绩效[J].审计研究,2016,(2):104-112.
[55]韩少真,潘颖,张晓明.公司治理水平与经营业绩——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].中国经济问题,2015,(1):50-62.
[2]姚颐,刘志远.机构投资者具有监督作用吗?[J].金融研究,2009,06:128-143.
[3]田澍,林树,俞乔.新兴市场环境下机构投资者投资行为——基于中国大陆资本市场的研究[J].金融研究,2012,08:139-151.
[4]史永东,王谨乐.中国机构投资者真的稳定市场了吗?[J].经济研究,2014,12:100-112.
[5]Smith M.P..Shareholder Activism By Institutional Investors:Evidence From PERS[J].Journal of Finance,1996,51(1):227-252.
[6]Bertrand,M.,Mullainathan,S..Are CEOs Rewarded For Luck?The Ones Without Principals Are[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(3):901-932.
[7]Bushee,B.J.,Carter,M.E.,and Gerakos,J..Institutional Investor Preferences For Corporate Governance Mechanisms[J].Journal of Management Accounting Research,2013,26(2):123-149.
[8]潘爱玲,潘清.机构投资者持股对公司业绩的影响分析——基于2009—2011年沪深上市公司的实证检验[J].亚太经济,2013,(3):101-104.
[9]Healy,P.M.and Wahlen,J.M..A review of The Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting[J].Accounting Horizons,1999,13(4):365-383.
[10]Ball,R.,and Shivakumar,L..Earnings Quality At Initial Public fferings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,45(2):324-349.
[11]Cotter,J.and Najah,M.M..Stitutional Investor Influence on Global Climate Change Disclosure Practices[J].Australian Journal of Management,2012,39(1):5-34.
[12]杨海燕,韦德洪,孙健.机构投资者持股能提高上市公司会计信息质量吗?——兼论不同类型机构投资者的差异[J].会计研究,2012,(09):16-23+96.
[13]Rajgopal,S.,Venkatachalam,M.,and Jiambalvo,J.J..Is Institutional Ownership Associated With Earnings Management and The Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings?[J].Lancaster University Working Paper,1999,NO.163433.
[14]Jiambalvo,J.,Rajgopal,S.and Venkatachalam,M..Institutional Ownership and The Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2002,19(1):117-145.
[15]Mitra,S.,and Cready,W.M..Institutional Stock Ownership,Accrual Management,and Information Environment[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2005,20(3):257-286.
[16]高雷,张杰.公司治理、机构投资者与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(09):64-72+96.
[17]李延喜,杜瑞,高锐.机构投资者持股比例与上市公司盈余管理的实证研究[J].管理评论,2011(03):39-45+70.
[18]宋建波,高升好,关馨姣.机构投资者持股能提高上市公司盈余持续性吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2012,(2):128-138.
[19]Bai,C.E.,Liu,Q.,Lu,J.,Song,F.M.,and Zhang,J..Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2005,32(4):599-616.
[20]Ajinkya,B.,Bhojraj,S.,and Sengupta,P..The Association Between Outside Directors,Institutional Investors and The Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts[J].Journal of accounting Research,2005,43(3):343-376.
[21]Beasley,M.S..An Empirical Analysis of The Relation Between The Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud[J].Accounting Review,1999,71(4):443-465.
[22]Peasnell,K.V.,Pope,P.F.and Young,S..Board Monitoring and Earnings Management:Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2005,32(7-8):1311-1346.
[23]贺远琼,陈昀.不确定环境中高管团队规模与企业绩效关系的实证研究——基于中国制造业上市公司的证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2009,(2):123-128.
[24]覃家琦.高管规模、代理科层与公司业绩——模型及来自我国上市公司的证据[A].中国管理现代化研究会.第四届(2009)中国管理学年会——会计与财务分会场论文集[C].中国管理现代化研究会,2009:21.
[25]南晓莉,李芊卉.高管团队规模、薪酬差距与公司风险承担研究[J].会计之友,2017,(1):81-88.
[26]石大林,栗婧岩,徐新.高管薪酬、交互效应与公司绩效间的动态关系——基于动态内生性的经验研究[J].金融发展研究,2014,(3):3-10.
[27]盛明泉,车鑫.管理层权力、高管薪酬与公司绩效[J].中央财经大学学报,2016(5):97-104.
[28]祁雨佳.高管特征与公司绩效相关性研究——基于煤业上市公司的经验证据[J].中国市场,2017(1):136-137.
[29]李斌,郭剑桥.高管薪酬与公司绩效关系的实证研究[J].财经问题研究,2013,(11):115-121.
[30]巩娜.高管薪酬差距、控股股东与民营上市公司绩效关系实证分析[J].中央财经大学学报,2015,(7):64-73.
[31]罗华伟,宋侃,干胜道.高管薪酬外部公平性与企业绩效关联性研究——来自中国A股上市房地产公司的证据[J].软科学,2015(1):6-10.
[32]朱滔.董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司未来业绩:监督还是合谋?[J].会计研究,2015,(8):49-56+97.
[33]Demsetz H..The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Law&Economics,1983,26(2):375-390.
[34]Holderness&Sheehan D.P.Sheehan.The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations.[J].Journal of Financial Economies,1988,20:317-346.
[35]Morck R.Shleifer A.and R.W.Vishny.Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economies,1988,20(1-2):293-315.
[36]Mc Connell and H.Servas.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27(2):595-612.
[37]冯根福,蒋文定,黄建山.我国上市公司高管持股角色对公司绩效影响的实证分析[J].宏观经济研究,2012,(4):54-59.
[38]李维安,李汉军.股权结构、高管持股与公司绩效——来自民营上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2006,(5):4-10.
[39]宋建波,高升好,关馨姣.机构投资者持股能提高上市公司盈余持续性吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2012,(2):128-138..
[40]杜勇,刘龙峰,陈建英,叶鸿鸽.政府补助、机构投资者增持与公司亏损逆转程度[J].西南大学学报(社会科学版),2016,42(6):55-65.
[41]孔东民,王江元.机构投资者竞争与公司业绩[J].证券市场导报,2016,(3):11-16.
[42]彭利达,张文霞.机构投资者是现金分红的内生动力吗?——基于异质机构投资者的经验研究[J].财经问题研究,2016,(2):40-45.
[43]Cox P,Brammer S,Millington A..Pension Funds and Corporate Social Performance An Empirical Analysis[J].Business&Society,2007,47(2):213-241.
[44]彭利达.异质机构投资者与上市公司绩效——现金分红的中介作用[J].财经问题研究,2015,(8):50-55.
[45]高群,黄谦.机构投资者持股对内部人控制与盈余管理关系的影响——基于中国上市公司的经验分析[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2010,25(2):52-57.
[46]杨风,李卿云.股权结构与研发投资——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2016,(2):123-135.
[47]王亮.上市公司亏损的制度因素探析[J].管理现代化,2001,(4):47-51.
[48]李青原,刘惠,王红建.机构投资者持股、异质性与股价延迟度研究[J].证券市场导报,2013,(10):24-32.
[49]李争光,赵西卜,曹丰,刘向强.机构投资者异质性与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(3):111-121.
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