沙夫茨伯里“内在形式”说及其道德哲学辨析
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摘要
"内在形式"(inward form)是一个在现代哲学语境里常被忽略的重要观念。但正是基于内在形式这一"活的自然"观,沙夫茨伯里建立起自治而相信情感能力的道德哲学,也建立起以人类内在成形和自我践形即自我教化为核心的审美哲学。沙夫茨伯里对道德感、审美感等自然情感能力的推崇,使理性认知为核心的近代认识论问题在其哲学中较为边缘,也使他的思想长期处在现代道德哲学的主流视野之外。但随着20世纪认知科学的进展,情感能力是人类道德能力的核心得到承认,理性主义道德哲学的根基正在受到动摇。对沙夫茨伯里内在形式说及其哲学话语的探察,为此提供了一条回归问题本源的新路径。
"Inner form" or "inward form" is a concept that is often overlooked in the modern philosophical context. But based on the view of the "living nature" of the "inward form", Shaftesbury establishes not only a kind of moral philosophy of autonomy that believes in emotional capability, but also an aesthetic philosophy of self-formation and self-practice, namely self-cultivation. Shaftesbury's respect for the moral sense, aesthetic sense and other natural emotional ability makes the modern epistemology with rational cognition as the core more marginal in his philosophy, and also keeps his thoughts outside the mainstream of modern moral philosophy for a long time. With the progress of cognitive science in the twentieth century, emotional capability is recognized as the core of the moral competence of human and,the foundation of rationalist moral philosophy has been shaken, which gives us a new vision to research Shaftesbury's moral philosophy.
"Inner form" or "inward form" is a concept that is often overlooked in the modern philosophical context. But based on the view of the "living nature" of the "inward form", Shaftesbury establishes not only a kind of moral philosophy of autonomy that believes in emotional capability, but also an aesthetic philosophy of self-formation and self-practice, namely self-cultivation. Shaftesbury's respect for the moral sense, aesthetic sense and other natural emotional ability makes the modern epistemology with rational cognition as the core more marginal in his philosophy, and also keeps his thoughts outside the mainstream of modern moral philosophy for a long time. With the progress of cognitive science in the twentieth century, emotional capability is recognized as the core of the moral competence of human and,the foundation of rationalist moral philosophy has been shaken, which gives us a new vision to research Shaftesbury's moral philosophy.
引文
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[2] Haidt J.The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail:A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment [J].Psychological Review,2001,108 (4):814-834.
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[4] 张曦.道德能力与情感的首要性[J].哲学研究,2016(5) :121-126.
[5] 沙夫茨伯里.人、风俗、意见与时代之特征[M].赵林,李斯,译.武汉:武汉大学出版社,2010.
[6] Shaftesbury.Characteristics of Men,Manners,Opinions,Times[M].London:Cambridge University Press,1999.
[7] George S.Der Naturbegriff bei Shaftesbury [M].Frankfurt am Main:Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universit?t,1962.
[8] Grossklaus D.Natürliche Religion und aufgekl?rte Gesellschaft:Shaftesburys Verh?ltnis zu den Cambridge Platonists [M].Heidelberg:C.Winter,2000.
[9] Weiser Chr.F.Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben [M].Leipzig:Teubner,1916.
[10] Nussbaum M.C.Upheavals of Thought:The Intelligence of the Emotions [M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.
[11] Greene J.How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?[J].Trends in Cognitive Sciences,2002,6 (12):517-523.
[2] Haidt J.The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail:A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment [J].Psychological Review,2001,108 (4):814-834.
[3] Damasio A.The Feeling of What Happens:Body,Emotion and the Making of Consciousness [M].London:Heinemann,1999.
[4] 张曦.道德能力与情感的首要性[J].哲学研究,2016(5) :121-126.
[5] 沙夫茨伯里.人、风俗、意见与时代之特征[M].赵林,李斯,译.武汉:武汉大学出版社,2010.
[6] Shaftesbury.Characteristics of Men,Manners,Opinions,Times[M].London:Cambridge University Press,1999.
[7] George S.Der Naturbegriff bei Shaftesbury [M].Frankfurt am Main:Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universit?t,1962.
[8] Grossklaus D.Natürliche Religion und aufgekl?rte Gesellschaft:Shaftesburys Verh?ltnis zu den Cambridge Platonists [M].Heidelberg:C.Winter,2000.
[9] Weiser Chr.F.Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben [M].Leipzig:Teubner,1916.
[10] Nussbaum M.C.Upheavals of Thought:The Intelligence of the Emotions [M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.
[11] Greene J.How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?[J].Trends in Cognitive Sciences,2002,6 (12):517-523.