股权激励对中小企业双元创新战略的影响研究
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摘要
设计有效的激励契约以引导高管在资源约束条件下进行理性的技术创新战略选择是提高中小企业创新能力的关键途径。本文采用2007～2014年中国中小上市公司的平衡面板数据,运用均值T检验与多元回归分析等方法实证检验了高管股权激励对中小企业双元性创新战略选择的影响。结果表明:授予高管股权激励的中小企业,自主研发投入水平、突破性创新与渐进性创新水平等均明显高于其他中小企业;在技术创新路径方面,股权激励强度越大,中小企业越倾向于选择内部自主研发,而非外部技术引进;在技术创新模式方面,股权激励强度与突破性创新模式之间存在显著的倒U型关系,这是传统委托代理理论与行为代理模型共同作用的结果。研究结论为创新导向的公司治理制度设计提供了理论借鉴与实践参考。
With the acceleration of technological change and the intensification of market competition,the importance of improving independent innovation capability for Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises has been increasingly prominent. Therefore,how to guide executives to allocate resources rationally to the innovation process is the key to determine the effectiveness of technological innovation in SMEs. From the perspective of synergy between institutional innovation and technological innovation,many scholars have actively explored institutional transformation to promote technological innovation in recent years,especially the corporate governance system that can support innovation. As an important component of the governance system,the impact of equity incentive on technological innovation has also become a matter of concern for scholars. However,most of the current researches focus on how equity incentive to stimulate the innovation willingness of executives. Few researches involve how to guide executives to rationally allocate resources,that is,how to influence the strategic choice of technological innovation.In practice,when enterprises put their willingness of technological innovation into practice,they are faced with an ambidextrous strategic choice of innovation:( 1) in terms of technological innovation path,whether to choose internal independent R&D or external technology introduction?( 2) in terms of technological innovation mode,should they rely mainly on radical innovation or incremental innovation? First of all,internal independent R&D and external technology introduction are both technological innovation behaviors of enterprises,but they are different forms of technological sources for enterprises. Secondly,technological innovation can be divided intoradical innovation and incremental innovation because of the different intensity and objects of technological change. Continuous incremental innovation is an important accumulation of radical innovation. Radical innovation can more easily transform technology into lasting competitive advantages of enterprises and help SMEs to keep up with the pace of market changes. However,the return period of radical innovation is longer and the uncertainty of its output is higher. In reality,many SMEs are apt to fall into the " application trap" because they are persistent in applying existing technologies to obtain short-term benefits. Then,will the equity incentives granted to executives and different intensity of equity incentives have an impact on the technological innovation strategy choices of SMEs in China? How to reasonably guide the executives to make more effective decision for ambidextrous technological innovation strategy through designing equity incentive contracts? This is a common concern in both the field of theory and practice,and it is also as the logical entry point of this article.In view of this,we use the balanced panel data of China's small and medium-sized listed companies from 2007 to 2014 to do theoretical and empirical research on the above issues. There are three theoretical contributions. First of all,from the perspective of synergy between institutional innovation and technological innovation,we explore and interpret the effect of equity incentive on the strategic choice of technological innovation and expand the research perspective of technological innovation-oriented corporate governance system design. Additionally,technological innovation is commonly regarded as a static variable of a single dimension. Based on ambidexterity theory,we divide technological innovation into two dimensions including the path and mode.And we explain the influence way of equity incentive on technological innovation concretely to interpret the internal mechanism of the interaction between the two dimensions so as to provide more beneficial reference for enterprises' practice. Finally,combining the traditional principal-agent theory with the behavioral agency model,the positive correlation between equity incentive and internal independent R&D path and the inverse U-curve hypothesis between equity incentive and radical innovation are proposed and verified,which break through the limitation of linear thinking and provide new empirical evidence for the evolution of the theory.Our primary conclusions and implications are as follows. Firstly,SMEs which awarded executive equity incentives are significantly higher than other SMEs in terms of independent R&D investment level,radical innovation and incremental innovation level. Therefore,under the established institutional environment,equity incentive is an important way to promote SMEs' executives to make reasonable strategic choice of technological innovation so as to improve their technological innovation ability. Secondly,in terms of technological innovation path,the stronger the equity incentive intensity is,the more SMEs tend to choose internal independent R&D rather than external technology introduction. If improving the level of independent R&D is the focus of technological innovation strategy,it is undoubtedly an effective measure to increase the proportion of equity incentive in executive compensation when designing executive incentive contracts. Thirdly,there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentive intensity and radical innovation in term of technological innovation mode,which is the result of the interaction of traditional principal-agent theory and behavioral agent model. Owing to the dual characteristics of " risk aversion" and " loss aversion",the promotion effect of equity incentive on radical innovation does not always exist. When the intensity of equity incentive exceeds the optimal value,it restrains radical innovation. Therefore,reasonable design of equity incentive intensity and contract structure considering different institutional factors is the key to improve the radical innovation level of small and medium-sized enterprises.We introduce ambidexterity theory to corporate governance research,and focus on the choice of path and mode of technological innovation in order to explore the specific ways in which equity incentives affect technological innovation systematically. Although some domestic scholars have used different samples to come to the conclusion that equity incentives can promote enterprises' innovation ability,but they mostly ignored the process of technological innovation. In addition,we combine the traditional principal-agent theory with behavioral agency model,and introduced the two theory into technological innovation research. The non-linear relationship between equity incentive and radical innovation is proposed and confirmed,which is consistent with the similar conclusions drawn by Martin et al.( 2013) and Baixauli-Soler et al.( 2015). But they used risk-taking as a dependent variable. Based on all above,the following research will further discuss the multi-level constitutional factors that affect the strength of equity incentive and the structural design of equity incentive contracts that promote technological innovation in enterprises,so as to provide more abundant empirical evidence for theory and practice.
With the acceleration of technological change and the intensification of market competition,the importance of improving independent innovation capability for Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises has been increasingly prominent. Therefore,how to guide executives to allocate resources rationally to the innovation process is the key to determine the effectiveness of technological innovation in SMEs. From the perspective of synergy between institutional innovation and technological innovation,many scholars have actively explored institutional transformation to promote technological innovation in recent years,especially the corporate governance system that can support innovation. As an important component of the governance system,the impact of equity incentive on technological innovation has also become a matter of concern for scholars. However,most of the current researches focus on how equity incentive to stimulate the innovation willingness of executives. Few researches involve how to guide executives to rationally allocate resources,that is,how to influence the strategic choice of technological innovation.In practice,when enterprises put their willingness of technological innovation into practice,they are faced with an ambidextrous strategic choice of innovation:( 1) in terms of technological innovation path,whether to choose internal independent R&D or external technology introduction?( 2) in terms of technological innovation mode,should they rely mainly on radical innovation or incremental innovation? First of all,internal independent R&D and external technology introduction are both technological innovation behaviors of enterprises,but they are different forms of technological sources for enterprises. Secondly,technological innovation can be divided intoradical innovation and incremental innovation because of the different intensity and objects of technological change. Continuous incremental innovation is an important accumulation of radical innovation. Radical innovation can more easily transform technology into lasting competitive advantages of enterprises and help SMEs to keep up with the pace of market changes. However,the return period of radical innovation is longer and the uncertainty of its output is higher. In reality,many SMEs are apt to fall into the " application trap" because they are persistent in applying existing technologies to obtain short-term benefits. Then,will the equity incentives granted to executives and different intensity of equity incentives have an impact on the technological innovation strategy choices of SMEs in China? How to reasonably guide the executives to make more effective decision for ambidextrous technological innovation strategy through designing equity incentive contracts? This is a common concern in both the field of theory and practice,and it is also as the logical entry point of this article.In view of this,we use the balanced panel data of China's small and medium-sized listed companies from 2007 to 2014 to do theoretical and empirical research on the above issues. There are three theoretical contributions. First of all,from the perspective of synergy between institutional innovation and technological innovation,we explore and interpret the effect of equity incentive on the strategic choice of technological innovation and expand the research perspective of technological innovation-oriented corporate governance system design. Additionally,technological innovation is commonly regarded as a static variable of a single dimension. Based on ambidexterity theory,we divide technological innovation into two dimensions including the path and mode.And we explain the influence way of equity incentive on technological innovation concretely to interpret the internal mechanism of the interaction between the two dimensions so as to provide more beneficial reference for enterprises' practice. Finally,combining the traditional principal-agent theory with the behavioral agency model,the positive correlation between equity incentive and internal independent R&D path and the inverse U-curve hypothesis between equity incentive and radical innovation are proposed and verified,which break through the limitation of linear thinking and provide new empirical evidence for the evolution of the theory.Our primary conclusions and implications are as follows. Firstly,SMEs which awarded executive equity incentives are significantly higher than other SMEs in terms of independent R&D investment level,radical innovation and incremental innovation level. Therefore,under the established institutional environment,equity incentive is an important way to promote SMEs' executives to make reasonable strategic choice of technological innovation so as to improve their technological innovation ability. Secondly,in terms of technological innovation path,the stronger the equity incentive intensity is,the more SMEs tend to choose internal independent R&D rather than external technology introduction. If improving the level of independent R&D is the focus of technological innovation strategy,it is undoubtedly an effective measure to increase the proportion of equity incentive in executive compensation when designing executive incentive contracts. Thirdly,there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentive intensity and radical innovation in term of technological innovation mode,which is the result of the interaction of traditional principal-agent theory and behavioral agent model. Owing to the dual characteristics of " risk aversion" and " loss aversion",the promotion effect of equity incentive on radical innovation does not always exist. When the intensity of equity incentive exceeds the optimal value,it restrains radical innovation. Therefore,reasonable design of equity incentive intensity and contract structure considering different institutional factors is the key to improve the radical innovation level of small and medium-sized enterprises.We introduce ambidexterity theory to corporate governance research,and focus on the choice of path and mode of technological innovation in order to explore the specific ways in which equity incentives affect technological innovation systematically. Although some domestic scholars have used different samples to come to the conclusion that equity incentives can promote enterprises' innovation ability,but they mostly ignored the process of technological innovation. In addition,we combine the traditional principal-agent theory with behavioral agency model,and introduced the two theory into technological innovation research. The non-linear relationship between equity incentive and radical innovation is proposed and confirmed,which is consistent with the similar conclusions drawn by Martin et al.( 2013) and Baixauli-Soler et al.( 2015). But they used risk-taking as a dependent variable. Based on all above,the following research will further discuss the multi-level constitutional factors that affect the strength of equity incentive and the structural design of equity incentive contracts that promote technological innovation in enterprises,so as to provide more abundant empirical evidence for theory and practice.
引文
[1]Barker V.L.,Mueller G.C.CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending[J].Management Science,2002,48(6):782-801.
[2]Alessandri T M,Pattit J M.Drivers of R&D investment:The interaction of behavioral theory and managerial incentives[J].Journal of Business Research,2014,67(2):151-158.
[3]徐宁,徐向艺.技术创新导向的高管激励整合效应---基于高科技上市公司的实证研究[J].科研管理,2013(9):46-53.Xu Ning,Xu Xiangyi.The integrated effect of executive incentives on technology innovation-Empirical research based on high-tech listed companies[J].Science Research Management,2013,34(9):46-53
[4]Currim I S,Lim J,Kim J W.You get what you pay for:The effect of top executives’compensation on advertising and R&D spending decisions and stock market return[J].Journal of Marketing,2012,76(5):33-48.
[5]Baranchuk N,Kieschnick R,Moussawi R.Motivating innovation in newly public firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2014,111(3):578-588.
[6]崔淼,苏敬勤.技术引进与自主创新的协同:理论和案例[J].管理科学,2013(2):01-12.Cui Miao,Su Jingqin.Synergy between technology introduction and independent innovation:Theory and a case study[J].Journal of Management Science,2013,26(2):01-12.
[7]Cheng S.R&D expenditures and CEO compensation[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):305-328.
[8]陈劲,郑刚.创新管理:赢得持续竞争优势[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2013:48.Chen Jin,Zheng Gang.Innovation management:Gaining the sustainable competitive advantage[M].Beijing:Peking University Press,2013:48.
[9]Ciftci M,Lev B,Radhakrishnan S.Is research and development mispriced or properly risk adjusted?[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2011,26(1):81-116.
[10]Balkin D B,Gomez-Mejia L R.Is CEO pay in high-technology firms related to innovation?[J].Academy of Management Journal,2000,46(6):1118-1129.
[11]Lerner J,Wulf J.Innovation and incentives:Evidence from corporate R&D[J].Review of Economics&Statistics,2007,89(4):634-644.
[12]Xu C,Yan M.Radical or incremental innovations:R&D investment around CEO retirement[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2014,29(4):547-576.
[13]马富萍.高管持股与技术创新的相关性研究:基于文献综述[J].科技管理研究,2009(11):298-300.Ma Fuping.Research on the relationship between top management’stockholding and technological innovation:Based on literature review[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2009(11):298-300.
[14]Dong J,Gou Y.Corporate governance structure,managerial discretion,and the R&D investment in China[J].International Review of Economics&Finance,2010,19(2):180-188.
[15]Hellmann T,Thiele V.Incentives and innovation:A multitasking approach[J].American Economic Journal:Microeconomics,2011,3(1):78-128.
[16]Clinch G.Employee compensation and firms’research and development activity[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(1):59-78.
[17]Xue Y.Make or buy new technology:The role of CEO compensation contract in a firm’s route to innovation[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2007,12(4):659-690.
[18]Czarnitzki D,Kraft K.Management control and innovative activity[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2004,24(1):1-24.
[19]Wu J,Tu R.CEO stock option pay and R&D spending:Abehavioral agency explanation[J].Journal of Business Research,2007,60(5):482-492.
[20]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Governance,residual claims and organizational forms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[21]Wiseman R M,Gomez-Mejia L R.A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking[J].Academy of Management Review,1998,23(1):133-153.
[22]Martin G P,Gomez-Mejia L R,Wiseman R M.Executive stock options as mixed gambles:Revisiting the behavioral agency model[J].Academy of Management Journal,2013,56(2):451-472.
[23]Baixauli-Soler J S,Belda-Ruiz M,Sanchez-Marin G.Executive stock options,gender diversity in the top management team,and firm risk taking[J].Journal of Business Research,2015,28(2):451-463.
[24]Lim E N K.The role of reference point in CEO restricted stock and its impact on R&D intensity in high-technology firms[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,36(6):872-889.
[25]Cabrales A L,Medina C C,Lavado A C,et al.Managing functional diversity,risk taking and incentives for teams to achieve radical innovations[J].R&D Management,2008,38(1):35-50.
[26]Song X M,Montoya-Weiss M M.Critical development activities for really new versus incremental products[J].Journal of Product Innovation Management,1998,15(2):124-135.
[27]王燕妮.高管激励对研发投入的影响研究---基于我国制造业上市公司的实证检验[J].科学学研究,2011(7):1071-1078.Wang Yanni.The Influence of top management incentive on R&D investment-Evidence from listed manufacturing companies in China[J].Studies in Science of Science,2011,29(7):1071-1078.
[28]巩娜.股权激励对于我国民营企业研发投入的影响---以控股股东及行业为调节变量[J].经济管理,2013(7):65-73.Gong Na.The effect of equity incentive plan on the R&D input of private listed company-Based on the moderator of controlling shareholder and industry[J].Economic Management,2013,35(7):65-73.
[29]谭洪涛,袁晓星,杨小娟.股权激励促进了企业创新吗?---来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].研究与发展管理,2016(2):01-11.Tan Hongtao,Yuan Xiaoxing,Yang Xiaojuan.Does equity incentive enhance firm innovation?-Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies[J].R&D Management,2016,28(2):01-11.
(1)对于在沪深主板上市的中小规模上市公司的筛选,严格遵循工业和信息化部、国家统计局、发展改革委、财政部等部门2011年联合颁发的《中小企业标准暂行规定》。该规定从从业人员、营业收入、资产总额三个方面,按照行业差异设定了不同的划分标准。
(1)本文将未授予高管股权激励的中小上市公司,界定为自2007~2014年八年来高管持股比例之和为0的中小上市公司。
[2]Alessandri T M,Pattit J M.Drivers of R&D investment:The interaction of behavioral theory and managerial incentives[J].Journal of Business Research,2014,67(2):151-158.
[3]徐宁,徐向艺.技术创新导向的高管激励整合效应---基于高科技上市公司的实证研究[J].科研管理,2013(9):46-53.Xu Ning,Xu Xiangyi.The integrated effect of executive incentives on technology innovation-Empirical research based on high-tech listed companies[J].Science Research Management,2013,34(9):46-53
[4]Currim I S,Lim J,Kim J W.You get what you pay for:The effect of top executives’compensation on advertising and R&D spending decisions and stock market return[J].Journal of Marketing,2012,76(5):33-48.
[5]Baranchuk N,Kieschnick R,Moussawi R.Motivating innovation in newly public firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2014,111(3):578-588.
[6]崔淼,苏敬勤.技术引进与自主创新的协同:理论和案例[J].管理科学,2013(2):01-12.Cui Miao,Su Jingqin.Synergy between technology introduction and independent innovation:Theory and a case study[J].Journal of Management Science,2013,26(2):01-12.
[7]Cheng S.R&D expenditures and CEO compensation[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):305-328.
[8]陈劲,郑刚.创新管理:赢得持续竞争优势[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2013:48.Chen Jin,Zheng Gang.Innovation management:Gaining the sustainable competitive advantage[M].Beijing:Peking University Press,2013:48.
[9]Ciftci M,Lev B,Radhakrishnan S.Is research and development mispriced or properly risk adjusted?[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2011,26(1):81-116.
[10]Balkin D B,Gomez-Mejia L R.Is CEO pay in high-technology firms related to innovation?[J].Academy of Management Journal,2000,46(6):1118-1129.
[11]Lerner J,Wulf J.Innovation and incentives:Evidence from corporate R&D[J].Review of Economics&Statistics,2007,89(4):634-644.
[12]Xu C,Yan M.Radical or incremental innovations:R&D investment around CEO retirement[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2014,29(4):547-576.
[13]马富萍.高管持股与技术创新的相关性研究:基于文献综述[J].科技管理研究,2009(11):298-300.Ma Fuping.Research on the relationship between top management’stockholding and technological innovation:Based on literature review[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2009(11):298-300.
[14]Dong J,Gou Y.Corporate governance structure,managerial discretion,and the R&D investment in China[J].International Review of Economics&Finance,2010,19(2):180-188.
[15]Hellmann T,Thiele V.Incentives and innovation:A multitasking approach[J].American Economic Journal:Microeconomics,2011,3(1):78-128.
[16]Clinch G.Employee compensation and firms’research and development activity[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(1):59-78.
[17]Xue Y.Make or buy new technology:The role of CEO compensation contract in a firm’s route to innovation[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2007,12(4):659-690.
[18]Czarnitzki D,Kraft K.Management control and innovative activity[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2004,24(1):1-24.
[19]Wu J,Tu R.CEO stock option pay and R&D spending:Abehavioral agency explanation[J].Journal of Business Research,2007,60(5):482-492.
[20]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Governance,residual claims and organizational forms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[21]Wiseman R M,Gomez-Mejia L R.A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking[J].Academy of Management Review,1998,23(1):133-153.
[22]Martin G P,Gomez-Mejia L R,Wiseman R M.Executive stock options as mixed gambles:Revisiting the behavioral agency model[J].Academy of Management Journal,2013,56(2):451-472.
[23]Baixauli-Soler J S,Belda-Ruiz M,Sanchez-Marin G.Executive stock options,gender diversity in the top management team,and firm risk taking[J].Journal of Business Research,2015,28(2):451-463.
[24]Lim E N K.The role of reference point in CEO restricted stock and its impact on R&D intensity in high-technology firms[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,36(6):872-889.
[25]Cabrales A L,Medina C C,Lavado A C,et al.Managing functional diversity,risk taking and incentives for teams to achieve radical innovations[J].R&D Management,2008,38(1):35-50.
[26]Song X M,Montoya-Weiss M M.Critical development activities for really new versus incremental products[J].Journal of Product Innovation Management,1998,15(2):124-135.
[27]王燕妮.高管激励对研发投入的影响研究---基于我国制造业上市公司的实证检验[J].科学学研究,2011(7):1071-1078.Wang Yanni.The Influence of top management incentive on R&D investment-Evidence from listed manufacturing companies in China[J].Studies in Science of Science,2011,29(7):1071-1078.
[28]巩娜.股权激励对于我国民营企业研发投入的影响---以控股股东及行业为调节变量[J].经济管理,2013(7):65-73.Gong Na.The effect of equity incentive plan on the R&D input of private listed company-Based on the moderator of controlling shareholder and industry[J].Economic Management,2013,35(7):65-73.
[29]谭洪涛,袁晓星,杨小娟.股权激励促进了企业创新吗?---来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].研究与发展管理,2016(2):01-11.Tan Hongtao,Yuan Xiaoxing,Yang Xiaojuan.Does equity incentive enhance firm innovation?-Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies[J].R&D Management,2016,28(2):01-11.
(1)对于在沪深主板上市的中小规模上市公司的筛选,严格遵循工业和信息化部、国家统计局、发展改革委、财政部等部门2011年联合颁发的《中小企业标准暂行规定》。该规定从从业人员、营业收入、资产总额三个方面,按照行业差异设定了不同的划分标准。
(1)本文将未授予高管股权激励的中小上市公司,界定为自2007~2014年八年来高管持股比例之和为0的中小上市公司。