交叉网络外部性、平台异质性与对角兼并的圈定效应
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摘要
对角兼并是一种有别于纵向兼并的特殊兼并模式,虽然形式上类似于纵向兼并,但在双边市场中二者的反竞争效应有很大差异。考察在平台异质性和交叉网络外部性的双重作用下,平台对角兼并行为的市场圈定效应,并对谷歌与Double Click并购案进行剖析。平台异质性程度增强会加强对角兼并对关键性投入品价格上升的作用,交叉网络外部性则会进一步加剧对角兼并对竞争性平台利润的侵蚀,最终形成市场圈定效应。研究结果为针对平台对角兼并行为的反垄断审查提供理论依据。
Diagonal merger is a special merger mode that is different from vertical merger. Although diagonal merger looks similar to vertical merger,the anti-competitive effects of them are quite different in two-sided markets. This paper studies the market foreclosure effect of platform diagonal merger under the dual role of platform heterogeneity and crossnetwork externality,and analyzes the merger case of Google-Double Click. The results show that the heterogeneity of the platform will enhance the raising prices effect of diagonal mergers on key inputs,and the cross-network externality will further aggravate the erosion of profits of competitive platforms by diagonal mergers,which finally form the market foreclosure effect.This paper can provide a theoretical basis for antitrust review of diagonal mergers of platforms in two-sided markets.
Diagonal merger is a special merger mode that is different from vertical merger. Although diagonal merger looks similar to vertical merger,the anti-competitive effects of them are quite different in two-sided markets. This paper studies the market foreclosure effect of platform diagonal merger under the dual role of platform heterogeneity and crossnetwork externality,and analyzes the merger case of Google-Double Click. The results show that the heterogeneity of the platform will enhance the raising prices effect of diagonal mergers on key inputs,and the cross-network externality will further aggravate the erosion of profits of competitive platforms by diagonal mergers,which finally form the market foreclosure effect.This paper can provide a theoretical basis for antitrust review of diagonal mergers of platforms in two-sided markets.
引文
[1]孙晋,范舟.欧盟《非横向合并评估指南》评析——兼论对我国非横向合并反垄断法规制的启示[J].经济法研究,2010年第9卷:268-289.
[2]吴汉洪,周孝.双边平台横向并购的福利效应:基于文献的评论[J].中国人民大学学报,2017(2):146-156.
[3]TREMBLAY V J,TREMBLAY C H.Horizontal,vertical,and conglomerate mergers[M]//TREMBLAY V J,TREMBLAY C H.New perspectives on industrial organization.New York:Springer,c2012:521-566.
[4]GORE D,LEWIS S,LOFARO A,et al.The economic assessment of mergers under European competition law[M].Cambridge,UK:Cambridge University Press,2013.
[5]PROCTOR A.Conglomerate mergers:comparison with vertical foreclosure[J].World competition,2015,4(38):571-596.
[6]HIGGINS R S.Diagonal merger[J].Review of industrial organization,1997,12(4):609-623.
[7]GABRIELSEN T S.Conglomerate mergers:vertical mergers in disguise[J].International journal of the economics of business,2003,10(1):1-16.
[8]MORTON F M S,SHAPIRO C.Strategic patent acquisitions[J].Antitrust law journal,2014,79(2):463-499.
[9]HOVENKAMP E,COTTER T F.Anticompetitive patent injunctions[J].Minnesota law review,2016,100(3):871-920.
[10]刘海飞,许金涛.互联网异质性财经新闻对股市的影响——来自中国互联网数据与上市公司的证据[J].产业经济研究,2017(1):76-88.
[11]BARROS P P,KIND H J,NILSSEN T,et al.Media competition on the internet[R].Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration discussion paper,2004,No.21.
[12]KIND H J,NILSSEN T,SRGARD L.Inter-firm price coordination in a two-sided market[J].International journal of industrial organization,2016,44:101-112.
[13]闫雪凌,林建浩.产品竞争中的策略互动行为特征——基于我国三大省级卫视的实证研究[J].产业经济研究,2017(5):62-74.
[14]万兴,高觉民.纵向差异化双边市场中平台策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013(4):934-941.
[15]纪汉霖,王小芳.平台差异化且用户部分多归属的双边市场竞争[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014(6):1398-1406.
[16]王亚楠,朱弋.平台型垄断企业经营模式研究——以中国互联网公司为例[J].南京财经大学学报,2016(5):17-24.
[17]LEE R S.Vertical integration and exclusivity in platform and two-sided markets[J].American economic review,2013,103(7):2960-3000.
[18]POUYET J,TRGOUT T.Vertical mergers in platform markets[R].CEPR discussion papers,2016,No.11703.
[19]万兴,杨晶.互联网平台选择、纵向一体化与企业绩效[J].中国工业经济,2017(7):156-174.
[20]曲振涛,周正,周方召.网络外部性下的电子商务平台竞争与规制——基于双边市场理论的研究[J].中国工业经济,2010(4):120-129.
[21]王小芳,纪汉霖.用户部分多归属条件下双边市场平台纵向一体化策略[J].系统工程,2011(3):21-26.
[22]EVANS D.Economics of vertical restraints for multi-sided platforms[J].Competition policy international,2013,9(1):66-89.
[23]傅联英,骆品亮.开放还是封闭:基于利润比较的支付平台转型策略研究[J].南方经济,2016(3):36-53.
[24]LI Z X,AGARWAL A.Platform integration and demand spillovers in complementary markets:evidence from Facebook's integration of Instagram[J].Management science,2016,63(10):3438-3458.
[25]曲创,刘洪波.平台非中立性策略的圈定效应——基于搜索引擎市场的试验研究[J].经济学动态,2017(1):28-40.
[26]ROCHET J C,TIROLE J.Two-sided markets:an overview[R].IDEI working paper,2004.
[27]RYSMAN M.Competition between networks:a study of the market for yellow pages[J].Review of economic studies,2004,71(2):483-512.
[28]RYSMAN M.An empirical analysis of payment card usage[J].Journal of industrial economics,2007,55(1):1-36.
[29]PRIEGER J E,HU W M.An empirical analysis of indirect network effects in the home video game market[R].NET institute working paper,2006,No.06-25.
[30]VAN CAYSEELE P,VANORMELINGEN S.Prices and network effects in two-sided markets:the Belgian newspaper industry[R].Working paper for Hogeschool-universiteit Brussel,faculteit economie en management,2009,No.2009/06.
[31]傅联英.银行卡支付平台双边市场特征识别与测度[J].商业研究,2013(6):125-132.
[32]EVANS D S,NOEL M D.The analysis of mergers that involve multisided platform businesses[J].Journal of competition law and economics,2008,4(3):663-695.
[33]CHIOU L.Vertical integration and antitrust in search markets[J].Journal of law,economics,and organization,2017,33(4):653-685.
[34]尚秀芬,陈宏民.双边市场特征的企业竞争策略与规制研究综述[J].产业经济研究,2009(4):89-94.
[35]李海舰,田跃新,李文杰.互联网思维与传统企业再造[J].中国工业经济,2014(10):135-146.
(1)北京中长石基信息技术股份有限公司是中国酒店信息系统专业服务的领导者,网址:http://www.shijigroup.com/zh-cn/about-us/s hiji.aspx。合并信息详见凤凰财经报道,网址:http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20141103/13243579_0.shtml。
(2)广东粤科软件工程有限公司专注于为票务及电影行业提供整体解决方案,网址:http://www.ykse.com.cn/us.html。合并信息详见虎嗅网报道,网址:https://www.huxiu.com/article/113329.html。
(3)欧盟委员会调查谷歌并购Double Click案:Case/M.4731-Google/Double Click;美国联邦贸易委员会调查谷歌并购Double Click案:Google&Double Click,FTC File No.071-0170。
(4)欧盟委员会调查谷歌并购摩托罗拉移动案:Case/M.6381-Google/Motorola Mobility;美国联邦贸易委员会调查谷歌并购摩托罗拉移动案:Motorola Mobility&Google,FTC File No.121-0120。
(5)Tremblay and Tremblay[3]把兼并分为横向兼并、纵向兼并和混合兼并(Conglomerate Mergers);欧盟委员会认为兼并模式分为横向兼并和非横向兼并,非横向兼并分为纵向和混合两类;Gore et al.[4]把兼并分为横向兼并和非横向兼并,其中非横向兼并包含纵向兼并和混合兼并;并认为对角兼并是混合兼并的一种特殊类型。但是东南非共同市场兼并指南把非横向兼并宽泛地分为三种类型:纵向兼并、对角兼并和混合兼并;Proctor[5]也认为对角兼并不等同于混合兼并。
(6)Gore et al.[4]、Higgins[6]、Gabrielsen[7]、Morton and Shapiro[8]、Hovenkamp and Cotter[9]从不同角度分析了对角兼并策略,都认为对角兼并策略具有市场圈定效应,这也为本文研究对角兼并的市场圈定效应提供了夯实的理论基础。
(7)参照Rochet and Tirole[26]中关于利润函数的设定,以及对利润函数的求解方法。
(8)Rysman[27]测算出黄页市场中广告数量对消费者和消费者数量对广告商的交叉网络外部性分别为0.154、0.564。Rysman[28]测算出了四大卡组织Visa、Master Card、American Express、Discover的交叉网络外部性分别为0.036、-0.008、0.02、0.021。
(9)在在线广告中存在发行商/网站经营商(Publishers)和广告商(Advertisers)。发行商在其经营的网站上售卖广告空间,从而获取收益。广告商则通过购买广告空间来展示其广告(Advertisements)。
(10)欧盟委员会分析的对象主要是搜索广告和非搜索广告;分类广告占比比较小,尚未纳入分析。搜索广告主要是直接销售,非搜索广告主要通过广告交易平台进行间接销售。
(11)谷歌在线广告分为Ad Words(搜索广告)和Ad Sense(非搜索广告)。欧盟委员为认为兼并会使Ad Sense受益,实际上会使Ad Words受益。
(12)随着技术的成熟和用户行为数据积累和大数据的运用,搜索广告和非搜索广告在显示形式和精准性上的差距在不断缩小,搜索广告和非搜索广告之间具有较强的替代关系。
(13)Evans and Noel[32]也认为在双边市场中Google与Double Click兼并会致使谷歌提高关键性投入品的价格。
(14)搜索引擎Bing在2009年才由微软推出,因此本文尚未统计其数据。
(15)中国商务部认定该项合并具有排除、限制竞争的影响,并专门附加了严厉的补救措施。商务部公告2012年第25号文件关于附加限制性条件批准谷歌收购摩托罗拉移动经营者集中反垄断审查决定的公告。网址:http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/c/201205/20120508134325.html。
[2]吴汉洪,周孝.双边平台横向并购的福利效应:基于文献的评论[J].中国人民大学学报,2017(2):146-156.
[3]TREMBLAY V J,TREMBLAY C H.Horizontal,vertical,and conglomerate mergers[M]//TREMBLAY V J,TREMBLAY C H.New perspectives on industrial organization.New York:Springer,c2012:521-566.
[4]GORE D,LEWIS S,LOFARO A,et al.The economic assessment of mergers under European competition law[M].Cambridge,UK:Cambridge University Press,2013.
[5]PROCTOR A.Conglomerate mergers:comparison with vertical foreclosure[J].World competition,2015,4(38):571-596.
[6]HIGGINS R S.Diagonal merger[J].Review of industrial organization,1997,12(4):609-623.
[7]GABRIELSEN T S.Conglomerate mergers:vertical mergers in disguise[J].International journal of the economics of business,2003,10(1):1-16.
[8]MORTON F M S,SHAPIRO C.Strategic patent acquisitions[J].Antitrust law journal,2014,79(2):463-499.
[9]HOVENKAMP E,COTTER T F.Anticompetitive patent injunctions[J].Minnesota law review,2016,100(3):871-920.
[10]刘海飞,许金涛.互联网异质性财经新闻对股市的影响——来自中国互联网数据与上市公司的证据[J].产业经济研究,2017(1):76-88.
[11]BARROS P P,KIND H J,NILSSEN T,et al.Media competition on the internet[R].Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration discussion paper,2004,No.21.
[12]KIND H J,NILSSEN T,SRGARD L.Inter-firm price coordination in a two-sided market[J].International journal of industrial organization,2016,44:101-112.
[13]闫雪凌,林建浩.产品竞争中的策略互动行为特征——基于我国三大省级卫视的实证研究[J].产业经济研究,2017(5):62-74.
[14]万兴,高觉民.纵向差异化双边市场中平台策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013(4):934-941.
[15]纪汉霖,王小芳.平台差异化且用户部分多归属的双边市场竞争[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014(6):1398-1406.
[16]王亚楠,朱弋.平台型垄断企业经营模式研究——以中国互联网公司为例[J].南京财经大学学报,2016(5):17-24.
[17]LEE R S.Vertical integration and exclusivity in platform and two-sided markets[J].American economic review,2013,103(7):2960-3000.
[18]POUYET J,TRGOUT T.Vertical mergers in platform markets[R].CEPR discussion papers,2016,No.11703.
[19]万兴,杨晶.互联网平台选择、纵向一体化与企业绩效[J].中国工业经济,2017(7):156-174.
[20]曲振涛,周正,周方召.网络外部性下的电子商务平台竞争与规制——基于双边市场理论的研究[J].中国工业经济,2010(4):120-129.
[21]王小芳,纪汉霖.用户部分多归属条件下双边市场平台纵向一体化策略[J].系统工程,2011(3):21-26.
[22]EVANS D.Economics of vertical restraints for multi-sided platforms[J].Competition policy international,2013,9(1):66-89.
[23]傅联英,骆品亮.开放还是封闭:基于利润比较的支付平台转型策略研究[J].南方经济,2016(3):36-53.
[24]LI Z X,AGARWAL A.Platform integration and demand spillovers in complementary markets:evidence from Facebook's integration of Instagram[J].Management science,2016,63(10):3438-3458.
[25]曲创,刘洪波.平台非中立性策略的圈定效应——基于搜索引擎市场的试验研究[J].经济学动态,2017(1):28-40.
[26]ROCHET J C,TIROLE J.Two-sided markets:an overview[R].IDEI working paper,2004.
[27]RYSMAN M.Competition between networks:a study of the market for yellow pages[J].Review of economic studies,2004,71(2):483-512.
[28]RYSMAN M.An empirical analysis of payment card usage[J].Journal of industrial economics,2007,55(1):1-36.
[29]PRIEGER J E,HU W M.An empirical analysis of indirect network effects in the home video game market[R].NET institute working paper,2006,No.06-25.
[30]VAN CAYSEELE P,VANORMELINGEN S.Prices and network effects in two-sided markets:the Belgian newspaper industry[R].Working paper for Hogeschool-universiteit Brussel,faculteit economie en management,2009,No.2009/06.
[31]傅联英.银行卡支付平台双边市场特征识别与测度[J].商业研究,2013(6):125-132.
[32]EVANS D S,NOEL M D.The analysis of mergers that involve multisided platform businesses[J].Journal of competition law and economics,2008,4(3):663-695.
[33]CHIOU L.Vertical integration and antitrust in search markets[J].Journal of law,economics,and organization,2017,33(4):653-685.
[34]尚秀芬,陈宏民.双边市场特征的企业竞争策略与规制研究综述[J].产业经济研究,2009(4):89-94.
[35]李海舰,田跃新,李文杰.互联网思维与传统企业再造[J].中国工业经济,2014(10):135-146.
(1)北京中长石基信息技术股份有限公司是中国酒店信息系统专业服务的领导者,网址:http://www.shijigroup.com/zh-cn/about-us/s hiji.aspx。合并信息详见凤凰财经报道,网址:http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20141103/13243579_0.shtml。
(2)广东粤科软件工程有限公司专注于为票务及电影行业提供整体解决方案,网址:http://www.ykse.com.cn/us.html。合并信息详见虎嗅网报道,网址:https://www.huxiu.com/article/113329.html。
(3)欧盟委员会调查谷歌并购Double Click案:Case/M.4731-Google/Double Click;美国联邦贸易委员会调查谷歌并购Double Click案:Google&Double Click,FTC File No.071-0170。
(4)欧盟委员会调查谷歌并购摩托罗拉移动案:Case/M.6381-Google/Motorola Mobility;美国联邦贸易委员会调查谷歌并购摩托罗拉移动案:Motorola Mobility&Google,FTC File No.121-0120。
(5)Tremblay and Tremblay[3]把兼并分为横向兼并、纵向兼并和混合兼并(Conglomerate Mergers);欧盟委员会认为兼并模式分为横向兼并和非横向兼并,非横向兼并分为纵向和混合两类;Gore et al.[4]把兼并分为横向兼并和非横向兼并,其中非横向兼并包含纵向兼并和混合兼并;并认为对角兼并是混合兼并的一种特殊类型。但是东南非共同市场兼并指南把非横向兼并宽泛地分为三种类型:纵向兼并、对角兼并和混合兼并;Proctor[5]也认为对角兼并不等同于混合兼并。
(6)Gore et al.[4]、Higgins[6]、Gabrielsen[7]、Morton and Shapiro[8]、Hovenkamp and Cotter[9]从不同角度分析了对角兼并策略,都认为对角兼并策略具有市场圈定效应,这也为本文研究对角兼并的市场圈定效应提供了夯实的理论基础。
(7)参照Rochet and Tirole[26]中关于利润函数的设定,以及对利润函数的求解方法。
(8)Rysman[27]测算出黄页市场中广告数量对消费者和消费者数量对广告商的交叉网络外部性分别为0.154、0.564。Rysman[28]测算出了四大卡组织Visa、Master Card、American Express、Discover的交叉网络外部性分别为0.036、-0.008、0.02、0.021。
(9)在在线广告中存在发行商/网站经营商(Publishers)和广告商(Advertisers)。发行商在其经营的网站上售卖广告空间,从而获取收益。广告商则通过购买广告空间来展示其广告(Advertisements)。
(10)欧盟委员会分析的对象主要是搜索广告和非搜索广告;分类广告占比比较小,尚未纳入分析。搜索广告主要是直接销售,非搜索广告主要通过广告交易平台进行间接销售。
(11)谷歌在线广告分为Ad Words(搜索广告)和Ad Sense(非搜索广告)。欧盟委员为认为兼并会使Ad Sense受益,实际上会使Ad Words受益。
(12)随着技术的成熟和用户行为数据积累和大数据的运用,搜索广告和非搜索广告在显示形式和精准性上的差距在不断缩小,搜索广告和非搜索广告之间具有较强的替代关系。
(13)Evans and Noel[32]也认为在双边市场中Google与Double Click兼并会致使谷歌提高关键性投入品的价格。
(14)搜索引擎Bing在2009年才由微软推出,因此本文尚未统计其数据。
(15)中国商务部认定该项合并具有排除、限制竞争的影响,并专门附加了严厉的补救措施。商务部公告2012年第25号文件关于附加限制性条件批准谷歌收购摩托罗拉移动经营者集中反垄断审查决定的公告。网址:http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/c/201205/20120508134325.html。