管理者从军经历与政府补助——基于慈善捐赠和冗余雇员的双重视角
|
摘要
管理者独特的背景经历会影响企业战略决策及经营绩效。文章以2009–2015年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验管理者从军经历对企业获取政府补助的影响,并从慈善捐赠及冗余雇员的视角,探讨从军经历管理者获得政府补助的来源路径。文章进一步分析了管理者从军经历与在职消费的关系,结果显示从军经历显著降低管理层在职消费。所得结论为:具有从军经历的管理者通过慈善捐赠的路径显著促进了政府补助,而冗余雇员与管理者从军经历存在显著负相关关系,并未在管理者从军经历与政府补助间起到中介作用;具有从军经历的管理者倾向于通过慈善捐赠的方式来承担社会责任并建立良好的政企关系,在维护社会公共利益的同时能够为企业赢取更多的利益,实现公共利益与企业利益的双赢。此外,从军经历对管理者具有积极的正向影响,使其在企业经营活动中明显降低对私人收益的追求。
As an important way to promote the optimal allocation of resources and regional economic development,government subsidies play an assignable role in the production and operation of enterprises. Therefore,the research on factors influencing government subsidies has drawn wide attention. Existing researches suggest that political connections can help enterprises to obtain government subsidies. Based on this view,we take into account that China has a large number of veterans entering various enterprises each year,and military experience can be regarded as one of the manifestations of political connections. Therefore,this paper chooses military experience of managers as an entry point to study how military experience influences the acquisition of government subsidies. At the same time,based on the upper echelons theory,it chooses the dual perspectives of corporate philanthropy and redundant employees to discuss the different influences of managers' military experience,and further explores whether corporate philanthropy and redundant employees play intermediary roles between military experience of managers and government subsidies,that is to say,the aim is to explore the way that managers with military experience strive for government subsidies.This paper takes A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2015 in China as the research object,and examines the research questions through the empirical analysis. The conclusion shows that overall,there is a significant positive correlation between military experience of managers and government subsidies;corporate philanthropy plays a significant intermediary role in the relationship between military experience and government subsidies,while there is a significant negative correlation between redundant employees and military experience of managers;the redundant employees do not play an intermediary role between military experience of managers and government subsidies. In the further analysis and discussion,it explores the relationship between military experience and perk consumption. The results show that military experience is conducive to the reduction in the on-the-job consumption of management and confirm that managers with military experience are more honest and trustworthy. The conclusions can be understood as follows:military experience of managers helps enterprises to obtain government subsidies,and compared with the way of redundant employees that may damage the performance of enterprises,managers with military experience prefer the way of corporate philanthropy to shoulder social responsibilities and establish a good relationship between governments and enterprises,thus gaining more government support. In addition,military experience has a positive impact on managers,so that they can significantly reduce the pursuit of private benefits in business operations. The expected contribution of this paper mainly consists of two aspects:in theory,it expands the relevant research about the antecedents of government subsidies and political connections from the perspective of military experience;in practice,it reveals how military experience affects the acquisition of government subsidies and its impact on corporate philanthropy and redundant employees. In the context of a large number of veterans entering China every year,this paper has some reference to resettlement issues.
As an important way to promote the optimal allocation of resources and regional economic development,government subsidies play an assignable role in the production and operation of enterprises. Therefore,the research on factors influencing government subsidies has drawn wide attention. Existing researches suggest that political connections can help enterprises to obtain government subsidies. Based on this view,we take into account that China has a large number of veterans entering various enterprises each year,and military experience can be regarded as one of the manifestations of political connections. Therefore,this paper chooses military experience of managers as an entry point to study how military experience influences the acquisition of government subsidies. At the same time,based on the upper echelons theory,it chooses the dual perspectives of corporate philanthropy and redundant employees to discuss the different influences of managers' military experience,and further explores whether corporate philanthropy and redundant employees play intermediary roles between military experience of managers and government subsidies,that is to say,the aim is to explore the way that managers with military experience strive for government subsidies.This paper takes A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2015 in China as the research object,and examines the research questions through the empirical analysis. The conclusion shows that overall,there is a significant positive correlation between military experience of managers and government subsidies;corporate philanthropy plays a significant intermediary role in the relationship between military experience and government subsidies,while there is a significant negative correlation between redundant employees and military experience of managers;the redundant employees do not play an intermediary role between military experience of managers and government subsidies. In the further analysis and discussion,it explores the relationship between military experience and perk consumption. The results show that military experience is conducive to the reduction in the on-the-job consumption of management and confirm that managers with military experience are more honest and trustworthy. The conclusions can be understood as follows:military experience of managers helps enterprises to obtain government subsidies,and compared with the way of redundant employees that may damage the performance of enterprises,managers with military experience prefer the way of corporate philanthropy to shoulder social responsibilities and establish a good relationship between governments and enterprises,thus gaining more government support. In addition,military experience has a positive impact on managers,so that they can significantly reduce the pursuit of private benefits in business operations. The expected contribution of this paper mainly consists of two aspects:in theory,it expands the relevant research about the antecedents of government subsidies and political connections from the perspective of military experience;in practice,it reveals how military experience affects the acquisition of government subsidies and its impact on corporate philanthropy and redundant employees. In the context of a large number of veterans entering China every year,this paper has some reference to resettlement issues.
引文
[1]窦祥胜,王再锋,张睿熊.内部控制对高管薪酬和在职消费的影响[J].商业研究,2017,(5).
[2]杜勇,陈建英.政治关联、慈善捐赠与政府补助--来自中国亏损上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2016,(5).
[3]杜勇,鄢波,张欢,等.慈善捐赠、政府补助与扭亏绩效--基于中国亏损上市公司的经验证据[J].经济科学,2015,(4).
[4]冯埃生.混合所有制、企业性质和冗余雇员[J].云南社会科学,2016,(3).
[5]冯根福,赵珏航.管理者薪酬、在职消费与公司绩效--基于合作博弈的分析视角[J].中国工业经济,2012,(6).
[6]高勇强,陈亚静,张云均.“红领巾”还是“绿领巾”:民营企业慈善捐赠动机研究[J].管理世界,2012,(8).
[7]耿强,胡睿昕.企业获得政府补贴的影响因素分析--基于工业企业数据库的实证研究[J].审计与经济研究,2013,(6).
[8]何红渠,刘家祯.产权性质、政府补助与企业盈利能力--基于机械、设备及仪表上市企业的实证检验[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2016,(2).
[9]赖黎,巩亚林,马永强.管理者从军经历、融资偏好与经营业绩[J].管理世界,2016,(8).
[10]李刚,侯青川,张瑾.政府补助与公司投资效率--基于中国制度背景的实证分析[J].审计与经济研究,2017,(4).
[11]李晓玲,侯啸天,葛长付.慈善捐赠是真善还是伪善:基于企业违规的视角[J].上海财经大学学报,2017,(4).
[12]李焰,王琳.媒体监督、声誉共同体与投资者保护[J].管理世界,2013,(11).
[13]林润辉,谢宗晓,李娅,等.政治关联、政府补助与环境信息披露--资源依赖理论视角[J].公共管理学报,2015,(2).
[14]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率--来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,(5).
[15]罗进辉,万迪昉.大股东持股对管理者过度在职消费行为的治理研究[J].证券市场导报,2009,(6).
[16]罗劲博.制度环境、在职消费与盈余质量--基于A股上市公司的经验数据[J].山西财经大学学报,2013,(7).
[17]马连福,王元芳,沈小秀.国有企业党组织治理、冗余雇员与高管薪酬契约[J].管理世界,2013,(5).
[18]唐清泉,罗党论.政府补贴动机及其效果的实证研究--来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007,(6).
[19]田利辉,张伟.政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应[J].经济研究,2013,(11).
[20]王红建,李青原,邢斐.金融危机、政府补贴与盈余操纵--来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2014,(7).
[21]温忠麟,侯杰泰,张雷.调节效应与中介效应的比较和应用[J].心理学报,2005,(2).
[22]徐细雄,李摇琴,林丁健.女性高管与企业慈善捐赠:基于产权性质与制度环境的分析[J].华东经济管理,2015,(10).
[23]许年行,李哲.高管贫困经历与企业慈善捐赠[J].经济研究,2016,(12).
[24]薛云奎,白云霞.国家所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008,(10).
[25]张敏,马黎珺,张雯.企业慈善捐赠的政企纽带效应--基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2013,(7).
[26]张铁铸,沙曼.管理层能力、权力与在职消费研究[J].南开管理评论,2014,(5).
[27]张玮倩,曲延英,郑迎飞.媒体负面报道能有效监督高管薪酬吗--基于薪酬替代视角的实证分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2015,(6).
[28]赵宇恒,孙悦.政府补助:补助了企业还是高管[J].现代财经,2014,(10).
[29]周炜,徐玉德,李慧云.政企关系网络、在职消费与市场化制度建设[J].统计研究,2011,(2).
[30]Albert G H.Ownership,government R&D,private R&D,and productivity in Chinese industry[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2001,29(1):136-157.
[31]Benmelech E,Frydman C.Military CEOs[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,117(1):43-59.
[32]Bernini C,Pellegrini G.How are growth and productivity in private firms affected by public subsidy?Evidence from a regional policy[J].Regional Science and Urban Economics,2011,41(3):253-265.
[33]Blau B M,Brough T J,Thomas D W.Corporate lobbying,political connections,and the bailout of banks[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2013,37(8):3007-3017.
[34]Boycko M,Shleifer A,Vishny R W.A theory of privatisation[J].Economic Journal,1996,106(435):309-319.
[35]Carroll A B.The pyramid of corporate social responsibility:Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders[J].Business Horizons,1991,34(4):39-48.
[36]Cull R,Xu L C.Institutions,ownership,and finance:The determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):117-146.
[37]Elder G H.Military times and turning points in men’s lives[J].Developmental Psychology,1986,22(2):233-245.
[38]Elder G H,Gimbel C,Ivie R.Turning points in life:The case of military service and war[J].Military Psychology,1991,3(4):215-231.
[39]Faccio M,Masulis R W,Mcconnell J J.Political connections and corporate bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[40]Graham J R,Harvey C R,Puri M.Capital allocation and delegation of decision-making authority within firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,115(3):449-470.
[41]Hambrick D C,Mason P A.Upper Echelons:The organization as a reflection of its top managers[J].Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[42]Hart Oliver.Financial contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39(4):1079-1100.
[43]Holman E A,Silver R C.Getting“stuck”in the past:Temporal orientation and coping with trauma[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1998,74(5):1146-1163.
[44]Johnson S A,Ryan Jr H E,Tian Y S.Managerial incentives and corporate fraud:The sources of incentives matter[J].Review of Finance,2009,13(1):115-145.
[45]JonasⅢH S,Fry R E,Srivastva S.The office of the CEO:Understanding the executive experience[J].Academy of Management Executive,1990,4(3):36-48.
[46]Kang K N,Park H.Influence of government R&D support and inter-firm collaborations on innovation in Korean biotechnology SMEs[J].Technovation,2012,32(1):68-78.
[47]Locke J L.An essay concerning human understanding[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008.
[48]Luo J H,Xiang Y G,Zhu R C.Military top executives and corporate philanthropy:Evidence from China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2017,34(3):725-755.
[49]Malmendier U,Tate G,Yan J.Overconfidence and early-life experiences:The effect of managerial traits on corporate financial policies[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1687-1733.
[50]Rajan R G,Wulf J.Are perks purely managerial excess?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):1-33.
[51]Wang H L,Qian C L.Corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance:The roles of stakeholder response and political access[J].Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(6):1159-1181.
[52]Xu L C,Zhu T,Lin Y M.Politician control,agency problems and ownership reform[J].Economics of Transition,2005,13(1):1-24.
[53]Zheng Y,Zhu Y D.Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China[J].Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2013,23(3):146-165.
[2]杜勇,陈建英.政治关联、慈善捐赠与政府补助--来自中国亏损上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2016,(5).
[3]杜勇,鄢波,张欢,等.慈善捐赠、政府补助与扭亏绩效--基于中国亏损上市公司的经验证据[J].经济科学,2015,(4).
[4]冯埃生.混合所有制、企业性质和冗余雇员[J].云南社会科学,2016,(3).
[5]冯根福,赵珏航.管理者薪酬、在职消费与公司绩效--基于合作博弈的分析视角[J].中国工业经济,2012,(6).
[6]高勇强,陈亚静,张云均.“红领巾”还是“绿领巾”:民营企业慈善捐赠动机研究[J].管理世界,2012,(8).
[7]耿强,胡睿昕.企业获得政府补贴的影响因素分析--基于工业企业数据库的实证研究[J].审计与经济研究,2013,(6).
[8]何红渠,刘家祯.产权性质、政府补助与企业盈利能力--基于机械、设备及仪表上市企业的实证检验[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2016,(2).
[9]赖黎,巩亚林,马永强.管理者从军经历、融资偏好与经营业绩[J].管理世界,2016,(8).
[10]李刚,侯青川,张瑾.政府补助与公司投资效率--基于中国制度背景的实证分析[J].审计与经济研究,2017,(4).
[11]李晓玲,侯啸天,葛长付.慈善捐赠是真善还是伪善:基于企业违规的视角[J].上海财经大学学报,2017,(4).
[12]李焰,王琳.媒体监督、声誉共同体与投资者保护[J].管理世界,2013,(11).
[13]林润辉,谢宗晓,李娅,等.政治关联、政府补助与环境信息披露--资源依赖理论视角[J].公共管理学报,2015,(2).
[14]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率--来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,(5).
[15]罗进辉,万迪昉.大股东持股对管理者过度在职消费行为的治理研究[J].证券市场导报,2009,(6).
[16]罗劲博.制度环境、在职消费与盈余质量--基于A股上市公司的经验数据[J].山西财经大学学报,2013,(7).
[17]马连福,王元芳,沈小秀.国有企业党组织治理、冗余雇员与高管薪酬契约[J].管理世界,2013,(5).
[18]唐清泉,罗党论.政府补贴动机及其效果的实证研究--来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007,(6).
[19]田利辉,张伟.政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应[J].经济研究,2013,(11).
[20]王红建,李青原,邢斐.金融危机、政府补贴与盈余操纵--来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2014,(7).
[21]温忠麟,侯杰泰,张雷.调节效应与中介效应的比较和应用[J].心理学报,2005,(2).
[22]徐细雄,李摇琴,林丁健.女性高管与企业慈善捐赠:基于产权性质与制度环境的分析[J].华东经济管理,2015,(10).
[23]许年行,李哲.高管贫困经历与企业慈善捐赠[J].经济研究,2016,(12).
[24]薛云奎,白云霞.国家所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008,(10).
[25]张敏,马黎珺,张雯.企业慈善捐赠的政企纽带效应--基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2013,(7).
[26]张铁铸,沙曼.管理层能力、权力与在职消费研究[J].南开管理评论,2014,(5).
[27]张玮倩,曲延英,郑迎飞.媒体负面报道能有效监督高管薪酬吗--基于薪酬替代视角的实证分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2015,(6).
[28]赵宇恒,孙悦.政府补助:补助了企业还是高管[J].现代财经,2014,(10).
[29]周炜,徐玉德,李慧云.政企关系网络、在职消费与市场化制度建设[J].统计研究,2011,(2).
[30]Albert G H.Ownership,government R&D,private R&D,and productivity in Chinese industry[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2001,29(1):136-157.
[31]Benmelech E,Frydman C.Military CEOs[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,117(1):43-59.
[32]Bernini C,Pellegrini G.How are growth and productivity in private firms affected by public subsidy?Evidence from a regional policy[J].Regional Science and Urban Economics,2011,41(3):253-265.
[33]Blau B M,Brough T J,Thomas D W.Corporate lobbying,political connections,and the bailout of banks[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2013,37(8):3007-3017.
[34]Boycko M,Shleifer A,Vishny R W.A theory of privatisation[J].Economic Journal,1996,106(435):309-319.
[35]Carroll A B.The pyramid of corporate social responsibility:Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders[J].Business Horizons,1991,34(4):39-48.
[36]Cull R,Xu L C.Institutions,ownership,and finance:The determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):117-146.
[37]Elder G H.Military times and turning points in men’s lives[J].Developmental Psychology,1986,22(2):233-245.
[38]Elder G H,Gimbel C,Ivie R.Turning points in life:The case of military service and war[J].Military Psychology,1991,3(4):215-231.
[39]Faccio M,Masulis R W,Mcconnell J J.Political connections and corporate bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[40]Graham J R,Harvey C R,Puri M.Capital allocation and delegation of decision-making authority within firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,115(3):449-470.
[41]Hambrick D C,Mason P A.Upper Echelons:The organization as a reflection of its top managers[J].Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[42]Hart Oliver.Financial contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39(4):1079-1100.
[43]Holman E A,Silver R C.Getting“stuck”in the past:Temporal orientation and coping with trauma[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1998,74(5):1146-1163.
[44]Johnson S A,Ryan Jr H E,Tian Y S.Managerial incentives and corporate fraud:The sources of incentives matter[J].Review of Finance,2009,13(1):115-145.
[45]JonasⅢH S,Fry R E,Srivastva S.The office of the CEO:Understanding the executive experience[J].Academy of Management Executive,1990,4(3):36-48.
[46]Kang K N,Park H.Influence of government R&D support and inter-firm collaborations on innovation in Korean biotechnology SMEs[J].Technovation,2012,32(1):68-78.
[47]Locke J L.An essay concerning human understanding[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008.
[48]Luo J H,Xiang Y G,Zhu R C.Military top executives and corporate philanthropy:Evidence from China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2017,34(3):725-755.
[49]Malmendier U,Tate G,Yan J.Overconfidence and early-life experiences:The effect of managerial traits on corporate financial policies[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1687-1733.
[50]Rajan R G,Wulf J.Are perks purely managerial excess?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):1-33.
[51]Wang H L,Qian C L.Corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance:The roles of stakeholder response and political access[J].Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(6):1159-1181.
[52]Xu L C,Zhu T,Lin Y M.Politician control,agency problems and ownership reform[J].Economics of Transition,2005,13(1):1-24.
[53]Zheng Y,Zhu Y D.Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China[J].Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2013,23(3):146-165.