论最惠国条款适用于投资争端解决程序的平等理论困境
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摘要
从立法论的视角来看,平等理论是最惠国条款得以适用的重要法理基础。当前国际仲裁中存在着将最惠国条款的适用范围从实体性领域扩大到程序性投资争端解决程序的实践。这种行为混淆了形式平等与实质平等,对平等理论造成了巨大的冲击,不但损害了最惠国条款得以适用的法理基础,也严重背离了缔约国的缔约目的。因此,在缔约国没有明确同意的情形下,不得将最惠国条款的适用范围扩大至投资争端解决程序。
From the legislative perspective,the theory of equality is the theoretical basis of most favored nation clause. In current international arbitration practice,the most favored nation clause is applicable to the investment dispute settlement procedure. That will damage the legal bases of the most favored nation clause,and bring serious deviation of the aim of the contracting parties. Therefore,unless the contracting parties will be clearly recognized,the application of MFN clause in international investment dispute settlement procedures is illegal and inappropriate.
From the legislative perspective,the theory of equality is the theoretical basis of most favored nation clause. In current international arbitration practice,the most favored nation clause is applicable to the investment dispute settlement procedure. That will damage the legal bases of the most favored nation clause,and bring serious deviation of the aim of the contracting parties. Therefore,unless the contracting parties will be clearly recognized,the application of MFN clause in international investment dispute settlement procedures is illegal and inappropriate.
引文
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[16]梁丹妮.国际投资条约最惠国待遇条款适用问题研究---以伊佳兰公司诉中国案为中心的分析[J].法商研究,2012,(2):102.
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[20]刘笋.论国际投资仲裁对国家主权的挑战---兼评美国的应对之策及其启示[J].法商研究,2008,(3):3.
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[22]刘颖,封筠.国际投资争端中最惠国待遇条款适用范围的扩展---由实体问题向程序问题的转变[J].法学评论,2013,(4):49.
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[26]杨丽艳,雷俊生.国际投资法中的差别待遇初探[J].当代亚太,2003,(12):22.
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[28]徐泉.国际贸易投资自由化法律规制研究[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2004.277.
[29]余劲松.论国际投资法中国有化补偿的依据[J].中国社会科学,1986,(2):66.
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[2]朱明新.最惠国待遇条款适用投资争端解决程序的表象与实质---基于条约解释的视角[J].法商研究,2015,(3):171.
[3]John H.Jackson,William J.Davey and Alan O.Sykes,Jr.,Legal Problems of International Economic Relations,4th ed.,West Group,2002.p.416.
[4][美]约翰·H·杰克逊.世界贸易体制---国际经济关系的法律与政策[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2001.178.
[5]Jonathan T.Fried,Two Paradigms for the Role of International Trade Law,20 Can,Law Journal of American,39,1994.p.42.
[6]Donald M.McRae,The Contribution of International Trade Law to Development of International Law,260 Recueil des Cours 99,1996.p.173.
[7]Nicholas DiM ascio and Joost Pauwelyn,Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties:Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?American Journal of International Law,January,2008.pp.23-25.
[8]Nartnirum Junngam,An MFN Clause and BIT Dispute Settlement:A Host State’s Implied Consent to Arbitration by Reference,UCLAJournal of international Law and Foreign Affairs,Vol.399.2010.p.78.
[9]Stephan W.Schill,Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Though Most-Favored-Nation Clauses,Berkeley Journal of International Law,Vol.27.p.27.
[10][德]康德.历史理性批判文集[M].北京:商务印书馆,2008.115.
[11]周忠海.国际法学述评[M].北京:法律出版社,2001.767-768.
[12][美]约翰·罗尔斯.正义论[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1988.66.
[13]李春林,张章盛.国际法的代际演进与国际法律差别待遇的历史演变[J].福建论坛,2010,(3):152.
[14]陈安,蔡从燕.国际投资法的新发展与中国双边投资条约的新实践[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2007.390.
[15]曾华群.论“特殊与差别待遇”条款的发展及其法理基础[J].厦门大学学报,2003,(6):5.
[16]梁丹妮.国际投资条约最惠国待遇条款适用问题研究---以伊佳兰公司诉中国案为中心的分析[J].法商研究,2012,(2):102.
[17]张磊.论外交保护中对当地救济原则的限制---以联合国《外交保护草案》第15条为线索[J].华东政法大学学报,2014,(5):136.
[18]石慧.投资条约仲裁机制的批判与重构[M].北京:法律出版社,2008.2.
[19]张庆麟.国际投资法专论[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,2007.287.
[20]刘笋.论国际投资仲裁对国家主权的挑战---兼评美国的应对之策及其启示[J].法商研究,2008,(3):3.
[21]何志鹏.国际经济法治:内涵、标准与路径[J].国际经济法学刊,2012,(4):71.
[22]刘颖,封筠.国际投资争端中最惠国待遇条款适用范围的扩展---由实体问题向程序问题的转变[J].法学评论,2013,(4):49.
[23]Most-Favored-Nation Treatment,UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements,UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10/Vol.Ⅲ,UN,1999.p.7.
[24]王启富,陶髦.法律辞海[M].长春:吉林人民出版,1998.1137-1138.
[25]Lavanya Rajamani,Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law,Oxford University Press,2006.p.1.
[26]杨丽艳,雷俊生.国际投资法中的差别待遇初探[J].当代亚太,2003,(12):22.
[27]Domke.Indonesian Nationalization Measure before Foreign Court.American International Law Journal,1960.pp.305-306.
[28]徐泉.国际贸易投资自由化法律规制研究[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2004.277.
[29]余劲松.论国际投资法中国有化补偿的依据[J].中国社会科学,1986,(2):66.
[30]Siemens A.G.v.The Argentina Republic,ICSID CASE NO.ARB/02/8.paras.100-106.