政策不确定性与企业家活动配置
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摘要
基于中国私营企业调查数据(CPES)和城市官员匹配数据,本文检验了政策不确定性对企业家活动配置的影响。结果表明:政策不确定性会减少企业家生产活动,突出表现为企业家直接生产活动的减少;政策不确定性的异质性影响具有差异化特征。进一步验证企业改制和企业家政治身份的调节效应后发现,两者均会导致企业家活动"粘性"。其中,前者更多地影响间接生产活动,后者更多地影响直接生产活动和净生产活动。本文结论在经过剔除样本数据、控制更多因素、变更估计方法、开展不同聚类标准检验后仍较为稳健。本文不仅提供了政策不确定性影响企业家这一特殊微观个体行为的证据,还对构建亲清新型政商关系、培育优秀企业家精神、实现政府治理能力和政企关系向"能治""善治""长治"的转变具有一定启示意义。
Based on the data of China Private Enterprise Survey( CPES) and city officials,this paper firstly investigated the impact of policy uncertainty on the allocation of Entrepreneurial Activities,while the mediation effect of enterprise restructuring and the political status of entrepreneurs were also discussed. Empirical results suggest that the impact of policy uncertainty on the activity of entrepreneurs is significantly negative mainly though the reduction of direct production activities,although the magnitude and significant level of such impacts may diversify among different types of policy uncertainty,entrepreneurs' age,enterprise's age,and education background of entrepreneurial. Furthermore,two approaches of mediation effect,namely the enterprise restructuring and the political status of entrepreneurs were also examined.Specifically,the negative impacts of policy uncertainty on the activities of entrepreneurs could be weakened by these approaches,while heterogeneity of such weakening among different entrepreneur activities types was also evidenced. As for the activities of direct production and net production,mediation effects caused by political status of entrepreneurs were significant in both situations,whilst those induced by enterprise restructuring may only exit in indirect production activities.This conclusion is stable by doing robustness test like adding enterprise,city and province-level important control variables,change estimation method,using Propensity Score Matching method( PSM) and different clustering robust standard error.This research can not only evidence the impact of policy uncertainty on the micro behavior entrepreneurs,but also meaningful for strengthening city business environment,building the Qin( close) and Qing( pure) new government-business relationship,nurturing entrepreneurship,and release entrepreneurs dividend.China's economy has entered a new era. It's very important to lay a solid foundation by focusing on policy uncertainty and allocation of entrepreneurial activities issues,and it is also beneficial to build consensus and emphasize the role of entrepreneurs. We firmly believe that the role of entrepreneurs has important theoretical and practical significance for promoting the construction of business environment,cultivating entrepreneurship and releasing the dividends of entrepreneurs under the background of the new era. Policy recommendations are as follows:First,the government should"be able to governance". The government should make active efforts to create a stable,fair and transparent business environment. It is well known that business environments are challenging to formulate and execute,and the policy uncertainty may reinforce that difficulty. In adhering to the principle of the spirit of central government and fundamental rule,both the subjective and objective factors,as well as the relative stability of administration officials should be considered,especially the stability and policy continuity of chief officials. This can make entrepreneur team to form stable expectations,reduce the direct and indirect impact of the policy uncertainty,especially for negative effect.Second,the reform of state-owned enterprises should be "well-governed ". The reform should still be adopted for promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises,strengthening the supervision of enterprise restructuring process,and guiding entrepreneurs to build enterprise core ability,which can truly accomplish the transformation of the entrepreneur's role from "corporate officials"to real entrepreneurs.Third,political and commercial relations should be "durably-governed". Facing business relationships in new era,the government should actively set up reasonable communication platform between entrepreneurs and government officials according to the requirements of a new government-business relationship. Meanwhile,the governments should encourage entrepreneurs and officials to strengthen communication,establishing normal and reasonable contact. The microcosmic subject should be able to do and well to do. Entrepreneurs should clearly position themselves and their enterprises,and continue to make more efforts in enterprise management,cultivate outstanding entrepreneur spirit,durable driving force of China's economic development.
Based on the data of China Private Enterprise Survey( CPES) and city officials,this paper firstly investigated the impact of policy uncertainty on the allocation of Entrepreneurial Activities,while the mediation effect of enterprise restructuring and the political status of entrepreneurs were also discussed. Empirical results suggest that the impact of policy uncertainty on the activity of entrepreneurs is significantly negative mainly though the reduction of direct production activities,although the magnitude and significant level of such impacts may diversify among different types of policy uncertainty,entrepreneurs' age,enterprise's age,and education background of entrepreneurial. Furthermore,two approaches of mediation effect,namely the enterprise restructuring and the political status of entrepreneurs were also examined.Specifically,the negative impacts of policy uncertainty on the activities of entrepreneurs could be weakened by these approaches,while heterogeneity of such weakening among different entrepreneur activities types was also evidenced. As for the activities of direct production and net production,mediation effects caused by political status of entrepreneurs were significant in both situations,whilst those induced by enterprise restructuring may only exit in indirect production activities.This conclusion is stable by doing robustness test like adding enterprise,city and province-level important control variables,change estimation method,using Propensity Score Matching method( PSM) and different clustering robust standard error.This research can not only evidence the impact of policy uncertainty on the micro behavior entrepreneurs,but also meaningful for strengthening city business environment,building the Qin( close) and Qing( pure) new government-business relationship,nurturing entrepreneurship,and release entrepreneurs dividend.China's economy has entered a new era. It's very important to lay a solid foundation by focusing on policy uncertainty and allocation of entrepreneurial activities issues,and it is also beneficial to build consensus and emphasize the role of entrepreneurs. We firmly believe that the role of entrepreneurs has important theoretical and practical significance for promoting the construction of business environment,cultivating entrepreneurship and releasing the dividends of entrepreneurs under the background of the new era. Policy recommendations are as follows:First,the government should"be able to governance". The government should make active efforts to create a stable,fair and transparent business environment. It is well known that business environments are challenging to formulate and execute,and the policy uncertainty may reinforce that difficulty. In adhering to the principle of the spirit of central government and fundamental rule,both the subjective and objective factors,as well as the relative stability of administration officials should be considered,especially the stability and policy continuity of chief officials. This can make entrepreneur team to form stable expectations,reduce the direct and indirect impact of the policy uncertainty,especially for negative effect.Second,the reform of state-owned enterprises should be "well-governed ". The reform should still be adopted for promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises,strengthening the supervision of enterprise restructuring process,and guiding entrepreneurs to build enterprise core ability,which can truly accomplish the transformation of the entrepreneur's role from "corporate officials"to real entrepreneurs.Third,political and commercial relations should be "durably-governed". Facing business relationships in new era,the government should actively set up reasonable communication platform between entrepreneurs and government officials according to the requirements of a new government-business relationship. Meanwhile,the governments should encourage entrepreneurs and officials to strengthen communication,establishing normal and reasonable contact. The microcosmic subject should be able to do and well to do. Entrepreneurs should clearly position themselves and their enterprises,and continue to make more efforts in enterprise management,cultivate outstanding entrepreneur spirit,durable driving force of China's economic development.
引文
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(1)该条例自2018年1月1日起正式施行,在全国是第一个将政府投资服务、诚信建设以及纠纷调处等纳入统一框架和法定职责的地方立法条例。
(1)关于这一方面,中共中央、国务院印发《关于完善产权保护制度依法保护产权的意见》就特别强调:不得以政府换届、领导人员更替等理由违约毁约,因违约毁约侵犯合法权益的,要承担法律和经济责任。
(1)本文所指的企业改制,是指由国营企业、城镇集体企业、农村集体企业向私营企业的转变。
(1)本文感谢中国社会科学院私营企业主群体研究中心提供数据协助,但文责自负。
(2)实际上,将样本拓展至全样本并未影响本文的核心结论,在稳健性检验部分亦有讨论。
(1)应指出,对基准模型的估计,若采用普通稳健标准误,本文更容易得出符合预期的估计效果。
(1)为表述方便,这里用“老龄型”“年轻型”企业家的概念,分别对应企业家年龄的高、低组。
(1)限于篇幅,这里省略了相应结果(备索)。
(1)调查问卷提供了以下信息:企业家担任人大代表(政协委员)的行政级别,包括乡(镇)级、县(市)级、地(市、州)级、省级和全国级;担任人大代表的最高级别,包括人大主任,副主任和常委;担任政协委员的最高级别,包括政协主席、副主席和常委。
(2)调查数据显示,总体上看,反映存在融资难的样本占全样本的比例接近70%;而从构成情况看,反映贷款抵押、担保条件是导致企业融资难问题的样本占存在融资难样本的比例接近50%。
(1)数据显示:从构成情况看,担任代表(委员)的企业家,其直接生产活动均值约为6.96,低于未担任职务的情形(约7.14),而间接生产活动则相反,前者(约2.74)高于后者(约2.65)。
(2)数据显示,有明确记录企业改制、收购方式的样本中,领导层收购这一方式的占比情况如下:2002年为60.62%,2004年为21.05%,2006年为19.66%,三年平均约33.78%,这一比例呈现出不断下降的趋势;2008年、2010年的指标有所差异,未列入。
(1)估计显示,P值为0.101,比较接近10%的显著性水平。若采用其他估计策略,可得显著效果,包括:采用限定样本和全样本下的聚类稳健标准误(聚类到行业层面)和普通稳健标准误。估计均表明,在表10模型(3)中,政策不确定性及其与企业改制的交互项皆有显著影响,表明企业改制的调节效应的确会影响间接生产活动,而在直接生产活动和净生产活动中则未发现显著影响,从侧面提供了证据。
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[7]庄子银.企业家精神、持续技术创新和长期经济增长的微观机制[J].北京:世界经济,2005,(12):32-43.
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[9]鲁德银.企业家行为、企业迁移、产业集群与农村城镇化政策[J].上海:财经研究,2007,(11):82-91.
[10]何轩,马骏,朱丽娜,李新春.腐败对企业家活动配置的扭曲[J].北京:中国工业经济,2016,(12):106-122.
[11]常建坤.中国传统文化与企业家创新精神[J].北京:经济管理,2006,(18):77-81.
[12]魏下海,董志强,张永璟.营商制度环境为何如此重要?——来自民营企业家“内治外攘”的经验证据[J].北京:经济科学,2015,(2):105-116.
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(1)该条例自2018年1月1日起正式施行,在全国是第一个将政府投资服务、诚信建设以及纠纷调处等纳入统一框架和法定职责的地方立法条例。
(1)关于这一方面,中共中央、国务院印发《关于完善产权保护制度依法保护产权的意见》就特别强调:不得以政府换届、领导人员更替等理由违约毁约,因违约毁约侵犯合法权益的,要承担法律和经济责任。
(1)本文所指的企业改制,是指由国营企业、城镇集体企业、农村集体企业向私营企业的转变。
(1)本文感谢中国社会科学院私营企业主群体研究中心提供数据协助,但文责自负。
(2)实际上,将样本拓展至全样本并未影响本文的核心结论,在稳健性检验部分亦有讨论。
(1)应指出,对基准模型的估计,若采用普通稳健标准误,本文更容易得出符合预期的估计效果。
(1)为表述方便,这里用“老龄型”“年轻型”企业家的概念,分别对应企业家年龄的高、低组。
(1)限于篇幅,这里省略了相应结果(备索)。
(1)调查问卷提供了以下信息:企业家担任人大代表(政协委员)的行政级别,包括乡(镇)级、县(市)级、地(市、州)级、省级和全国级;担任人大代表的最高级别,包括人大主任,副主任和常委;担任政协委员的最高级别,包括政协主席、副主席和常委。
(2)调查数据显示,总体上看,反映存在融资难的样本占全样本的比例接近70%;而从构成情况看,反映贷款抵押、担保条件是导致企业融资难问题的样本占存在融资难样本的比例接近50%。
(1)数据显示:从构成情况看,担任代表(委员)的企业家,其直接生产活动均值约为6.96,低于未担任职务的情形(约7.14),而间接生产活动则相反,前者(约2.74)高于后者(约2.65)。
(2)数据显示,有明确记录企业改制、收购方式的样本中,领导层收购这一方式的占比情况如下:2002年为60.62%,2004年为21.05%,2006年为19.66%,三年平均约33.78%,这一比例呈现出不断下降的趋势;2008年、2010年的指标有所差异,未列入。
(1)估计显示,P值为0.101,比较接近10%的显著性水平。若采用其他估计策略,可得显著效果,包括:采用限定样本和全样本下的聚类稳健标准误(聚类到行业层面)和普通稳健标准误。估计均表明,在表10模型(3)中,政策不确定性及其与企业改制的交互项皆有显著影响,表明企业改制的调节效应的确会影响间接生产活动,而在直接生产活动和净生产活动中则未发现显著影响,从侧面提供了证据。