CEO权力、企业战略与审计收费
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摘要
企业战略系企业全局性规划和商业模式的集中体现,不同战略类型反映了企业经营特征和经营风险的差异,而以往审计收费的研究忽略了企业战略这一因素。以2007-2016年A股上市公司为样本,考察了企业战略对审计收费的影响。研究发现,企业实施的战略越为激进,审计师越倾向于对其收取更高的审计费用,企业战略是影响审计收费的重要因素。利用审计工时和审计调整等独特数据探究企业战略影响审计收费的作用机理,本文发现审计收费更高的原因既包含了审计师容忍风险并收取更高的风险溢价的因素,也包含了审计资源投入更多的因素。CEO作为战略决策和执行的关键角色,当CEO权力更大时,企业战略激进程度与审计收费之间的正相关关系显著增强。
Corporate strategy is the embodiment of the overall planning and business models of enterprises.Different types of corporate strategy reflect the differences in business characteristics and business risks.However,previous studies of audit fees have neglected the factor of corporate strategy.Based on the data of Chinese A-type share listed firms over the period 2007 to 2016,this paper investigates the impact of corporate strategy on audit fees.It finds that firms' audit fees would increase when the strategy becomes more and more aggressive,and corporate strategy is an important factor affecting audit fees.CEO plays a key role in strategic decision-making and execution.When the CEO's power is greater,the positive correlation between the aggressive degree of business strategy and audit fees is significantly enhanced.This paper uses unique data such as audit hours and audit adjustments to further explore the mechanism of the effect of corporate strategy on audit fees,and finds that higher audit fees include both higher risk premiums from the risk which auditors have to undertake and more audit resource input.This study extends the research on the factors and mechanism of audit fees,and has serious implications for auditors to carry out risk oriented auditing more effectively.It also has implications for firms to improve corporate governance.
Corporate strategy is the embodiment of the overall planning and business models of enterprises.Different types of corporate strategy reflect the differences in business characteristics and business risks.However,previous studies of audit fees have neglected the factor of corporate strategy.Based on the data of Chinese A-type share listed firms over the period 2007 to 2016,this paper investigates the impact of corporate strategy on audit fees.It finds that firms' audit fees would increase when the strategy becomes more and more aggressive,and corporate strategy is an important factor affecting audit fees.CEO plays a key role in strategic decision-making and execution.When the CEO's power is greater,the positive correlation between the aggressive degree of business strategy and audit fees is significantly enhanced.This paper uses unique data such as audit hours and audit adjustments to further explore the mechanism of the effect of corporate strategy on audit fees,and finds that higher audit fees include both higher risk premiums from the risk which auditors have to undertake and more audit resource input.This study extends the research on the factors and mechanism of audit fees,and has serious implications for auditors to carry out risk oriented auditing more effectively.It also has implications for firms to improve corporate governance.
引文
[1]Simunic D A.The Pricing of Audit Services-Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(1):161-190.
[2]闫焕民,刘宁,陈小林.事务所转制是否影响审计定价策略——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2015(5):93-101.
[3]Dichev I D,Graham J R,Harvey C,et al.Earnings Quality:Evidence from the Field[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2013,56(2-3):1-33.
[4]王化成,张修平,高升好.企业战略影响过度投资吗[J].南开管理评论,2016(4):87-97.
[5]Wiersema M F,Bigley G A.New CEOs and Corporate Strategic Refocusing:How Experience as Heir Apparent Influences the Use of Power[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2002,47(4):707-727.
[6]Miles R E,Snow C C.Organizational Strategy,Structure and Process[M].New York:McGrawHill Press,1978:546-562.
[7]Miles R E,Snow C C.Organizational Strategy,Structure,and Process[M].Stanford,California:Stanford University Press,2003:17-42.
[8]Bentley K A,Omer T C,Sharp N Y.Business Strategy,Financial Reporting Irregularities,and Audit Effort[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,30(2):780-817.
[9]叶康涛,张姗姗,张艺馨.企业战略差异与会计信息的价值相关性[J].会计研究,2014(5):44-51.
[10]刘行.企业的战略类型会影响盈余特征吗——会计稳健性视角的考察[J].南开管理评论,2016(4):111-121.
[11]孙健,王百强,曹丰,等.公司战略影响盈余管理吗?[J].管理世界,2016(3):160-169.
[12]Chandler A D.Strategy and Structure:Chapters in the History of the American Enterprise[M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1962:2-20.
[13]Porter M E.Competitive Strategy:Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors[M].New York:The Free Press,1980:80-87.
[14]March J G.Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning[J].Organization Science,1991,2(1):71-87.
[15]Treacy M,Wiersema F.The Discipline of Market Leaders[M]. Reading MA:Addison-Wesley,1995:56-61.
[16]O’Donnell E,Jr J J S.The Halo Effect in Business Risk Audits:Can Strategic Risk Assessment Bias Auditor Judgment about Accounting Details?[J].Accounting Review,2005,80(3):921-939.
[17]Bowlin K.Risk-based Auditing,Strategic Prompts and Auditor Sensitivity to the Strategic Risk of Fraud[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2011,86(4):1231-1253.
[18]Chen Y,Eshleman J D,Soileau J S.Business Strategy and Auditor Reporting[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2016,36(2):63-86.
[19]Bentley-Goode K A,Newton N J,Thompson A.Business Strategy,Internal Control over Financial Reporting,and Audit Reporting Quality[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2017,36(4):49-69.
[20]Chenhall R H.Management Control Systems Design within its Organizational Context:Findings from Contingency-Based Research and Directions for the Future[J].Accounting Organizations and Society,2004,28(2):127-168.
[21]Higgins D,Omer T C,Phillips J D.The Influence of a Firm’s Business Strategy on its Tax Aggressiveness[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2015,32(2):674-702.
[22]张洽,袁天荣.CEO权力、私有收益与并购动因——基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J].财经研究,2013,39(4):101-110.
[23]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11):99-109.
[24]Anderson C,Jennifer J L.The Experience of Power:Examining the Effects of Power on Approach and Inhibition Tendencies[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,2002,83(6):1362-1377.
[25]周建,许为宾,余耀东.制度环境、CEO权力与企业战略风格[J].管理学报,2015(6):807-813.
[26]谢盛纹,叶王春子.CEO权力、环境不确定性与盈余管理[J].会计与经济研究,2014,28(3):21-36.
[27]权小峰,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[28]刘焱,姚海鑫.高管权力、审计委员会专业性与内部控制缺陷[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(2):4-12.
[29]周虹,李端生.高管团队异质性、CEO权力与企业内部控制质量[J].山西财经大学学报,2018(1):83-95.
[30]DeFond M L,Lim C Y,Zang Y.Client Conservatism and Auditor-Client Contracting[J].The Accounting Review,2016,91(1):69-98.
[31]陈峻,杨旭东,张志宏.环境不确定性、企业社会责任与审计收费[J].审计研究,2016(4):61-66.
[32]Chen Y,Gul F A,Veeraraghavan M.Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Audit Pricing[J].The Accounting Review,2015,90(6):2205-2234.
[33]Francis J R,Wang D.The Pricing of National and City-Specific Reputations for Industry Expertise in the U.S.Audit Market[J].The Accounting Review,2005,80(1):113-136.
(1)这里我们没有像许多实证论文那样通过展示传递路径(A→B→C)来说明影响机理问题,而是直接从企业战略影响审计师的风险应对措施和审计投入的角度(A→B)说明企业战略对审计收费(A→C)的影响机理。这主要是因为目前审计研究领域对于审计投入和审计风险补偿影响审计收费(B→C)的问题已达成共识,学者们一致认可影响审计收费的因素包含审计投入和风险补偿,而企业战略是通过审计投入还是风险补偿对审计收费产生影响还尚未得知,只有审计投入增加带来的审计收费增加才是对投资者和被审计单位而言更有意义的。因此,我们通过直接检验(A→B)的方式来验证(A→C)的影响机理问题。
(1)由于我国上市公司并未单独披露广告费用(计入销售费用),故本文采用销售费用替代广告费用。同时,由于研究区间为2007-2016年,企业战略的计算需要利用过去5年的数据(即2003-2016年)的研发费用数据,而我国研发费用披露的时间较晚,因此,参考王化成等[4]和叶康涛等[9]的方法,使用无形资产净值替代研发费用。
(1)由于审计调整数据和审计工时数据截止到2011年,因此,本文验证假说2和假说3中涉及到这两个变量的回归时,研究区间为2007-2011年。
[2]闫焕民,刘宁,陈小林.事务所转制是否影响审计定价策略——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2015(5):93-101.
[3]Dichev I D,Graham J R,Harvey C,et al.Earnings Quality:Evidence from the Field[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2013,56(2-3):1-33.
[4]王化成,张修平,高升好.企业战略影响过度投资吗[J].南开管理评论,2016(4):87-97.
[5]Wiersema M F,Bigley G A.New CEOs and Corporate Strategic Refocusing:How Experience as Heir Apparent Influences the Use of Power[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2002,47(4):707-727.
[6]Miles R E,Snow C C.Organizational Strategy,Structure and Process[M].New York:McGrawHill Press,1978:546-562.
[7]Miles R E,Snow C C.Organizational Strategy,Structure,and Process[M].Stanford,California:Stanford University Press,2003:17-42.
[8]Bentley K A,Omer T C,Sharp N Y.Business Strategy,Financial Reporting Irregularities,and Audit Effort[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,30(2):780-817.
[9]叶康涛,张姗姗,张艺馨.企业战略差异与会计信息的价值相关性[J].会计研究,2014(5):44-51.
[10]刘行.企业的战略类型会影响盈余特征吗——会计稳健性视角的考察[J].南开管理评论,2016(4):111-121.
[11]孙健,王百强,曹丰,等.公司战略影响盈余管理吗?[J].管理世界,2016(3):160-169.
[12]Chandler A D.Strategy and Structure:Chapters in the History of the American Enterprise[M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1962:2-20.
[13]Porter M E.Competitive Strategy:Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors[M].New York:The Free Press,1980:80-87.
[14]March J G.Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning[J].Organization Science,1991,2(1):71-87.
[15]Treacy M,Wiersema F.The Discipline of Market Leaders[M]. Reading MA:Addison-Wesley,1995:56-61.
[16]O’Donnell E,Jr J J S.The Halo Effect in Business Risk Audits:Can Strategic Risk Assessment Bias Auditor Judgment about Accounting Details?[J].Accounting Review,2005,80(3):921-939.
[17]Bowlin K.Risk-based Auditing,Strategic Prompts and Auditor Sensitivity to the Strategic Risk of Fraud[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2011,86(4):1231-1253.
[18]Chen Y,Eshleman J D,Soileau J S.Business Strategy and Auditor Reporting[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2016,36(2):63-86.
[19]Bentley-Goode K A,Newton N J,Thompson A.Business Strategy,Internal Control over Financial Reporting,and Audit Reporting Quality[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2017,36(4):49-69.
[20]Chenhall R H.Management Control Systems Design within its Organizational Context:Findings from Contingency-Based Research and Directions for the Future[J].Accounting Organizations and Society,2004,28(2):127-168.
[21]Higgins D,Omer T C,Phillips J D.The Influence of a Firm’s Business Strategy on its Tax Aggressiveness[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2015,32(2):674-702.
[22]张洽,袁天荣.CEO权力、私有收益与并购动因——基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J].财经研究,2013,39(4):101-110.
[23]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11):99-109.
[24]Anderson C,Jennifer J L.The Experience of Power:Examining the Effects of Power on Approach and Inhibition Tendencies[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,2002,83(6):1362-1377.
[25]周建,许为宾,余耀东.制度环境、CEO权力与企业战略风格[J].管理学报,2015(6):807-813.
[26]谢盛纹,叶王春子.CEO权力、环境不确定性与盈余管理[J].会计与经济研究,2014,28(3):21-36.
[27]权小峰,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[28]刘焱,姚海鑫.高管权力、审计委员会专业性与内部控制缺陷[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(2):4-12.
[29]周虹,李端生.高管团队异质性、CEO权力与企业内部控制质量[J].山西财经大学学报,2018(1):83-95.
[30]DeFond M L,Lim C Y,Zang Y.Client Conservatism and Auditor-Client Contracting[J].The Accounting Review,2016,91(1):69-98.
[31]陈峻,杨旭东,张志宏.环境不确定性、企业社会责任与审计收费[J].审计研究,2016(4):61-66.
[32]Chen Y,Gul F A,Veeraraghavan M.Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Audit Pricing[J].The Accounting Review,2015,90(6):2205-2234.
[33]Francis J R,Wang D.The Pricing of National and City-Specific Reputations for Industry Expertise in the U.S.Audit Market[J].The Accounting Review,2005,80(1):113-136.
(1)这里我们没有像许多实证论文那样通过展示传递路径(A→B→C)来说明影响机理问题,而是直接从企业战略影响审计师的风险应对措施和审计投入的角度(A→B)说明企业战略对审计收费(A→C)的影响机理。这主要是因为目前审计研究领域对于审计投入和审计风险补偿影响审计收费(B→C)的问题已达成共识,学者们一致认可影响审计收费的因素包含审计投入和风险补偿,而企业战略是通过审计投入还是风险补偿对审计收费产生影响还尚未得知,只有审计投入增加带来的审计收费增加才是对投资者和被审计单位而言更有意义的。因此,我们通过直接检验(A→B)的方式来验证(A→C)的影响机理问题。
(1)由于我国上市公司并未单独披露广告费用(计入销售费用),故本文采用销售费用替代广告费用。同时,由于研究区间为2007-2016年,企业战略的计算需要利用过去5年的数据(即2003-2016年)的研发费用数据,而我国研发费用披露的时间较晚,因此,参考王化成等[4]和叶康涛等[9]的方法,使用无形资产净值替代研发费用。
(1)由于审计调整数据和审计工时数据截止到2011年,因此,本文验证假说2和假说3中涉及到这两个变量的回归时,研究区间为2007-2011年。