摘要
区域性税收优惠政策是促进地区经济增长、协调区域发展的重要手段,但其对非税收优惠地的负外部性没有引起足够关注。本文基于西部大开发战略中的企业所得税优惠政策(法定税率降低54%),采用变换控制组的双重差分方法,研究区域性税收优惠政策在不同税率地区间产生的再分配效应。研究发现:企业所得税优惠能够促进西部地区的税基增长,但是税基的增长无法对冲税率下降的影响,导致西部地区所得税收入的显著减少;由于区域性优惠政策没有覆盖流转税税种,西部地区的税基增长间接带来了增值税和营业税的显著增加;西部地区税基的增长是以相邻地区的税基流失为代价,距离西部大开发越近的地区,其税基流失越明显。本文的研究结论表明,在进一步完善区域性税收优惠政策的过程中,要加强配套制度建设,合理引导企业与要素的流动,尽可能降低区域性税收优惠政策的负外部性,实现区域性税收优惠对效率与公平的兼顾。
Regional tax incentives are an important means of promoting regional economic growth and coordinating regional development, but their negative externalities to non-tax concessions have not attracted enough attention. Based on the preferential corporate income tax policy in the western development strategy(the statutory tax rate is reduced by 54%), this paper uses the method of difference-in-difference by transformation the control group, studying the redistributive effect of tax incentives between different tax rates among different regions. We find that: First, corporate income tax concessions can promote tax base growth in the western region, but the growth of the tax base cannot offset the decline in the tax rate, resulting in a significant reduction in income tax revenue in the western region. Second, due to the turnover tax is not covered in the regional preferential policies,the tax base growth in the western region has indirectly brought about a significant increase in value-added tax and business tax. Finally, the growth of the tax base in the western region is at the expense of the loss of the tax base in the adjacent regions. More closer to the western development, the loss of its tax base are more obviously.The conclusions of this paper indicate that in the process of further improving regional tax preferential policies, it is necessary to strengthen the construction of supporting systems, reasonably guide the flow of enterprises and factors, minimize the negative externalities of regional tax preferential policies, and achieve a balance between efficiency and equity when carrying the regional tax incentives.
引文
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(1)参见《国务院关于实施西部大开发若干政策措施的通知》。
(2)这些政策包括企业所得税“五免五减半”,增值税返还15%—50%,个税返还70%—90%。具体见《关于新疆喀什霍尔果斯两个特殊经济开发区企业所得税优惠政策的通知》《霍尔果斯经济开发区企业所得税税收优惠管理办法》。
(3)全国因减免税两年减少财政收入逾3万亿元(http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-12-10/065231267397.shtml)。
(1)“两免三减半”,即前两年免征企业所得税,后三年减半征收企业所得税。“五免五减半”与此类似。
(2)财政部、海关总署、国家税务总局《关于深入实施西部大开发战略有关税收政策问题的通知》。
(1)迁移距离影响税收优惠的税基增长效应这一结论还表明:如果税收优惠对本地税基增长的驱动作用仅仅是本地企业自身发展效率提升的结果,那么,税收优惠对税基增长的正向作用就不会随着与非税收优惠地的距离而变化。相反地,若针对特定地区的税收优惠政策对低税率地区税基增长的驱动效应中包括了高税率地区向低税率地区的资源转移,那么,随着与周围非税收优惠地距离的增加,区域性税收优惠对税基增长的提升作用就会逐渐降低,模型的推论较好地支持了本文关于区域性税收优惠再分配效应的猜想。
(2)企业三迁:找寻税负洼地(http://finance.ifeng.com/news/corporate/20120228/5670869.shtml)。
(1)感谢匿名评审专家提出的宝贵意见。
(1)本文同样采用地理RD方法进行了稳健性检验,基本结论仍然成立,如有需要可向作者索要。
(1)《取消农业特产税正当时》(http://jiuban.moa.gov.cn/fwllm/jjps/200304/t20030422_78603.htm)。
(2)详见国务院办公厅颁布的《国务院办公厅关于落实中共中央国务院关于促进中部地区崛起若干意见有关政策措施的通知》。
(3)财政部、国家税务总局2007年印发的《中部地区扩大增值税抵扣范围暂行办法》中,明确规定在山西省的太原、大同、阳泉、长治;安徽省的合肥、马鞍山、蚌埠、芜湖、淮南;江西省的南昌、萍乡、景德镇、九江;河南省的郑州、洛阳、焦作、平顶山、开封;湖北省的武汉、黄石、襄樊、十堰和湖南省的长沙、株州、湘潭、衡阳的八大行业实行增值税转型试点。