会计业绩、公司治理机制与高管薪酬契约
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摘要
会计信息的契约角色及其实现机制是新兴市场和转型经济体会计有用性研究的重要命题。在实证考察我国经济转型关键期内外部公司治理机制对会计业绩与高管薪酬关联性影响的基础上,研究结果表明,会计业绩信息在我国上市公司的高管薪酬契约中得到了广泛运用,但在不同内外部公司治理机制下,会计业绩与高管薪酬的关联性存在明显差异。研究发现,产权性质为非国有、制衡型股权结构以及所属行业竞争更为充分的公司,其会计业绩与高管薪酬的关联性更强。不过,研究并未发现外部审计以及董事会中设立薪酬委员会与否会对上述关联性产生显著影响。
This paper investigates the relationship between accounting information which reflects corporate profitability and corporate executives' compensation in different governance institutions. We found there are significant differences of the relationship between accounting performance and executive's compensation information in the context of different governance institutions. Specifically,the relationship is stronger in non-stated listed corporate,more competitive industries and lower share ratio of the first shareholder. However,we did not find that the external audit and the establishment of a remuneration committee on the board of directors will have a significant impact on the above-mentined relevance.
This paper investigates the relationship between accounting information which reflects corporate profitability and corporate executives' compensation in different governance institutions. We found there are significant differences of the relationship between accounting performance and executive's compensation information in the context of different governance institutions. Specifically,the relationship is stronger in non-stated listed corporate,more competitive industries and lower share ratio of the first shareholder. However,we did not find that the external audit and the establishment of a remuneration committee on the board of directors will have a significant impact on the above-mentined relevance.
引文
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[2]Watts R L,Zimmerman J L.Positive Accounting Theory:a Ten Year Perspective[J].Accounting Review,1990.
[3]Jensen M C,Murphy K J.Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2).
[4]Bushman R M,Smith A J.Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,32(1-3).
[5]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(12).
[6]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效关联性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9).
[7]陈志广.高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2002(5).
[8]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007(1).
[9]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009(3).
[10]刘星,徐光伟.政府管制、管理层权力与国企高管薪酬刚性[J].经济科学,2012(1).
[11]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排[J].会计研究,2004(12).
[12]章卫东,张洪辉,邹斌.政府干预、大股东资产注入:支持抑或掏空[J].会计研究,2012(8).
[13]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001(12).
[14]孔东民,刘莎莎,王亚男.市场竞争、产权与政府补贴[J].经济研究,2013(2).
[15]Core J E,Holthausen R W,Larcker D F.Corporate Governance,Chief Executive Officer Compensation,and Firm Performance1[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51(3).
[16]Harvey K D,Shrieves R E.Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Governance Choices[J].Journal of Financial Research,2001,24(4).
[17]Cyert R M,Kang S H,Kumar P.Corporate Governance,Takeovers,and Top-management Compensation:Theory and Evidence[J].Management Science,2002,48(4).
[18]Main B G M,Johnston J.Remuneration Committees and Corporate Governance[J].Accounting and Business Research,1993,23(sup1).
[19]Ezzamel M,Watson R.Market Comparison Earnings and the Bidding-up of Executive Cash Compensation:Evidence From the United Kingdom[J].Academy of Management Journal,1998,41(2).
[20]Hill C W L,Snell S A.External Control,Corporate Strategy,and Firm Performance in Research-intensive Industries[J].Strategic Management Journal,1988,9(6).
[21]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007(9).
[22]Healy.P.The Impact of Bonus Schemes on the Selection of Accounting Principles[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985,7(1).