标准必要专利许可FRAND承诺可实施性
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摘要
标准必要专利许可的FRAND(公平、合理和非歧视性)承诺,是一个具有多重目标和协调多方利益的私人规制治理制度,对FRAND(声明)做一般的原则性规定并以基于良好意愿的私人谈判为基础,是标准必要专利治理有效的内在要求。FRAND承诺本质上是一个有约束力的合约承诺,大多情况下FRAND专利许可费争议属于合同法问题,只在特殊情况下才属于违反反垄断法。因此,对FRAND专利许可费纠纷的处理,应坚持合同法优先,采用"合同法+反垄断法"的混合实施路径;政府行政执法机关应避免实行价格监管,在具体案件执法中应重在坚持事前递增价值的基准并基于个案来裁定。
FRAND(fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) commitment for standard essential patent license is a private regulation and governance system of private with multiple objectives and coordinated multi-benefits. General principled provisions on FRAND(declaration) and private negotiations based on good intentions are the inherent requirements of standard essential patent governance effectiveness. FRAND commitment is essentially a binding contractual commitment,in most cases, the dispute of FRAND patent license fee is a contract law issue, only in exceptional circumstances it is a violation of anti-monopoly law. Therefore, to deal with the dispute of FRAND patent license fee, contract law should be given priority, and the hybrid enforcement path of "contract law + antimonopoly law" should be taken; the government administrative law enforcement agencies should avoid price supervision,in specific case enforcement, emphasis should be placed on insisting on the benchmark of ex ante incremental value and adjudicating on a case-by-case basis.
FRAND(fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) commitment for standard essential patent license is a private regulation and governance system of private with multiple objectives and coordinated multi-benefits. General principled provisions on FRAND(declaration) and private negotiations based on good intentions are the inherent requirements of standard essential patent governance effectiveness. FRAND commitment is essentially a binding contractual commitment,in most cases, the dispute of FRAND patent license fee is a contract law issue, only in exceptional circumstances it is a violation of anti-monopoly law. Therefore, to deal with the dispute of FRAND patent license fee, contract law should be given priority, and the hybrid enforcement path of "contract law + antimonopoly law" should be taken; the government administrative law enforcement agencies should avoid price supervision,in specific case enforcement, emphasis should be placed on insisting on the benchmark of ex ante incremental value and adjudicating on a case-by-case basis.
引文
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[9]王先林.涉及专利的标准制定和实施中的反垄断问题[J].法学家,2015,1(4):62-70.
[10]SIDAK J G.The meaning of FRAND:part II:injunctions[J].Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2015,11(1):201-269.
[11]RAHNASTO I.Intellectual property rights,external effects and anti-trust law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
[12]SPULBER D.Innovation economics:the interplay among technology standards,competitive conduct and economic performance[J].Journal of Competition Law&Economics,2013,9(4):777-825.
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[15]LEMLEY M.Intellectual property rights and standard-setting organizations[J].California Law Review,2002,90(6):1889-1980.
[16]COTTER T F.The comparative law and economics of standardessential patents and FRAND royalties[J].Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal,2014,22(3):311-363.
[17]CARY G S,NELSON M W,KAISER S J.The case for antitrust law to police the patent holdup problem in standard setting[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2011,77(3):913-945.
[18]MARINIELLO M.Fair,reasonable and non-discriminatory(FRAND)terms:a challenge for competition authorities[J].Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2011,7(3):523-541.
[2]CARLTON D W,SHAMPINE A L.An economic interpretation of FRAND[J].Journal of Competition Law&Economics,2013,9(3):531-552.
[3]LERNER J,TIROLE J.Standard-essential patents[J].Journal of Political Economy,2015,123(3):547-586.
[4]唐要家,尹温杰.标准必要专利歧视性许可的反竞争效应与反垄断政策[J].中国工业经济,2015(8):66-81.
[5]SWANSON D G,BAUMOL W J.Reasonable and nondiscriminatory(RAND)royalties,standards selection,and control of market power[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2005,73(1):1-58.
[6]SIDAK J G.The meaning of FRAND:part I:royalties[J].Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2013,9(4):931-1055.
[7]LEMLEY M,SHAPIRO C.A simple approach to setting reasonable royalties for standard-essential patents[J].Berkeley Technology Law Journal,2013,28(2):1135-1166.
[8]王晓晔.标准必要专利反垄断诉讼问题研究[J].中国法学,2015(6):217-238.
[9]王先林.涉及专利的标准制定和实施中的反垄断问题[J].法学家,2015,1(4):62-70.
[10]SIDAK J G.The meaning of FRAND:part II:injunctions[J].Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2015,11(1):201-269.
[11]RAHNASTO I.Intellectual property rights,external effects and anti-trust law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
[12]SPULBER D.Innovation economics:the interplay among technology standards,competitive conduct and economic performance[J].Journal of Competition Law&Economics,2013,9(4):777-825.
[13]FARRELL J,HAYES J,SHAPIRO C,et al.Standard setting,patents and hold-up[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2007,74(3):603-670.
[14]CRANE D A.Patent pools,RAND commitments and the problematics of price discrimination[J].Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper,2008,No.232.
[15]LEMLEY M.Intellectual property rights and standard-setting organizations[J].California Law Review,2002,90(6):1889-1980.
[16]COTTER T F.The comparative law and economics of standardessential patents and FRAND royalties[J].Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal,2014,22(3):311-363.
[17]CARY G S,NELSON M W,KAISER S J.The case for antitrust law to police the patent holdup problem in standard setting[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2011,77(3):913-945.
[18]MARINIELLO M.Fair,reasonable and non-discriminatory(FRAND)terms:a challenge for competition authorities[J].Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2011,7(3):523-541.