地方足球协会运行机理及改革策略
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摘要
随着中国足球协会去行政化的实施,地方足球协会改革议题被提上日程,并进入试点阶段。当然,改革地方足球协会首先需要明晰其运行机理,解构其关系体系及面临问题。在府际关系议题牵引下,力图探讨上述问题。研究认为,区别于西方,中国地方足球协会遵循自上而下逐条建构特征,并内嵌于地方体育行政部门的府际竞争体系之中,显现出双重套嵌性,引致组织效率流失和制约改革推进的套嵌困境。推进地方足球协会改革,则需转变理念,跳出单一的协会去行政化理论束缚,优先化解其所代理的府际博弈逐利性竞争困局;然后借由权利和资源配置方式调整转换地方足球协会的隶属关系,在强化政府职能转换实践中,扎实推进地方足球协会服务职能培育和自主造血能力提升。
With the implementation of the Chinese Football Association to be administrative,the local football association reform issues were put on the agenda,and entered the pilot phase. Of course,these reform first needs to clarify its operating mechanism,deconstruct its relationship system and face problems. This study seeks to explore the above issues under the traction of intergovernmental relations. We found that,unlike the Western,the Chinese local soccer association follows the topdown constructive feature and embeds itself into the inter-governmental competition system of the local sports administration department,showing double nesting,resulting the dilemma as:organizational efficiency loss and reform restriction. To solve the problem,we need to change the reform idea which as single government and association relations issues,give priority to resolve the profit-taking competition dilemma of intergovernmental game by the local football association;and then change the Football Association affiliation by adjust the power and resource,promote the service functions and hematologist ability of local football association,on the basis of the practice of the government functions transformation.
With the implementation of the Chinese Football Association to be administrative,the local football association reform issues were put on the agenda,and entered the pilot phase. Of course,these reform first needs to clarify its operating mechanism,deconstruct its relationship system and face problems. This study seeks to explore the above issues under the traction of intergovernmental relations. We found that,unlike the Western,the Chinese local soccer association follows the topdown constructive feature and embeds itself into the inter-governmental competition system of the local sports administration department,showing double nesting,resulting the dilemma as:organizational efficiency loss and reform restriction. To solve the problem,we need to change the reform idea which as single government and association relations issues,give priority to resolve the profit-taking competition dilemma of intergovernmental game by the local football association;and then change the Football Association affiliation by adjust the power and resource,promote the service functions and hematologist ability of local football association,on the basis of the practice of the government functions transformation.
引文
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[11]张兵,仇军.管办分离后中国职业足球改革的路径选择与机制依赖[J].体育科学,2016,36(10):3-9.
[12]张建会,钟秉枢.全运会政策执行中的利益博弈--基于利益相关者利益视角的分析[J].武汉体育学院学报,2014,48(11):18-22.
[13]张智,孙懿,王志强.强化中央事权视角下体育项目治理的完善思路研究[J].沈阳体育学院学报,2017,36(1):112-116.
[14]周振超.当代中国政府“条块关系”研究[M].天津:天津人民出版社,2009:234.
[15]朱光磊.当代中国政府过程[M].天津:天津人民出版社,2010:266.
[16]SPIRES A J.Contingent symbiosis and civil society in an authoritarian state:Understanding the survival of China’s Grassroots NGOs[J].Am J Soc,2011,117(1):1-45.
[17]WEINGAST B R.Second generation fiscal federalism:The implications of fiscal incentives[J].J Urban Eco,2009.65(3):279-293.
[2]戴伟娟,刘香吉.从起源与发展看行业协会的行为逻辑[J].上海商学院学报,2010,11(4):36-39.
[3][英]亨特·戴维斯.足球史(1863-2004)[M].李军花等译.济南:希望出版社,2005:26.
[4]仇军,刘波,张兵,等.体育强国建设:中国的实践与挑战[M].南京:江苏人民出版社,2016:232-235.
[5]谭华.体育史[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2009:289.
[6][美]W·理查德·斯科特,[美]杰拉尔德·F·戴维斯.组织理论:理性、自然与开放系统的视角[M].高俊山译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2011:272.
[7]郁建兴.民间商会与地方政府--基于浙江省温州市的研究[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006:85.
[8]郁建兴,周俊,张建民,等.全面深化改革时代的行业协会商会发展[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2014:48-49.
[9]翟鸿祥.行业协会发展理论与实践[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003:34.
[10][美]詹姆斯·S·科尔曼.社会理论的基础[M].邓方,译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2008:43.
[11]张兵,仇军.管办分离后中国职业足球改革的路径选择与机制依赖[J].体育科学,2016,36(10):3-9.
[12]张建会,钟秉枢.全运会政策执行中的利益博弈--基于利益相关者利益视角的分析[J].武汉体育学院学报,2014,48(11):18-22.
[13]张智,孙懿,王志强.强化中央事权视角下体育项目治理的完善思路研究[J].沈阳体育学院学报,2017,36(1):112-116.
[14]周振超.当代中国政府“条块关系”研究[M].天津:天津人民出版社,2009:234.
[15]朱光磊.当代中国政府过程[M].天津:天津人民出版社,2010:266.
[16]SPIRES A J.Contingent symbiosis and civil society in an authoritarian state:Understanding the survival of China’s Grassroots NGOs[J].Am J Soc,2011,117(1):1-45.
[17]WEINGAST B R.Second generation fiscal federalism:The implications of fiscal incentives[J].J Urban Eco,2009.65(3):279-293.