上市公司税收规避对现金持有水平及价值的影响研究
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  • 英文篇名:Research on Effect of Tax Avoidance on Cash Holding Level and its Valuation in China's Listed Companies
  • 作者:王珮 ; 粟立钟 ; 丁丹
  • 英文作者:WANG Pei;SU Lizhong;DING Dan;China University of Petroleum Beijing;School of Business,Beijing Technology and Business University;China Petroleum Finance Co.Ltd;
  • 关键词:税收规避 ; 委托代理理论 ; 现金持有水平 ; 现金持有价值 ; 股权结构
  • 英文关键词:tax avoidance;;principal agent theory;;cash holding level;;value of cash holding;;ownership structure
  • 中文刊名:BJSB
  • 英文刊名:Journal of Beijing Technology and Business University(Social Sciences)
  • 机构:中国石油大学(北京)经济管理学院;北京工商大学商学院;中油财务有限责任公司;
  • 出版日期:2019-03-18
  • 出版单位:北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.34;No.206
  • 基金:中国石油大学(北京)优秀青年教师研究项目“新常态经济下国有企业业绩评价体系的构建与应用”(ZX20150129)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:BJSB201902007
  • 页数:14
  • CN:02
  • ISSN:11-4509/C
  • 分类号:67-80
摘要
以2008—2016年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,根据税收规避和现金持有相关理论,探讨了税收规避对现金持有水平以及现金持有价值的影响。研究发现,税收规避程度较高的公司,其现金持有水平和超额现金水平较低;现金冗余和现金不足的公司,其税收规避程度存在显著差异;进一步检验发现,现金冗余的公司存在因税收规避程度提高带来的信息不透明和监管薄弱,从而诱发管理层机会主义问题,这也为企业利用税收规避寻租提供了证据;此外,由于代理问题的存在和我国税收制度的特殊背景,税收规避不会显著增加现金持有价值,同时股权结构在税收规避影响现金持有价值的过程中发挥了一定的调节作用,从侧面证明了公司治理机制的重要性。
        With the listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the years from 2008 to 2016 as research object,this article explores the influence of tax avoidance on the cash holdings and the value of cash holdings based on the theory of tax avoidance and cash holdings. The research finds that those companies with higher scores in tax avoidance have relatively lower cash holdings and excess cash. There are significant differences between companies with redundant cash and with insufficient cash. Further test finds that the companies with redundant cash have the problems such as information opacity and weak supervision brought by the increased degree of tax avoidance to induce the opportunism of the management,which also provides evidence for enterprises to use tax to avoid rent-seeking. Due to the existing agent problems and China's special taxation system,tax avoidance cannot increase the value of cash holdings. At the same time,the ownership structure can impose some moderating impacts in this process. This paper proves the importance of corporate governance mechanism.
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