共享单车的治理逻辑——基于公共空间类型的对策分析
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摘要
共享单车非理性发展引发的秩序问题越来越考验城市的治理能力。借鉴可持续管理中的"状态—压力—反应"分析模型,认为公共空间的性质既影响了共享单车的治理效果,也决定了治理策略的选择。基于此,根据城市公共空间的物理属性和社会属性将其分为四种类型,并对应提出以下四种治理模式:社区主导型、市场主导型、政府主导型和协同管理型。共享单车的有效治理有赖于综合运用多种治理手段,既需要自上而下"掌舵"型管制,也需要自下而上"自主"型治理,以最终实现城市和社会的可持续发展。
The disorder problems caused by the rapid development of bicycle-sharing service test governance abilities of urban managers. This paper employed " state-pressure-response" mode of sustainable development to clarify that the type of urban public space not only influenced the governance performance of bicycle-sharing service, but also determined its governing strategies.Specifically,this paper divided urban public space into four categories according to its physical and social attributes,and put forward the following four governance modes: community-driven,market-driven,government-driven and cooperative management. This paper holds that multiple means of governance,both top-down and bottom-up,should be employed to achieve the good performance of bicycle-sharing service to ultimately realize the sustainability of city and society.
The disorder problems caused by the rapid development of bicycle-sharing service test governance abilities of urban managers. This paper employed " state-pressure-response" mode of sustainable development to clarify that the type of urban public space not only influenced the governance performance of bicycle-sharing service, but also determined its governing strategies.Specifically,this paper divided urban public space into four categories according to its physical and social attributes,and put forward the following four governance modes: community-driven,market-driven,government-driven and cooperative management. This paper holds that multiple means of governance,both top-down and bottom-up,should be employed to achieve the good performance of bicycle-sharing service to ultimately realize the sustainability of city and society.
引文
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[34] Pennington M. Elinor Ostrom and the robust political economy of common-pool resources[J]. Journal of Institutional Economics,2013,9(4):449-468.
[35]奥斯特罗姆,帕克斯,惠特克.公共服务的制度建构:都市警察服务的制度结构[M].宋全喜,任睿,译.上海:三联书店上海分店,2000.
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[37] Carlsson L, Berkes F. Co-management:concepts and methodological implications[J]. Journal of Environmental Management,2005,75(1):65.
[2]秦铮,王钦.分享经济演绎的三方协同机制:例证共享单车[J].改革,2017(5):124-134.
[3]郭鹏,林祥枝,黄艺,等.共享单车:互联网技术与公共服务中的协同治理[J].公共管理学报,2017(3):1-10.
[4]刘然,张旭霞.城市公共空间中共享单车的负外部性治理——解读、困境与规制路径[J].学习论坛,2018,34(01):71-76.
[5]诸大建,王欢明,刘淑妍.基于PSR模型的公共服务治理系统性研究[J].经济与管理研究,2010(4):75-82.
[6] Hardin G. The Tragedy of the Commons[J]. Science,1968,(162):1243-1248.
[7]曼瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海:三联书店上海分店,1995.
[8]鲍文涵,张明.从市场治理到自主治理:公共资源治理理论研究回顾与展望[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2016,37(6):58-66.
[9] North D C,Thomas R P. The first economic revolution[J].Economic History Review,2010,30(2):229-241.
[10] Cheung S N S. The structure of a contract and the theory of a non-exclusive resource[J]. Journal of Law&Economics,1970,13(1):49-70.
[11] Smith R J. Resolving the tragedy of the commons by creating private property rights in wildlife[J]. Cato Journal,1981,1(2):439-468.
[12] Hardin G. Political requirements for preserving our common heritage in Wildlife and America[M]. Washington D. C:Council on Environmental Quality,1978.
[13] Heilbronerl R L. An inquiry into the human prospect[M]. New York:Norton,1974.
[14]埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆.公共事务的治理之道:集体行动制度的演进[M].上海:上海译文出版社,2012.
[15]阳晓伟.公共产权资源治理理论的演进与进展[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2015,17(1):112-121.
[16]鄞益奋.网络治理:公共管理的新框架[J].公共管理学报,2007,4(1):89-96.
[17] Acheson J M. Institutional failure in resource management[J].Annual Review of Anthropology,2006,35(1):117-134.
[18] Aldrich J H. Elinor Ostrom and the “just right”solution[J].Public Choice,2010,143(3-4):269-273.
[19]李德华.城市规划原理[M].北京:中国建筑工业出版社,2001.
[20]王鹏.城市公共空间的系统化建设[M].南京:东南大学出版社,2002.
[21]杨保军.城市公共空间的失落与新生[J].城市规划学刊,2006(6):9-15.
[22]王欢明,诸大建.城市定点类公共服务供给模式及其治理机制研究[J].东北大学学报(社会科学版),2015,17(3):276-281.
[23]王玲,王伟强.城市公共空间的公共经济学分析[J].城市规划学刊,2002(1):40-44.
[24]陆铭,李爽.社会资本、非正式制度与经济发展[J].管理世界,2008(9):161-165.
[25]周红云.社会资本:布迪厄、科尔曼和帕特南的比较[J].经济社会体制比较,2003(4):46-53.
[26]魏娜.我国城市社区治理模式:发展演变与制度创新[J].中国人民大学学报,2003,17(1):135-140.
[27] Ostrom E. A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action[J]. The American Political Science Review,1998,92(1):1-22.
[28] Giest S, Howlett M. Understanding the pre-conditions of commons governance:the role of network management[J].Environmental Science&Policy,2014,36(36):37-47.
[29] Folke C,Hahn T,Olsson P,et al. Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems[J]. Annual Review of Environment&Resources,2005,30(30):441-473.
[30]杨留花,诸大建.扩展计划行为理论框架下共享单车规范停放行为意向的影响因素分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(04):125-133.
[31]罗必良.科斯定理:反思与拓展——兼论中国农地流转制度改革与选择[J].经济研究,2017(11):178-193.
[32]曾贤刚,唐宽昊,卢熠蕾.“围栏效应”:产权分割与草原生态系统的完整性[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(2):88-93.
[33]朱富强.共享经济的现代发展及其潜在问题:以共享单车为例的分析[J].南方经济,2017,36(7):37-50.
[34] Pennington M. Elinor Ostrom and the robust political economy of common-pool resources[J]. Journal of Institutional Economics,2013,9(4):449-468.
[35]奥斯特罗姆,帕克斯,惠特克.公共服务的制度建构:都市警察服务的制度结构[M].宋全喜,任睿,译.上海:三联书店上海分店,2000.
[36] IUCN. Resolutions and recommendations,World Conservation Congress[EB/OL].[2018-05-25]. https://www. iucn. org/content/resolutions-and-recommendations-world-conservationcongress-montreal-canada-13-23-october-1996.
[37] Carlsson L, Berkes F. Co-management:concepts and methodological implications[J]. Journal of Environmental Management,2005,75(1):65.