考虑拆解补贴分配的闭环供应链物流服务偏好研究
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摘要
本文在物流外包和物流自营两类不同物流模式下,构建了政府同时补贴制造商和拆解企业的闭环供应链模型,运用博弈论方法,对两类模型进行比较分析,研究发现:(1)补贴分配系数仅仅影响回收转移价格大小,并不会对供应链节点企业利润造成影响;(2)无论是正向供应链还是逆向供应链,当物流服务成本较小时,制造商、销售商和拆解企业均偏好于选择物流外包;当物流服务成本进一步增加时,制造商偏好于选择物流外包,销售商和拆解企业偏好于选择物流自营;当物流成本较大时,制造商、销售商和拆解企业均倾向于选择物流自营;(3)闭环供应链系统中,物流服务成本相对较小时,物流外包模式下的系统利润高于物流自营模式;物流服务成本较大时,物流外包模式下的系统利润低于物流自营模式,物流服务成本的大小决定企业物流决策。因此企业可以通过物流服务成本的大小制定相应的物流策略,以维持供应链的长期稳定性。最后通过数值算例对结论进行验证。
The papen is based on logistics outsourcing and the logistics self-operated,two closed-loop supply chain models are constructed under subsidizing manufacturer and dismantling company,and using game theory comparing and analyzing two models,the result shows:( 1) subsidy distribution coefficient only affects the transfer price and does not affect the profit of the supply chain enterprises;( 2) in the forward or reverse supply chain,when the cost of logistics services is lower,manufacturer,seller and dismantling company tend to choose logistics outsourcing; when the cost of logistics services further increases,manufacturer tends to choose logistics outsourcing,seller and dismantling company tend to choose logistics self-operated; when logistics costs are higher,manufacturer,seller and dismantling company tend to choose logistics self-operated;( 3) in the supply chain system,when the logistics service cost is relatively smaller,the profit of the supply chain system under the logistics outsourcing model is more than self-operated model; when the logistics service cost is relatively higher,the profit of the supply chain system under the logistics outsourcing model is less than self-operated model,the cost of logistics services determines the enterprise's logistics decision. Therefore,the company can formulate the corresponding logistics strategy through the cost of logistics service to maintain the long-term stability of the supply chain. Finally,a numerical example is given to verify the conclusions.
The papen is based on logistics outsourcing and the logistics self-operated,two closed-loop supply chain models are constructed under subsidizing manufacturer and dismantling company,and using game theory comparing and analyzing two models,the result shows:( 1) subsidy distribution coefficient only affects the transfer price and does not affect the profit of the supply chain enterprises;( 2) in the forward or reverse supply chain,when the cost of logistics services is lower,manufacturer,seller and dismantling company tend to choose logistics outsourcing; when the cost of logistics services further increases,manufacturer tends to choose logistics outsourcing,seller and dismantling company tend to choose logistics self-operated; when logistics costs are higher,manufacturer,seller and dismantling company tend to choose logistics self-operated;( 3) in the supply chain system,when the logistics service cost is relatively smaller,the profit of the supply chain system under the logistics outsourcing model is more than self-operated model; when the logistics service cost is relatively higher,the profit of the supply chain system under the logistics outsourcing model is less than self-operated model,the cost of logistics services determines the enterprise's logistics decision. Therefore,the company can formulate the corresponding logistics strategy through the cost of logistics service to maintain the long-term stability of the supply chain. Finally,a numerical example is given to verify the conclusions.
引文
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[2] Savaskan R C,Wassenhove L N. Reverse Channel Design:The Case of Competing Retailers[J]. Management Science,2006,52(1):1~14.
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[4] Gu Q,Ji J,Gao T. Pricing Decisions for Reverse Supply Chains[J]. Kybernete,2011,40(5):831~841.
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[7]冯章伟,肖条军,柴彩春.第三方回收商领导型两级闭环供应链的回收与定价策略[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(1):118~127.
[8]陈军,田大钢.闭环供应链模型下的产品回收模式选择[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(1):88~97.
[9] Mitra S,Webster S. Competion in Remanufacturing and Effects of Government Subide[J]. Production Economic,2008,111(2):287~298
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[11]孙浩,张桂涛,钟永光,等.政府补贴下制造商回收的多期闭环供应链网络均衡[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(1):56~64.
[12]赵敬华,林杰.不同补贴对象下的闭环供应链定价模型[J].管理工程学报,2017,31(1):85~92.
[13] Tian Y,Govindan K,Zhu Q. A System Dynamics Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Green Supply Chain Management Diffusion Among Chinese Manufacturers[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production,2014,80:96~105.
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[15]李新然,王奇琦.政府补贴下考虑销售努力的闭环供应链研究[J].科研管理,2017,38(8):51~63..
[16]陈晓红,汪继,王傅强.消费者偏好和政府补贴下双渠道闭环供应链决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(12):3111~3122.
[17]公彦德,达庆利,占济舟.基于处理基金和拆解补贴的电器电子产品CLSC研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):97~105.
[18]刘永清,谢紫微,龚清明,等.考虑拆解补贴和回收竞争程度的废旧家电回收模型[J].系统工程,2016,34(4):117~125.
[19]舒彤,肖雨晴,陈收.政府补贴对再制造闭环供应链的影响研究[J].工业技术经济,2017,36(8):68~73.
[20]王玉燕,李帮义,申亮. TPL-CLSC的协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(5):101~106.
[21]公彦德,李帮义,刘涛.基于物流费用分摊比例的闭环供应链模型[J].系统工程学报,2011,26(1):39~49.
[22] Liang Y,Zuo X,Lei H. Research on Supply Chain Coordination of TPL Supplier Participation[J]. Science&Technology Management Research,2013,4(1):1~7.
[23]公彦德,达庆利.闭环供应链主导模式与物流模式的组合研究[J].管理科学学报,2015,18(10):14~25.
[24]张福安,达庆利,公彦德.考虑双向主导相异的闭环供应链物流策略与补贴机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):44~51.
[25] Garg K,Agarwal V,Jha PC. Transportation Decision Making Through Logistics Outsourcing and 3PL Selection in an Integrated Closed-Loop Supply Chain[J]. Springer India,2015,336:477~489.
[26] Giri B C,Sarker B R. Improving Performance By Coordinating a Supply Chain with Third Party Logistics Outsourcing Under Production Disruption[J]. Computers&Industrial Engineering,2017,(103):168~177.
[2] Savaskan R C,Wassenhove L N. Reverse Channel Design:The Case of Competing Retailers[J]. Management Science,2006,52(1):1~14.
[3]熊中楷,梁晓萍.考虑消费者环保意识的闭环供应链回收模式研究[J].软科学,2014,28(11):61~66.
[4] Gu Q,Ji J,Gao T. Pricing Decisions for Reverse Supply Chains[J]. Kybernete,2011,40(5):831~841.
[5]李明芳,薛景梅.不同渠道权力结构下制造商回收闭环供应链绩效分析[J].控制与决策,2016,31(11):2095~2100.
[6]公彦德,蒋雨薇.闭环供应链混合回收模式定价及渠道选择研究[J].软科学,2018,32(5):127~131.
[7]冯章伟,肖条军,柴彩春.第三方回收商领导型两级闭环供应链的回收与定价策略[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(1):118~127.
[8]陈军,田大钢.闭环供应链模型下的产品回收模式选择[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(1):88~97.
[9] Mitra S,Webster S. Competion in Remanufacturing and Effects of Government Subide[J]. Production Economic,2008,111(2):287~298
[10]张汉江,余华英,李聪颖.闭环供应链上的回收激励契约设计与政府补贴再制造政策的优化[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(8):71~78.
[11]孙浩,张桂涛,钟永光,等.政府补贴下制造商回收的多期闭环供应链网络均衡[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(1):56~64.
[12]赵敬华,林杰.不同补贴对象下的闭环供应链定价模型[J].管理工程学报,2017,31(1):85~92.
[13] Tian Y,Govindan K,Zhu Q. A System Dynamics Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Green Supply Chain Management Diffusion Among Chinese Manufacturers[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production,2014,80:96~105.
[14] Zhou J,Zhang G,Liu P,et al. The Analysis on Carbon Emission Reduction Effect of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Government's Recovering Subsidy[C]. 2011 Fourth International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization(CSO),2011:1172~1176.
[15]李新然,王奇琦.政府补贴下考虑销售努力的闭环供应链研究[J].科研管理,2017,38(8):51~63..
[16]陈晓红,汪继,王傅强.消费者偏好和政府补贴下双渠道闭环供应链决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(12):3111~3122.
[17]公彦德,达庆利,占济舟.基于处理基金和拆解补贴的电器电子产品CLSC研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):97~105.
[18]刘永清,谢紫微,龚清明,等.考虑拆解补贴和回收竞争程度的废旧家电回收模型[J].系统工程,2016,34(4):117~125.
[19]舒彤,肖雨晴,陈收.政府补贴对再制造闭环供应链的影响研究[J].工业技术经济,2017,36(8):68~73.
[20]王玉燕,李帮义,申亮. TPL-CLSC的协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(5):101~106.
[21]公彦德,李帮义,刘涛.基于物流费用分摊比例的闭环供应链模型[J].系统工程学报,2011,26(1):39~49.
[22] Liang Y,Zuo X,Lei H. Research on Supply Chain Coordination of TPL Supplier Participation[J]. Science&Technology Management Research,2013,4(1):1~7.
[23]公彦德,达庆利.闭环供应链主导模式与物流模式的组合研究[J].管理科学学报,2015,18(10):14~25.
[24]张福安,达庆利,公彦德.考虑双向主导相异的闭环供应链物流策略与补贴机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):44~51.
[25] Garg K,Agarwal V,Jha PC. Transportation Decision Making Through Logistics Outsourcing and 3PL Selection in an Integrated Closed-Loop Supply Chain[J]. Springer India,2015,336:477~489.
[26] Giri B C,Sarker B R. Improving Performance By Coordinating a Supply Chain with Third Party Logistics Outsourcing Under Production Disruption[J]. Computers&Industrial Engineering,2017,(103):168~177.