供应链上游食品质量检测的信号博弈策略
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摘要
运用信号博弈方法,通过构建食品供应链供求企业的信号博弈模型,研究由原材料供应商和食品加工商组成的两级食品供应链质量检测选择的策略及其影响因素,结果表明:其一,当伪装成本过高时,不同类型的原材料供应商制定不同的批发价可以作为传递自己供应高低质量原材料的信号;食品加工商在供应商选择高批发价时不进行质检,在供应商选择低批发价时选择质检。其二,当伪装成本较低时,批发价作为信号传递作用将减弱以至不存在;原材料供应商选择高批发价,食品加工商则根据惩罚成本是否大于检测成功成本而选择质检或不质检。
In this paper,the signal game model of supply and demand enterprises is used to study the strategy and influencing factors of quality testing and selection of two-level food supply chain composed of raw material suppliers and food processors. The results show that: Firstly,When the disguised cost is too high,different wholesale prices set by different types of food suppliers can be used as a signal to deliver the quality of raw materials. Food processors choose not to make quality inspection when suppliers select a high wholesale price,while choosing to do it when suppliers select a low wholesale price. Secondly,When the disguised cost is low,the wholesale price will be weakened as a signal transmission. Food suppliers choose high wholesale prices,and food processors will make their decision whether to do the inspection according to whether the cost of punishment is greater than the cost of successful testing.
In this paper,the signal game model of supply and demand enterprises is used to study the strategy and influencing factors of quality testing and selection of two-level food supply chain composed of raw material suppliers and food processors. The results show that: Firstly,When the disguised cost is too high,different wholesale prices set by different types of food suppliers can be used as a signal to deliver the quality of raw materials. Food processors choose not to make quality inspection when suppliers select a high wholesale price,while choosing to do it when suppliers select a low wholesale price. Secondly,When the disguised cost is low,the wholesale price will be weakened as a signal transmission. Food suppliers choose high wholesale prices,and food processors will make their decision whether to do the inspection according to whether the cost of punishment is greater than the cost of successful testing.
引文
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[16]陆晓鸣,席酉民.一个关于最优价格、质量和广告策略的动态最优控制模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,1996,16(12):17-21.
[17]王可山.食品安全信息问题研究述评[J].经济学动态,2012(8):92-96.
[18]许民利,王俏,欧阳林寒.食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(5):131-141.
[2]刘晓丽,李建标,刘彦平.食品供应链管理、可追溯性与食品安全管理绩效[J].经济与管理研究,2016,37(8):102-109.
[3]慕静.食品安全监管模式创新与食品供应链安全风险控制的研究[J].食品工业科技,2012,33(10):49-51.
[4]刘永胜.食品供应链风险相关概念辨析[J].经济问题,2014(8):12-15.
[5]朱立龙,尤建新.非对称信息供应链质量信号传递博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):109-118.
[6]潘文军,王健.食品安全问题研究:基于供应链网络视角[J].中国科技论坛,2014(9):155-160.
[7]ORTEGA D L,WANG H H,WU L,et al.Modeling heterogeneity in consumer preferences for select food safety attributes in China[J].Food Policy,2011,36(2):318-324.
[8]吴元元.信息基础、声誉机制与执法优化:食品安全治理的新视野[J].中国社会科学,2012(6):115-133.
[9]龚强,张一林,余建宇.激励、信息与食品安全规制[J].经济研究,2013(3):135-147.
[10]HWANG I,RADHAKRISHNAN S,SU L.Vendor certification and appraisal:implications for supplier quality[J].Management Science,2006,52(10):1472-1482.
[11]FOSTER S T.Toward an understanding of supply chain quality management[J].Journal of Operations Management,2008,4(26):461-467.
[12]KAYNAK H,HARTLEY J L.A replication and extension of quality management into the supply chain[J].Journal of Operations Management,2008,26(4):468-489.
[13]UNNEVHR L,HOFFMANN V.Food safety management and regulation:international experiences and lessons for China[J].Journal of Integrative Agriculture,2015,14(11):2218-2230.
[14]洪江涛,黄沛.两级供应链上质量控制的动态协调机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):62-65.
[15]朱立龙,尤建新.供应链节点企业间产品质量控制策略研究[C].中国管理科学学术年会,2009:336-342.
[16]陆晓鸣,席酉民.一个关于最优价格、质量和广告策略的动态最优控制模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,1996,16(12):17-21.
[17]王可山.食品安全信息问题研究述评[J].经济学动态,2012(8):92-96.
[18]许民利,王俏,欧阳林寒.食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(5):131-141.