双重信息非对称下供应链的商业信用契约
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摘要
论文研究了逆向选择和道德风险并存情形下商业信用在供应链中的激励作用。基于一个简单的二层供应链系统,结合Stackelberg博弈理论和机制设计理论,分别构建单一信息非对称和双重信息非对称的商业信用激励模型,推导并比较了两种信息结构下商业信用契约的最优配置和销售商的最优订购决策。进一步分析了销售商库存成本、市场规模等参数对激励契约和销售商最优决策,以及供应链成员和系统收益的影响。研究表明:通过设计合理的商业信用激励契约,可诱使销售商披露其真实成本信息并激励其付出足够的销售努力。
There exists the asymmetric information in supply chain management.Information asymmetry could cause adverse selection and moral hazard which often coexist.Trade credit is not only an effective short-term financing channel but also a kind of incentive and coordination mechanism in the supply chain.The incentive effect of trade credit on the supply chain is considered under the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard.In the two-tier supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer,the manufacturer provides trade credit to the retailer,allowing the retailer to delay payment for goods.Based on game theory and incentive mechanism theory,the manufacturer provides the retailerwith trade credit contract menu{t,T}whichincludes trade credit periodt and transfer payment T.The contract menu couldencourage the retailer to reveal its true inventory holding cost information and improve its sales effort level.First,we construct trade credit incentive modelsunder single-information asymmetry(moral hazard).Based on this,trade credit incentive models are built under dual asymmetric information.The corresponding optimal trade credit contracts are obtained by adopting the method of extremum principle and mathematical programming.Further,the retailer's optimal sales efforts level and optimal order quantity are deduced.Under the two different information structures,the optimal decisions of supply chain members and the profits of the two members and the whole system are compared,and then the incentive effects of trade credit are discussed.By numerical simulation,the effectiveness of the optimal trade credit contract is verifiecl and then the influence of the retailer's inventory holding costs on the contract parameters,the retailer's decision variables and the profits of the supply chain,is analyzed.The results show that the reasonably designed trade credit contracts could motivate the retailer to disclose its real cost and also inspire the retailer to make enough efforts.
There exists the asymmetric information in supply chain management.Information asymmetry could cause adverse selection and moral hazard which often coexist.Trade credit is not only an effective short-term financing channel but also a kind of incentive and coordination mechanism in the supply chain.The incentive effect of trade credit on the supply chain is considered under the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard.In the two-tier supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer,the manufacturer provides trade credit to the retailer,allowing the retailer to delay payment for goods.Based on game theory and incentive mechanism theory,the manufacturer provides the retailerwith trade credit contract menu{t,T}whichincludes trade credit periodt and transfer payment T.The contract menu couldencourage the retailer to reveal its true inventory holding cost information and improve its sales effort level.First,we construct trade credit incentive modelsunder single-information asymmetry(moral hazard).Based on this,trade credit incentive models are built under dual asymmetric information.The corresponding optimal trade credit contracts are obtained by adopting the method of extremum principle and mathematical programming.Further,the retailer's optimal sales efforts level and optimal order quantity are deduced.Under the two different information structures,the optimal decisions of supply chain members and the profits of the two members and the whole system are compared,and then the incentive effects of trade credit are discussed.By numerical simulation,the effectiveness of the optimal trade credit contract is verifiecl and then the influence of the retailer's inventory holding costs on the contract parameters,the retailer's decision variables and the profits of the supply chain,is analyzed.The results show that the reasonably designed trade credit contracts could motivate the retailer to disclose its real cost and also inspire the retailer to make enough efforts.
引文
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[4]陈祥锋.资金约束供应链中商业信用合同的决策与价[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(12):13-20.
[5]王志宏,邵奇明,袁袁.贸易信用和收入共享组合合同下集成服务提供商与其客户间的协调[J].管理工程学报,2015,29(1):143-148.
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[10]Jaggi C K,Yadavalli V S S,Verma M,et al.An EOQ model with allowable shortage under trade credit in different scenario[J].Applied Mathematics and Computation,2015,252(C):541–551.
[11]Wang Yiju,Sun Xuefang,MengFanxiu.On the conditional and partial trade credit policy with capital constraints:A Stackelberg model[J].Applied Mathematical Modelling,2016,40(1):1-18.
[12]Luo Jianwen.Buyer-vendor inventory coordination with credit period incentives[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2007,108(1-2):143-152.
[13]Lee C H,Rhee B D.Trade credit for supply chain coordination[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2011,214(1):136-146.
[14]Zhong Yuanguang,Zhou Yongwu.Improving the supply chain’s performance through trade credit under inventory-dependent demand and limited storage capacity[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,143(2):364-370.
[15]OuyangL Y,Ho C H,Su C H,et al.An integrated inventory model with capacity constraint and order-size dependent trade credit[J].Computers&Industrial Engineering,2015,84(6):133-143.
[16]李群霞,王文彬,张群.供应链库存商业信用协调的研[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(2):58-65.
[17]秦娟娟,白晓健,张琛.VMI模式下考虑商业信用的供应链协调机制研究[J].管理评论,2016,28(3):207-220.
[18]Zhang Qinhong,Luo Jianwen.Coordination of supply chain with trade credit under bilateral information asymmetry[J].SystemsEngineering-Theory&Practice,2009,29(9):32-40.
[19]Luo Jianwen,Zhang Qinhong.Trade credit:A newmechanism to coordinate supply chain[J].Operations Research Letters,2012,40(5):378-384.
[20]何伟,徐福缘.非对称信息下的供需企业协调机制研[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(SI):508-512.
[21]马中华,陈祥锋.筛选不同竞争类型销售商的贸易信用合同设计研究[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(10):13-23.
[22]王志宏,夏青.非对称信息下供应商的最优商业信用契约[J].系统管理学报,2016,25(4):759-766.
[23]于丽萍,黄小原,李丽君.非对称信息下供应链中商业信用激励契约研究[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2008,29(1):141-144.
[24]Theilen B.Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents[J].Economics Letters,2003,79(2):283-289.
[25]Meng Dawen,Tian Guoqiang.Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensionaltypes[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2013,77(1):377-404.
[26]Berndt A,Gupta A.Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2009,56(5):725-743.
[27]Chen Fangruo.Salesforce incentives,marketing information,and production inventory planning[J].Management Science,2005,51(1):60-75.
[28]田厚平,刘长贤.双重信息不对称下销售渠道双目标混合激励模型[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(3):34-47.
[29]曹柬,杨春节,李平,等.不对称信息下供应链线性分成制契约设计研究[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(2):19-30.
[30]刘克宁,宋华明.不对称信息下创新产品研发外包的甄别契约设计[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(10):52-58.
[31]陈克贵,宋学锋,张明慧,等.信息不对称条件下煤矿企业安全监管激励机制[J].系统工程,2016,34(4):33-40.
[32]王文宾,赵学娟,张鹏,等.双重信息不对称下闭环供应链的激励机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):69-77.
[33]Chick S E,HasijiaS,Nasiry J.Information elicitation and influenza Vaccine Production[J].Operations Research,2017,65(1):75-96.
[2]Ferrando A,Mulier K.Do firms use the trade credit channel to manage growth?[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2013,37(8):3035-3046.
[3]Lin T T,Chou J H.Trade credit and bank loan:Evidence from Chinese firms[J].International Review of Economics&Finance,2015,36(SI):17-29.
[4]陈祥锋.资金约束供应链中商业信用合同的决策与价[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(12):13-20.
[5]王志宏,邵奇明,袁袁.贸易信用和收入共享组合合同下集成服务提供商与其客户间的协调[J].管理工程学报,2015,29(1):143-148.
[6]Haley C W,Higgins R C.Inventory policy and trade credit financing[J].Management Science,1973,20(4-Part-I):464-471.
[7]Goyal S K.Economic order quantity under conditions of permissible delay in payments[J].Journal of the Operational Research Society,1985,36(4):1069-1069.
[8]Sana S S,Chaudhuri K S.A deterministic EOQ model with delays in payments and price-discount offers[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2008,184(2):509-533.
[9]Taleizadeh A A,Pentico D W,Jabalameli M S,et al.An EOQ model with partial delayed payment and partial backordering[J].Omega,2013,41(2):354-368.
[10]Jaggi C K,Yadavalli V S S,Verma M,et al.An EOQ model with allowable shortage under trade credit in different scenario[J].Applied Mathematics and Computation,2015,252(C):541–551.
[11]Wang Yiju,Sun Xuefang,MengFanxiu.On the conditional and partial trade credit policy with capital constraints:A Stackelberg model[J].Applied Mathematical Modelling,2016,40(1):1-18.
[12]Luo Jianwen.Buyer-vendor inventory coordination with credit period incentives[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2007,108(1-2):143-152.
[13]Lee C H,Rhee B D.Trade credit for supply chain coordination[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2011,214(1):136-146.
[14]Zhong Yuanguang,Zhou Yongwu.Improving the supply chain’s performance through trade credit under inventory-dependent demand and limited storage capacity[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,143(2):364-370.
[15]OuyangL Y,Ho C H,Su C H,et al.An integrated inventory model with capacity constraint and order-size dependent trade credit[J].Computers&Industrial Engineering,2015,84(6):133-143.
[16]李群霞,王文彬,张群.供应链库存商业信用协调的研[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(2):58-65.
[17]秦娟娟,白晓健,张琛.VMI模式下考虑商业信用的供应链协调机制研究[J].管理评论,2016,28(3):207-220.
[18]Zhang Qinhong,Luo Jianwen.Coordination of supply chain with trade credit under bilateral information asymmetry[J].SystemsEngineering-Theory&Practice,2009,29(9):32-40.
[19]Luo Jianwen,Zhang Qinhong.Trade credit:A newmechanism to coordinate supply chain[J].Operations Research Letters,2012,40(5):378-384.
[20]何伟,徐福缘.非对称信息下的供需企业协调机制研[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(SI):508-512.
[21]马中华,陈祥锋.筛选不同竞争类型销售商的贸易信用合同设计研究[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(10):13-23.
[22]王志宏,夏青.非对称信息下供应商的最优商业信用契约[J].系统管理学报,2016,25(4):759-766.
[23]于丽萍,黄小原,李丽君.非对称信息下供应链中商业信用激励契约研究[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2008,29(1):141-144.
[24]Theilen B.Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents[J].Economics Letters,2003,79(2):283-289.
[25]Meng Dawen,Tian Guoqiang.Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensionaltypes[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2013,77(1):377-404.
[26]Berndt A,Gupta A.Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2009,56(5):725-743.
[27]Chen Fangruo.Salesforce incentives,marketing information,and production inventory planning[J].Management Science,2005,51(1):60-75.
[28]田厚平,刘长贤.双重信息不对称下销售渠道双目标混合激励模型[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(3):34-47.
[29]曹柬,杨春节,李平,等.不对称信息下供应链线性分成制契约设计研究[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(2):19-30.
[30]刘克宁,宋华明.不对称信息下创新产品研发外包的甄别契约设计[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(10):52-58.
[31]陈克贵,宋学锋,张明慧,等.信息不对称条件下煤矿企业安全监管激励机制[J].系统工程,2016,34(4):33-40.
[32]王文宾,赵学娟,张鹏,等.双重信息不对称下闭环供应链的激励机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):69-77.
[33]Chick S E,HasijiaS,Nasiry J.Information elicitation and influenza Vaccine Production[J].Operations Research,2017,65(1):75-96.