健全党和国家监督体系论纲
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摘要
党的十九大首次提出要从"健全党和国家监督体系"的角度优化权力制约监督机制,这是完善"决策权、执行权和监督权既相互制约又相互协调"的中国特色社会主义权力运行机制的重大创新。在"人民主权"基础上形成的党的执政体制,塑造了中国权力运行的监督结构,进而决定了"党和国家监督体系"在党和国家建设中的重要角色。"健全党和国家监督体系"的提出,是执政党对社会主义国家权力运行规律认识持续深化、理论逐渐丰富、不断推进制度创新的结果。"健全党和国家监督体系"的内在逻辑是同步优化党的监督体系与国家监督体系,在充分发挥各自功能的基础上实现两者的高度协调、深度融合,在由"分散"到"统一"的权力监督变革中形成整体合力。党的十八大以来,党的监督体系建设深入推进,进而催生贯通党和国家监督的监察体制改革,随之又带来国家监督体系的深度整合。国家监督体系主要由以人大监督为中心,以监察监督、检察监督、审计监督为支撑的国家机关监督体系构成。当前,健全党和国家监督体系有四个着力点,即持续健全党内监督;全面强化人大监督;统筹协调国家机关监督;充分保障对监督者的监督。
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed for the first time to optimize the power restriction and supervision mechanism from the perspective of " improving Party and state oversight system". This is a major innovation in improving the exercise of power of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The party 's ruling system formed on the basis of " people 's sovereignty" has shaped the supervision structure over the exercise of power,and then determined the important role of " Party and state oversight system" in Party and state construction. The proposal of " improving Party and state oversight system" is the result of the ruling party's deepening understanding of the law of the exercise of power in socialist countries,gradual enrichment of theories,and continuous advancement of institutional innovation. The internal logic of " improving Party and state oversight system" is to simultaneously optimize the Party's oversight system and the state oversight system,realize the high degree of coordination and deep integration of the two on the basis of giving full play to their respective functions,and create an overall synergy in the reform of power oversight from " distribution" to " unification".Since the 18 th CPC National Congress,the building of the Party 's oversight system has been further promoted,which in turn has led to the reform of oversight system that is applied both within the Party and the state,and further has brought about the deep integration of national oversight system. The state oversight system is mainly composed of the supervision system of the state organs with the supervision by the people's congress as the center and supported by supervision by inspection commissions,procuratorial supervision and audit supervision. At present,there are four focuses in improving Party and state oversight system: to continuously improve the intraparty oversight; to comprehensively strengthen the oversight by the people's congress; to coordinate and supervise the oversight by state organs; and to fully guarantee the supervision over supervisors.
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed for the first time to optimize the power restriction and supervision mechanism from the perspective of " improving Party and state oversight system". This is a major innovation in improving the exercise of power of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The party 's ruling system formed on the basis of " people 's sovereignty" has shaped the supervision structure over the exercise of power,and then determined the important role of " Party and state oversight system" in Party and state construction. The proposal of " improving Party and state oversight system" is the result of the ruling party's deepening understanding of the law of the exercise of power in socialist countries,gradual enrichment of theories,and continuous advancement of institutional innovation. The internal logic of " improving Party and state oversight system" is to simultaneously optimize the Party's oversight system and the state oversight system,realize the high degree of coordination and deep integration of the two on the basis of giving full play to their respective functions,and create an overall synergy in the reform of power oversight from " distribution" to " unification".Since the 18 th CPC National Congress,the building of the Party 's oversight system has been further promoted,which in turn has led to the reform of oversight system that is applied both within the Party and the state,and further has brought about the deep integration of national oversight system. The state oversight system is mainly composed of the supervision system of the state organs with the supervision by the people's congress as the center and supported by supervision by inspection commissions,procuratorial supervision and audit supervision. At present,there are four focuses in improving Party and state oversight system: to continuously improve the intraparty oversight; to comprehensively strengthen the oversight by the people's congress; to coordinate and supervise the oversight by state organs; and to fully guarantee the supervision over supervisors.
引文
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[4]张晋藩.中国古代监察法的历史价值———中华法系的一个视角[J].政法论坛,2005,(6):84-93.
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[10]孙晓春.卢梭的人民主权论与中国近代的民主进程[J].贵州社会科学,2009,(5):113-120.
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[15]中国大百科全书(法学卷)[M].北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2002.
[16]习近平.在首都各界纪念现行宪法公布施行30周年大会上的讲话[C]//.习近平谈治国理政(第1卷).北京:外文出版社,2014.
[17]十五大以来重要文献选编(上)[M].北京:中央文献出版社,2000.
[18]李莉.国家监察体制改革视域下的制度设计变迁———新中国成立以来权力监督的历史梳理[J].当代世界与社会主义,2018,(3):179-187.
[19]秦前红.我国监察机关的宪法定位以国家机关相互间的关系为中心[J].中外法学,2018,(3):555-569.
[20]钱小平.监察委员会监督职能激活及其制度构建———兼评《监察法》的中国特色[J].华东政法大学学报,2018,(3):39-48.
[21]魏昌东.监督职能是国家监察委员会的第一职能:理论逻辑与实现路径———兼论中国特色监察监督系统的规范性创建[J].法学论坛,2019,(1):25-36.
[22]陈瑞华.论国家监察权的性质[J].比较法研究,2019,(1):1-15.
[23]习近平.不断提高运用中国特色社会主义制度有效治理国家的能力[C]//.习近平谈治国理政(第1卷).北京:外文出版社,2014.
[24]李广德,王晨光.党内权力监督法治化的法理论证[J].马克思主义与现实,2018,(1):163-171.
[25]孔令望,等.国家监督论[M].杭州:浙江人民出版社,1991.
[26]程竹汝.授权与监督:论完善人民代表大会制度的几个问题[J].学术月刊,2005,(6):23-27.
[27]黄明涛.“最高国家权力机关”的权力边界[J].中国法学,2019,(1):104-121.
[28]靳海婷.论人大监督权与监察委监察权之关系、界限与衔接[J].华侨大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2018,(5):81-96.
[29]林彦.论人大执法检查对审判权运行的影响[J].政治与法律,2019,(2):2-13.
[30]彭新林.国家监察体制改革:历史借鉴与现实动因[J].法学杂志,2019,(1):44-55.
[31]左卫民,唐清宇.制约模式:监察机关与检察机关的关系模式思考[J].现代法学,2018,(4):18-27.
[32]蔡金荣.“国家监察全面覆盖”的规范结构探析[J].求实,2019,(1):29-47+110.
[33]江必新.十八大以来中国司法理论的发展与创新[N].民主与法制时报,2015-07-23.
[34]景跃进.中国特色的权力制约之路———关于权力制约的两种研究策略之辨析[J].经济社会体制比较,2017,(4):32-44+148.
(1)有学者考证了权力监督的思想谱系,认为西方政治思想家洛克通过颠覆“君权神授”学说,确立了对权力的法律---道德双重制约与监督原则。虽然洛克并未完善权力制约的缜密逻辑,也未构建精密的权力监督体系,但无论如何,其将权力监督与制约提上了理论视野。参见:王天海.权力监督的思想谱系及其当代启示[J].中国人民大学学报,2019,(1)。
[2]陈光中,邵俊.我国监察体制改革若干问题思考[J].中国法学,2017,(4):23-36.
[3]朱莲华,邱永明.论中国古代监察制度的性质[J].上海大学学报(社会科学版),1996,(2):63-68.
[4]张晋藩.中国古代监察法的历史价值———中华法系的一个视角[J].政法论坛,2005,(6):84-93.
[5]袁刚.封建皇权和中国古代的监察监督[J].法学杂志,2000,(3):57-59.
[6]马克思恩格斯选集(第4卷)[M].北京:人民出版社,2012.
[7]马克思恩格斯选集(第1卷)[M].北京:人民出版社,1995.
[8]马克思恩格斯选集(第2卷)[M].北京:人民出版社,1972.
[9]王天海.权力监督的思想谱系及其当代启示[J].中国人民大学学报,2019,(1):73-82.
[10]孙晓春.卢梭的人民主权论与中国近代的民主进程[J].贵州社会科学,2009,(5):113-120.
[11]蔡定剑.国家监督制度[M].北京:中国法制出版社,1991.
[12]十八大以来重要文献选编(中)[M].北京:中央文献出版社,2016.
[13]陈国权,等.权力制约监督论[M].杭州:浙江大学出版社,2013.
[14]陈国权,周鲁耀.制约与监督:两种不同的权力逻辑[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2013,(6):43-51.
[15]中国大百科全书(法学卷)[M].北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2002.
[16]习近平.在首都各界纪念现行宪法公布施行30周年大会上的讲话[C]//.习近平谈治国理政(第1卷).北京:外文出版社,2014.
[17]十五大以来重要文献选编(上)[M].北京:中央文献出版社,2000.
[18]李莉.国家监察体制改革视域下的制度设计变迁———新中国成立以来权力监督的历史梳理[J].当代世界与社会主义,2018,(3):179-187.
[19]秦前红.我国监察机关的宪法定位以国家机关相互间的关系为中心[J].中外法学,2018,(3):555-569.
[20]钱小平.监察委员会监督职能激活及其制度构建———兼评《监察法》的中国特色[J].华东政法大学学报,2018,(3):39-48.
[21]魏昌东.监督职能是国家监察委员会的第一职能:理论逻辑与实现路径———兼论中国特色监察监督系统的规范性创建[J].法学论坛,2019,(1):25-36.
[22]陈瑞华.论国家监察权的性质[J].比较法研究,2019,(1):1-15.
[23]习近平.不断提高运用中国特色社会主义制度有效治理国家的能力[C]//.习近平谈治国理政(第1卷).北京:外文出版社,2014.
[24]李广德,王晨光.党内权力监督法治化的法理论证[J].马克思主义与现实,2018,(1):163-171.
[25]孔令望,等.国家监督论[M].杭州:浙江人民出版社,1991.
[26]程竹汝.授权与监督:论完善人民代表大会制度的几个问题[J].学术月刊,2005,(6):23-27.
[27]黄明涛.“最高国家权力机关”的权力边界[J].中国法学,2019,(1):104-121.
[28]靳海婷.论人大监督权与监察委监察权之关系、界限与衔接[J].华侨大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2018,(5):81-96.
[29]林彦.论人大执法检查对审判权运行的影响[J].政治与法律,2019,(2):2-13.
[30]彭新林.国家监察体制改革:历史借鉴与现实动因[J].法学杂志,2019,(1):44-55.
[31]左卫民,唐清宇.制约模式:监察机关与检察机关的关系模式思考[J].现代法学,2018,(4):18-27.
[32]蔡金荣.“国家监察全面覆盖”的规范结构探析[J].求实,2019,(1):29-47+110.
[33]江必新.十八大以来中国司法理论的发展与创新[N].民主与法制时报,2015-07-23.
[34]景跃进.中国特色的权力制约之路———关于权力制约的两种研究策略之辨析[J].经济社会体制比较,2017,(4):32-44+148.
(1)有学者考证了权力监督的思想谱系,认为西方政治思想家洛克通过颠覆“君权神授”学说,确立了对权力的法律---道德双重制约与监督原则。虽然洛克并未完善权力制约的缜密逻辑,也未构建精密的权力监督体系,但无论如何,其将权力监督与制约提上了理论视野。参见:王天海.权力监督的思想谱系及其当代启示[J].中国人民大学学报,2019,(1)。