不同权利结构下基于自执行旁支付契约的低碳供应链合作减排策略
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摘要
针对由供应商和制造商组成的两级供应链的定价与减排决策问题,提出了基于自执行旁支付的利润契约机制对供应链进行协调。考虑消费者在对产品减排偏好程度的基础上,从"竞合"关系上对单渠道销售环境下的供应链参与者的运作进行研究。首先,通过建立两级供应链利润函数,讨论了不同主导力情形下供应链的定价与减排策略;然后,通过对均衡决策与最优利润的比较,提出了基于自执行旁支付的利润契约机制对供应链进行协调;最后,通过算例分析,进一步探讨了供应商和制造商通过自执行旁支付的供应链协调效率问题。发现政府加大对低碳环保型产品的宣传,能够有效地推动消费者环保意识的提高,有利于实现环境与经济的和谐发展。
This paper studies the pricing and emission reduction decision-making of a two-level supply chain composed of suppliers and manufacturers,and proposes a profit contract based on the contract with self-executing and payment by others. Considering consumers' preference for emission reduction products,this paper studies the operation of supply chain participants in a single channel marketing environment from the perspective of "competition-cooperation"relationship. By setting up a two-level supply chain profit function,the pricing and emission reduction strategies of supply chain under different dominant forces are discussed. And by comparing the equilibrium decision with the optimal profit,this paper proposes to coordinate the supply chain based on the contract mechanism of profit paid by execution. Finally, through the numerical simulation, the efficiency of supply chain coordination between suppliers and manufacturers is discussed. It is found that increasing the publicity of low-carbon environmental protection products by the government can effectively promote the improvement of consumers ' awareness of environmental protection, and is conducive to the harmonious development of environment and economy.
This paper studies the pricing and emission reduction decision-making of a two-level supply chain composed of suppliers and manufacturers,and proposes a profit contract based on the contract with self-executing and payment by others. Considering consumers' preference for emission reduction products,this paper studies the operation of supply chain participants in a single channel marketing environment from the perspective of "competition-cooperation"relationship. By setting up a two-level supply chain profit function,the pricing and emission reduction strategies of supply chain under different dominant forces are discussed. And by comparing the equilibrium decision with the optimal profit,this paper proposes to coordinate the supply chain based on the contract mechanism of profit paid by execution. Finally, through the numerical simulation, the efficiency of supply chain coordination between suppliers and manufacturers is discussed. It is found that increasing the publicity of low-carbon environmental protection products by the government can effectively promote the improvement of consumers ' awareness of environmental protection, and is conducive to the harmonious development of environment and economy.
引文
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[8]谢鑫鹏,赵道致,刘永军.需求具有碳排放敏感性的低碳供应链收益共享寄售契约[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(1):107-115.
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[10]杨满,汪传旭,徐朗.考虑搭便车的双渠道供应链定价与减排决策[J].计算机工程与应用,2018,54(14):229-235.
[11]HE R,XIONG Y,LIN Z.Carbon emissions in a dual channel closed loop supply chain:the impact of consumer free riding behavior[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,134:384-394.
[12]邓红星,李嘉璐.低碳排放约束下城市停车换乘设施规划研究[J].重庆理工大学学报(自然科学),2018,32(5):119-125.
[13]宋健,赵怡芳.京津冀能源消费碳排放分解比较研究[J].重庆理工大学学报(自然科学),2018,32(2):141-148.
[14]徐朗,汪传旭,施陈玲,等.不同契约机制下考虑再制造的双渠道供应链决策[J].控制与决策,2017,32(11):2005-2012.
[15]LI Y,XIE X,LIU Q.Study on longitudinal emission reduction investment of supply chain and government’s subsidy policy[J].Journal of Intelligent&Fuzzy Systems,2018,34(2):1177-1186.
[2]叶同,关志民,陶瑾,等.考虑消费者低碳偏好和参考低碳水平效应的供应链联合减排动态优化与协调[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(10):55-64.
[3]王一雷,朱庆华,夏西强.基于消费偏好的供应链上下游联合减排协调契约博弈模型[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(4):188-198.
[4]朱庆华,窦一杰.基于政府补贴分析的绿色供应链管理博弈模型[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(6):86-95.
[5]LIU Z L,ANDERSON T D,CRUZ G M.Consumer environmental awareness and competition intwo-stage supply chains.European Journal of Operational Research.2012,3(218):602-613.
[6]赵道致,原白云,徐春秋.低碳环境下供应链纵向减排合作的动态协调策略[J].管理工程学报,2016,30(1):147-154.
[7]刘超,慕静.随机需求与政府补贴条件下的低碳供应链协调[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(4):142-149.
[8]谢鑫鹏,赵道致,刘永军.需求具有碳排放敏感性的低碳供应链收益共享寄售契约[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(1):107-115.
[9]LIU Z G,ANDERAON T D,CRUZ J M.Comsumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains[J].European Journal of Operational Research.2012,218(3):602-613.
[10]杨满,汪传旭,徐朗.考虑搭便车的双渠道供应链定价与减排决策[J].计算机工程与应用,2018,54(14):229-235.
[11]HE R,XIONG Y,LIN Z.Carbon emissions in a dual channel closed loop supply chain:the impact of consumer free riding behavior[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,134:384-394.
[12]邓红星,李嘉璐.低碳排放约束下城市停车换乘设施规划研究[J].重庆理工大学学报(自然科学),2018,32(5):119-125.
[13]宋健,赵怡芳.京津冀能源消费碳排放分解比较研究[J].重庆理工大学学报(自然科学),2018,32(2):141-148.
[14]徐朗,汪传旭,施陈玲,等.不同契约机制下考虑再制造的双渠道供应链决策[J].控制与决策,2017,32(11):2005-2012.
[15]LI Y,XIE X,LIU Q.Study on longitudinal emission reduction investment of supply chain and government’s subsidy policy[J].Journal of Intelligent&Fuzzy Systems,2018,34(2):1177-1186.