环境、健康与经济增长:最优能源税收入分配研究
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摘要
在经济增长与环境保护的双重压力下,如何实现在不损害经济或尽量降低产出损失的前提下减少环境污染、提高居民福利水平已成为当前我国转变经济增长方式、实现经济转型过程中亟待解决的重大问题之一。本文在世代交叠模型基础上引入环境污染对健康的影响,系统探讨了在既定税率情形下能源税收入在居民收入与减排活动之间的最优分配比例,以降低"环境-健康-贫困"陷阱的风险。研究表明,理论上存在能够实现人均产出最大化或居民福利最大化的最优分配比例。然而,结合中国实际,研究发现我国能源税收入分配政策难以同时满足两者最优目标;具体分配比例取决于政府决策偏好,并需要根据实际情况进行相应调整。
Given its serious environmental pollution,China now risks falling into the"environment-health-poverty"trap,as it is highly likely that environmental pollution will slow economic growth due to impaired human health and thereby worsen poverty,leading to a more energy-intensive production mix and damaging the environment and public health. Thus,protecting the environment without hurting the economy presents a challenge for effective energy taxation reform in China.Energy taxation is a major policy measure for mitigating environmental pollution,but it has some undesirable side effects and the optimal energy tax revenue allocation has long been neglected.The literature shows that whether energy taxation hurts the economy remains controversial. Important issues that have often been ignored are the linkage between environmental pollution,public health,and labor productivity and the allocation of energy tax revenue to pollution abatement and residential income,both of which are of great concern for avoiding the"environment-health-poverty"trap. Thus,by considering the detrimental effect of environmental pollution on public health and the economy,this paper theoretically and empirically analyzes energy tax revenue allocation to maximize economic output and residential well-being.This paper introduces an overlapping generations( OLG) model that incorporates the negative effects of environmental pollution on labor productivity and introduces environmental quality and public health into the production functions as endogenous factors. We establish a two-period theoretical OLG model to systematically analyze the underlying mechanisms of the interactions of energy tax,energy consumption,environmental pollution,and public health and their effects on longterm economic growth. Given the levels of the energy tax rates,total production is a function of the energy tax revenue allocated to subsidized residential income when the economy reaches a stable equilibrium. Thus,the government can set an optimal allocation of energy tax revenue to minimize losses to economic output and social welfare.Our findings show that there exists a theoretically optimal redistribution to maximize steady-state production per capita or residential welfare. However,it is impossible for any tax revenue allocation policy to satisfy both goals. A higher share of labor in economic output or a greater influence of public health on labor productivity makes the allocation of energy tax revenue to pollution abatement activities more likely to increase the steady-state level of economic output per worker and lifetime residential welfare. However,when the effect of environmental pollution on public health decreases,the optimal allocation share of tax revenue to pollution abatement declines.The important policy implications can be summarized as follows: energy tax revenue is expected to be used to subsidize residential income and pollution mitigation activities in an open and transparent way; this allocation share is determined by policymakers' decision preference,and if the policy orientation is changed from GDP to residential well-being,it may slow the pace of economic growth but yield a welfare benefit. Local governments should also adjust their tax revenue allocation policies according to their own actual economic and social situations to maximize residential welfare and well-being.Our contributions can be summarized as follows. First,from the new perspective of the"environment-health-poverty"trap,we incorporate energy tax revenue allocation into pollution mitigation activities and residential income. Second,we establish a theoretical model and quantitatively analyze energy tax revenue and its optimal allocation to economic activities. Finally,we propose a number of policy suggestions and implications that may provide new insights into real-world policymaking.
Given its serious environmental pollution,China now risks falling into the"environment-health-poverty"trap,as it is highly likely that environmental pollution will slow economic growth due to impaired human health and thereby worsen poverty,leading to a more energy-intensive production mix and damaging the environment and public health. Thus,protecting the environment without hurting the economy presents a challenge for effective energy taxation reform in China.Energy taxation is a major policy measure for mitigating environmental pollution,but it has some undesirable side effects and the optimal energy tax revenue allocation has long been neglected.The literature shows that whether energy taxation hurts the economy remains controversial. Important issues that have often been ignored are the linkage between environmental pollution,public health,and labor productivity and the allocation of energy tax revenue to pollution abatement and residential income,both of which are of great concern for avoiding the"environment-health-poverty"trap. Thus,by considering the detrimental effect of environmental pollution on public health and the economy,this paper theoretically and empirically analyzes energy tax revenue allocation to maximize economic output and residential well-being.This paper introduces an overlapping generations( OLG) model that incorporates the negative effects of environmental pollution on labor productivity and introduces environmental quality and public health into the production functions as endogenous factors. We establish a two-period theoretical OLG model to systematically analyze the underlying mechanisms of the interactions of energy tax,energy consumption,environmental pollution,and public health and their effects on longterm economic growth. Given the levels of the energy tax rates,total production is a function of the energy tax revenue allocated to subsidized residential income when the economy reaches a stable equilibrium. Thus,the government can set an optimal allocation of energy tax revenue to minimize losses to economic output and social welfare.Our findings show that there exists a theoretically optimal redistribution to maximize steady-state production per capita or residential welfare. However,it is impossible for any tax revenue allocation policy to satisfy both goals. A higher share of labor in economic output or a greater influence of public health on labor productivity makes the allocation of energy tax revenue to pollution abatement activities more likely to increase the steady-state level of economic output per worker and lifetime residential welfare. However,when the effect of environmental pollution on public health decreases,the optimal allocation share of tax revenue to pollution abatement declines.The important policy implications can be summarized as follows: energy tax revenue is expected to be used to subsidize residential income and pollution mitigation activities in an open and transparent way; this allocation share is determined by policymakers' decision preference,and if the policy orientation is changed from GDP to residential well-being,it may slow the pace of economic growth but yield a welfare benefit. Local governments should also adjust their tax revenue allocation policies according to their own actual economic and social situations to maximize residential welfare and well-being.Our contributions can be summarized as follows. First,from the new perspective of the"environment-health-poverty"trap,we incorporate energy tax revenue allocation into pollution mitigation activities and residential income. Second,we establish a theoretical model and quantitatively analyze energy tax revenue and its optimal allocation to economic activities. Finally,we propose a number of policy suggestions and implications that may provide new insights into real-world policymaking.
引文
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祁毓、卢洪友、张宁传,2015:《环境质量、健康人力资本与经济增长》,《财贸经济》第6期。
王德发,2006:《能源税征收的劳动替代效应实证研究---基于上海市2002年大气污染的CGE模型的试算》,《财经研究》第2期。
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(1)近年来,中国政府致力于打造“健康中国”,提出“环境友好型社会”建设目标;社会公众也不断诉求环境健康权利,环境群体性事件年均增长高达29%,资料来源:http://www.china.com.cn/news/2012-10/27/content_26920089_3.htm。
(2)资料来源:http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/nfzm/detail_2013_04/07/23929797_0.shtml/。
(1)学者已从人口结构、收入分配、需求结构、产业结构、城市化进程、制度和技术进步、环境污染等方面证实中国可能面临“中等收入陷阱”(楼继伟,2010;蔡昉,2011;郑秉文,2011;张德荣,2013;祁毓和卢洪友,2015)。本文从环境污染的角度进行探讨。
(2)美国清洁空气法案在出台的十年内,调查发现污染至少导致100万的工人失业;且每年安抚失业工人的救济金达500万美元(Goodstein,1996)。李钢等(2012)发现:倘若中国提升环境管制强度,工业废弃物排放完全达到现行法律标准,将会使经济增长率下降约1个百分点,制造业部门就业量下降约1.8%,出口量减少约1.7%。
(3)以燃油税为例,我国于2009年开征燃油税。我国燃油税收入依次分配给公路养路费、航道养护费、公路运输管理费、公路客货运附加费、水路运输管理费、水运客货运附加费等六项开支、补助各地取消政府还贷二级公路收费、补贴农民种粮以及公益活动等。然而,根据我国财政部公布的2014年中央对地方税收返还和转移支付决算表,中央对地方转移支付中的成品油税费改革转移支付达740亿元,中央对地方税收返还中的成品油税费改革税收返还达1531亿元。也就是说,与燃油税费改革相关的中央对地方的转移支付与税收返还共计2271亿元。然而,有关这些转移支付与税收返还的具体用途却不得而知。而且,燃油税最初目的是替代原有养路费,但目前征收燃油税的同时,高速公路养路费仍在继续征收。现行燃油税收入用途已经成为一笔“糊涂账”。资料来源:http://www.gov.cn/xxgk/pub/govpublic/mrlm/200812/t20081219_33048;html.http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2014czys/201507/t20150709_1269837.html。
(1)这种做法与实际情况较为吻合。根据WHO(2004)的研究,高收入国家中有56%遭受污染健康危害的居民是年龄在19-59岁之间的工作人群;Davis et al.(2005)的研究表明,2003年美国1480万工人中有550万人(年龄19-64岁之间)因自身或家属生病而不能集中精力工作。据Devol et al.(2007)估算:每年美国七大慢性疾病造成了超过11万亿美元的劳动生产率损失。因此,环境污染对劳动生产率的影响是不可忽略的。Zivin&Neidell(2012)发现:美国臭氧浓度每降低10ppm,工人生产率提高5.5%,这意味着环境保护并不仅仅是生产者的负担,更是人力资本投资和促进经济增长的工具。Liu et al.(2008)发现,中国居民家庭收入受其成员健康质量的高度影响,揭示了健康质量在生产过程中扮演着人力资本的角色。
(2)李凯杰(2014)的研究发现,环境支出是改善环境的有效途径,同时也会通过健康途径影响经济增长。经验检验也证实政府环境支出的增加会显著推动经济增长。
(1)Pautrel(2009)基于环境污染影响劳动生产率的视角,构建理论模型,研究发现环境税税率与终身福利、产出分别呈倒U型关系,但尚未讨论税收收入再利用以实现“双重红利”的问题。
(2)实际中,能源税的征收是按照能源消耗量来征收。为简便起见,本文借鉴Pautrel(2012)有关环境税征收的做法,假设能源税的征收直接与产出多少相关,节能减排技术的进步在此处不予以考虑。
(1)本文中污染排放表现为流量,环境质量是存量,污染函数为环境质量的变化率。为简便起见,这里不考虑能源使用和排污等方面的技术进步,假设污染强度系数和能源强度系数均为常数。
(2)基于模型设置,环境质量变化不受产出活动的影响,更有利于接下来经济稳态条件的研究。环境质量函数若采用线性形式,如John&Pecchenino(1994),为确保Pt=Et-Dt=[z-τ(1-β)]yt>0,则必须存在假设z>τ(1-β),这在模型计算方面很难操作;且环境质量Et-Dt在经济平衡增长路径中是发散的。
(3)健康投资不属于本文研究的重点,为简化模型,θ设为常数。
(1)假设资本折旧率为10%时,有96%的资本存量在30年内完全折旧,而模型中个体由成年过渡到老年,大约需要30年,即30年为一期。因此,假设资本存量在当期完全折旧。
(2)篇幅所限,求解过程省略,感兴趣读者可向作者索取。
(1)由式(22)-(25)可知,在稳态均衡条件下,环境自净率μ的取值只会影响人均产出水平的高低,对居民福利水平及最优能源税收入分配比例并没有影响。而本文探讨的重点是能源税收入最优分配问题,因此,环境自净率的设定不影响本文结论。
(2)倘若大气污染物均匀地分布在空气中,那么,按照箱式模型,E2/E1=(C2-b)(C1-b),其中,E1与E2分别代表污染气体基准排放量与未来排放量,C1与C2分别代表污染气体基准污染浓度与未来浓度,b是污染背景浓度值。那么,在不考虑污染背景浓度的情况下,大气污染物存量上升1%就会引起污染浓度上升1%(Chen&He,2014),这也与事实基本相符。以北京市为例,据《中国统计年鉴2014-2015》,2014年烟尘排放量为5.74万吨,相比2013年下降了3.2%;PM2.5年均浓度值为86μg/m3,相比2013年下降了约3.3%。
(3)式(7)中变量hεt可以理解为第t期劳动生产率χt,即,χt=hεt。结合式(16)可得,劳动生产率为χt=[ηθ/(ξPφt)]ε,对污染存量Pt求导,由此可得χt/Pt=-εφ。也就是说,污染存量每上升一个百分点,劳动生产率会下降εφ个百分点。
(1)若我国制定极度宽松的能源税政策,能源税收入在GDP的比重低于1.14%时,将税收收入全部补贴减排活动,会同时实现人均产出与居民福利的最大化。鉴于目前我国能源环境问题的严重性,本文暂不考虑我国极度宽松的能源税政策情形。此外,若我国按照欧盟28国平均征税标准征收,能源税税率τ=1.84%,即ΤU<τ<Τy,模拟结果显示,同样存在人均产出最大化与福利水平最大化的目标冲突。限于篇幅,这些结果没有具体列示,感兴趣读者可向作者索取。
(2)由图2所示,随着β的变动,其对居民福利的边际效应影响相对较大,而对人均产出的边际效应影响相对较小,这意味着可能存在兼容产出最大化与福利最大化的次优解。
(1)另外,本文也对给定能源税税率τ介于临界值Tu与Ty之间的情形进行了敏感性检验,发现结果仍具有稳健性。限于篇幅,图3至图6仅列示了部分模拟结果图,如需其他结果图,可向作者索取。
李凯杰,2014:《环境支出促进了经济增长吗?---基于省级面板数据的研究》,《世界经济研究》第12期。
楼继伟,2010:《中国经济未来15年:风险、动力和政策挑战》,《比较》第6期。
祁毓、卢洪友,2015:《污染、健康与不平等---跨越“环境健康贫困”陷阱》,《管理世界》第9期。
祁毓、卢洪友、张宁传,2015:《环境质量、健康人力资本与经济增长》,《财贸经济》第6期。
王德发,2006:《能源税征收的劳动替代效应实证研究---基于上海市2002年大气污染的CGE模型的试算》,《财经研究》第2期。
汪伟,2012:《人口老龄化、养老保险制度变革与中国经济增长---理论分析与数值模拟》,《金融研究》第10期。
王小鲁、樊纲,2000:《中国经济增长的可持续性---跨世界的回顾与展望》,经济科学出版社。
肖俊极、孙洁,2012:《消费税和燃油税的有效性比较分析》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
杨继生、徐娟、吴相俊,2013:《经济增长与环境和社会健康成本》,《经济研究》第12期。
杨岚、毛显强、刘琴、刘昭阳,2009:《基于CGE模型的能源税政策影响分析》,《中国人口·资源与环境》第2期。
张德荣,2013:《“中等收入陷阱”发生机理与中国经济增长的阶段性动力》,《经济研究》第9期。
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(1)近年来,中国政府致力于打造“健康中国”,提出“环境友好型社会”建设目标;社会公众也不断诉求环境健康权利,环境群体性事件年均增长高达29%,资料来源:http://www.china.com.cn/news/2012-10/27/content_26920089_3.htm。
(2)资料来源:http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/nfzm/detail_2013_04/07/23929797_0.shtml/。
(1)学者已从人口结构、收入分配、需求结构、产业结构、城市化进程、制度和技术进步、环境污染等方面证实中国可能面临“中等收入陷阱”(楼继伟,2010;蔡昉,2011;郑秉文,2011;张德荣,2013;祁毓和卢洪友,2015)。本文从环境污染的角度进行探讨。
(2)美国清洁空气法案在出台的十年内,调查发现污染至少导致100万的工人失业;且每年安抚失业工人的救济金达500万美元(Goodstein,1996)。李钢等(2012)发现:倘若中国提升环境管制强度,工业废弃物排放完全达到现行法律标准,将会使经济增长率下降约1个百分点,制造业部门就业量下降约1.8%,出口量减少约1.7%。
(3)以燃油税为例,我国于2009年开征燃油税。我国燃油税收入依次分配给公路养路费、航道养护费、公路运输管理费、公路客货运附加费、水路运输管理费、水运客货运附加费等六项开支、补助各地取消政府还贷二级公路收费、补贴农民种粮以及公益活动等。然而,根据我国财政部公布的2014年中央对地方税收返还和转移支付决算表,中央对地方转移支付中的成品油税费改革转移支付达740亿元,中央对地方税收返还中的成品油税费改革税收返还达1531亿元。也就是说,与燃油税费改革相关的中央对地方的转移支付与税收返还共计2271亿元。然而,有关这些转移支付与税收返还的具体用途却不得而知。而且,燃油税最初目的是替代原有养路费,但目前征收燃油税的同时,高速公路养路费仍在继续征收。现行燃油税收入用途已经成为一笔“糊涂账”。资料来源:http://www.gov.cn/xxgk/pub/govpublic/mrlm/200812/t20081219_33048;html.http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2014czys/201507/t20150709_1269837.html。
(1)这种做法与实际情况较为吻合。根据WHO(2004)的研究,高收入国家中有56%遭受污染健康危害的居民是年龄在19-59岁之间的工作人群;Davis et al.(2005)的研究表明,2003年美国1480万工人中有550万人(年龄19-64岁之间)因自身或家属生病而不能集中精力工作。据Devol et al.(2007)估算:每年美国七大慢性疾病造成了超过11万亿美元的劳动生产率损失。因此,环境污染对劳动生产率的影响是不可忽略的。Zivin&Neidell(2012)发现:美国臭氧浓度每降低10ppm,工人生产率提高5.5%,这意味着环境保护并不仅仅是生产者的负担,更是人力资本投资和促进经济增长的工具。Liu et al.(2008)发现,中国居民家庭收入受其成员健康质量的高度影响,揭示了健康质量在生产过程中扮演着人力资本的角色。
(2)李凯杰(2014)的研究发现,环境支出是改善环境的有效途径,同时也会通过健康途径影响经济增长。经验检验也证实政府环境支出的增加会显著推动经济增长。
(1)Pautrel(2009)基于环境污染影响劳动生产率的视角,构建理论模型,研究发现环境税税率与终身福利、产出分别呈倒U型关系,但尚未讨论税收收入再利用以实现“双重红利”的问题。
(2)实际中,能源税的征收是按照能源消耗量来征收。为简便起见,本文借鉴Pautrel(2012)有关环境税征收的做法,假设能源税的征收直接与产出多少相关,节能减排技术的进步在此处不予以考虑。
(1)本文中污染排放表现为流量,环境质量是存量,污染函数为环境质量的变化率。为简便起见,这里不考虑能源使用和排污等方面的技术进步,假设污染强度系数和能源强度系数均为常数。
(2)基于模型设置,环境质量变化不受产出活动的影响,更有利于接下来经济稳态条件的研究。环境质量函数若采用线性形式,如John&Pecchenino(1994),为确保Pt=Et-Dt=[z-τ(1-β)]yt>0,则必须存在假设z>τ(1-β),这在模型计算方面很难操作;且环境质量Et-Dt在经济平衡增长路径中是发散的。
(3)健康投资不属于本文研究的重点,为简化模型,θ设为常数。
(1)假设资本折旧率为10%时,有96%的资本存量在30年内完全折旧,而模型中个体由成年过渡到老年,大约需要30年,即30年为一期。因此,假设资本存量在当期完全折旧。
(2)篇幅所限,求解过程省略,感兴趣读者可向作者索取。
(1)由式(22)-(25)可知,在稳态均衡条件下,环境自净率μ的取值只会影响人均产出水平的高低,对居民福利水平及最优能源税收入分配比例并没有影响。而本文探讨的重点是能源税收入最优分配问题,因此,环境自净率的设定不影响本文结论。
(2)倘若大气污染物均匀地分布在空气中,那么,按照箱式模型,E2/E1=(C2-b)(C1-b),其中,E1与E2分别代表污染气体基准排放量与未来排放量,C1与C2分别代表污染气体基准污染浓度与未来浓度,b是污染背景浓度值。那么,在不考虑污染背景浓度的情况下,大气污染物存量上升1%就会引起污染浓度上升1%(Chen&He,2014),这也与事实基本相符。以北京市为例,据《中国统计年鉴2014-2015》,2014年烟尘排放量为5.74万吨,相比2013年下降了3.2%;PM2.5年均浓度值为86μg/m3,相比2013年下降了约3.3%。
(3)式(7)中变量hεt可以理解为第t期劳动生产率χt,即,χt=hεt。结合式(16)可得,劳动生产率为χt=[ηθ/(ξPφt)]ε,对污染存量Pt求导,由此可得χt/Pt=-εφ。也就是说,污染存量每上升一个百分点,劳动生产率会下降εφ个百分点。
(1)若我国制定极度宽松的能源税政策,能源税收入在GDP的比重低于1.14%时,将税收收入全部补贴减排活动,会同时实现人均产出与居民福利的最大化。鉴于目前我国能源环境问题的严重性,本文暂不考虑我国极度宽松的能源税政策情形。此外,若我国按照欧盟28国平均征税标准征收,能源税税率τ=1.84%,即ΤU<τ<Τy,模拟结果显示,同样存在人均产出最大化与福利水平最大化的目标冲突。限于篇幅,这些结果没有具体列示,感兴趣读者可向作者索取。
(2)由图2所示,随着β的变动,其对居民福利的边际效应影响相对较大,而对人均产出的边际效应影响相对较小,这意味着可能存在兼容产出最大化与福利最大化的次优解。
(1)另外,本文也对给定能源税税率τ介于临界值Tu与Ty之间的情形进行了敏感性检验,发现结果仍具有稳健性。限于篇幅,图3至图6仅列示了部分模拟结果图,如需其他结果图,可向作者索取。