富人治村、制度约束与公共物品供给——以农田水利灌溉为例
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摘要
改革开放后,由乡村企业家担任村干部的富人治村现象出现且普遍化,但对富人治村的效果,研究者各执两端。本文利用2014～2016年27省份756个村庄的治理调查数据,分析了富人治村对以农田水利灌溉为代表的公共物品供给的影响。结果显示,富人治村能够显著提升灌溉设施维护频率,但对整体灌溉状况和集体行动组织影响有限。本文还进一步分析了制度约束产生的交互作用:作为非正式制度的宗族网络规模并不能影响富人治村的治理绩效,但正式的基层民主制度可以显著提升村庄的公共物品供给水平。在劳动力外流、乡村治理衰败的背景下,兼具经济实力与政治权威的富人村干部逐渐超越传统的宗族网络,成为乡村公共事务中的主导性力量,而基层民主的发展则对富人村干部扩张中的权力构成了约束,激励其更好地提供公共服务。
After the reform and opening up, the phenomenon of villages managed by the rich has emerged and become nationwide. However, scholars hold different views towards the effectiveness of villages managed by the rich. Using the survey data collected from 756 villages in 27 provinces from 2014 to 2016, this article examines the impact of villages managed by the rich on rural public irrigation provision. The result shows that the rich village leaders can improve the frequency of maintenance on irrigation system, but have limited impact on the overall irrigation situation and collective action organizations. The study further analyzes the interactive effect of institutional constraints. The size of the clan network as an important informal institution does not affect the governance performance of the rich village leaders. Nevertheless, the formal community-level democracy can significantly increase public goods supply of the rich. In the context of labor outflow and rural governance decay, the wealthy cadres gradually surpass the traditional clan network and become the dominant impetus for public goods provision. The findings also denote that formal democratic institutions can restrict the extended power of rich cadres, and motivate them to provide better public goods.
After the reform and opening up, the phenomenon of villages managed by the rich has emerged and become nationwide. However, scholars hold different views towards the effectiveness of villages managed by the rich. Using the survey data collected from 756 villages in 27 provinces from 2014 to 2016, this article examines the impact of villages managed by the rich on rural public irrigation provision. The result shows that the rich village leaders can improve the frequency of maintenance on irrigation system, but have limited impact on the overall irrigation situation and collective action organizations. The study further analyzes the interactive effect of institutional constraints. The size of the clan network as an important informal institution does not affect the governance performance of the rich village leaders. Nevertheless, the formal community-level democracy can significantly increase public goods supply of the rich. In the context of labor outflow and rural governance decay, the wealthy cadres gradually surpass the traditional clan network and become the dominant impetus for public goods provision. The findings also denote that formal democratic institutions can restrict the extended power of rich cadres, and motivate them to provide better public goods.
引文
1.陈柏峰,2016:《富人治村的类型与机制研究》,《北京社会科学》第9期。
2.道格拉斯·C·诺思,2008:《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》,刘守英译,上海:格致出版社。
3.狄金华、钟涨宝,2014:《从主体到规则的转向——中国传统农村的基层治理研究》,《社会学研究》第5期。
4.杜增艳、陈红艳,2007:《能人治村在经济欠发达地区作用探析》,《社会科学论坛》第3期。
5.郭云南、姚洋、Jeremy Foltz,2012:《正式与非正式权威、问责与平滑消费:来自中国村庄的经验数据》,《管理世界》第1期。
6.贺雪峰,2011:《论富人治村——以浙江奉化调查为讨论基础》,《社会科学研究》第2期。
7.贺雪峰,2012:《乡村的去政治化及其后果——关于取消农业税后国家与农民关系的一个初步讨论》,《哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版)》第1期。
8.卢福营,2008:《治理村庄:农村新兴经济精英的社会责任——以浙江省永康市的私营企业主治村为例》,《社会科学》第12期。
9.卢福营,2011:《经济能人治村:中国乡村政治的新模式》,《学术月刊》第10期。
10.罗纳德·H·科斯、阿尔钦、德姆塞茨,1994:《财产权利与制度变迁:产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,刘守英等译,上海:上海人民出版社。
11.欧阳静,2011:《富人治村:机制与绩效研究》,《广东社会科学》第5期。
12.裘斌、卢福营,2011:《能人治理背景下的村民公共参与》,《社会科学战线》第12期。
13.仇叶,2017:《富人治村的类型与基层民主实践机制研究》,《中国农村观察》第1期。
14.饶静、叶敬忠,2007:《我国乡镇政权角色和行为的社会学研究综述》,《社会》第3期。
15.阮荣平、刘璐琳,2012:《农村“宗教热”原因探究:宗教社会风险假说》,《华南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》第11期。
16.孙秀林,2009:《村庄民主、村干部角色及其行为模式》,《社会》第1期。
17.孙秀林,2011:《华南的村治与宗族——一个功能主义的分析路径》,《社会学研究》第1期。
18.孙琼欢,2012:《派性政治:村庄治理的隐形机制》,北京:中国社会科学出版社。
19.万能、原新,2009:《1978年以来中国农民的阶层分化:回顾与反思》,《中国农村观察》第4期。
20.王小宁,2005:《农村公共物品供给制度变迁的路径依赖与创新》,《中国行政管理》第7期。
21.王亚华等,2016:《中国农村公共事务治理的危机与响应》,《清华大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)第6期。
22.温莹莹,2015:《非正式制度与村庄公共物品供给》,北京:中国社会出版社。
23.肖唐镖,2006:《什么人在当村干部?——对村干部社会政治资本的初步分析》,《管理世界》第9期。
24.徐勇、沈乾飞,2015:《破解“形式有权,实际无权”的基层民主难题》,《探索》第1期。
25.袁松,2015:《富人治村:城镇化进程中的乡村权力转型》,北京:中国社会科学出版社。
26.郑明怀,2013:《经济能人竞选村干部的驱动类型分析》,《广西社会科学》第6期。
27.Carol R.,1986,“The Comedy of the Commons:Custom,Commerce,and Inherently Public Property”,University of Chicago Law Review,53(3):711-781.
28.Mattingly,D.,2016,“Elite Capture:How Decentralization and Informal Institutions Weaken Property Rights in China”,World Politics,68(3):383-412.
29.Hadin,G.,1968,“The Tragedy of Commons”,Science,162(3859):1243-1248.
30.Huhe,N.,and M.Tang,2017,“Institutionalizing from the Middle:the Impacts of Provincial Legislation on Rural Grassroots Democracy in China”,Studies in Comparative International Development,52(3):372-393.
31.Olson,M.,1971,The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
32.Ostrom,E.,1990,Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
33.Tsai,L.,2007,“Solidary Groups,Informal Accountability,and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China”,American Political Science Review,101(2):355-372.
34.Wang Y.,C.Chen,and E.Araral,2016,“The Effects of Migration on Collective Action in the Commons:Evidence from Rural China”,World Development,88(3):79-93.
35.Xu,Y.,and Y.Yao,2014,“Informal Institutions,Collective Action,and Public Investment in Rural China”,American Political Science Review,109(2):371-391.
36.Yan X.,2012,“To Get Rich Is Not Only Glorious”:Economic Reform and the New Entrepreneurial Party Secretaries”,The China Quarterly,210(2):335-354.
2.道格拉斯·C·诺思,2008:《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》,刘守英译,上海:格致出版社。
3.狄金华、钟涨宝,2014:《从主体到规则的转向——中国传统农村的基层治理研究》,《社会学研究》第5期。
4.杜增艳、陈红艳,2007:《能人治村在经济欠发达地区作用探析》,《社会科学论坛》第3期。
5.郭云南、姚洋、Jeremy Foltz,2012:《正式与非正式权威、问责与平滑消费:来自中国村庄的经验数据》,《管理世界》第1期。
6.贺雪峰,2011:《论富人治村——以浙江奉化调查为讨论基础》,《社会科学研究》第2期。
7.贺雪峰,2012:《乡村的去政治化及其后果——关于取消农业税后国家与农民关系的一个初步讨论》,《哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版)》第1期。
8.卢福营,2008:《治理村庄:农村新兴经济精英的社会责任——以浙江省永康市的私营企业主治村为例》,《社会科学》第12期。
9.卢福营,2011:《经济能人治村:中国乡村政治的新模式》,《学术月刊》第10期。
10.罗纳德·H·科斯、阿尔钦、德姆塞茨,1994:《财产权利与制度变迁:产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,刘守英等译,上海:上海人民出版社。
11.欧阳静,2011:《富人治村:机制与绩效研究》,《广东社会科学》第5期。
12.裘斌、卢福营,2011:《能人治理背景下的村民公共参与》,《社会科学战线》第12期。
13.仇叶,2017:《富人治村的类型与基层民主实践机制研究》,《中国农村观察》第1期。
14.饶静、叶敬忠,2007:《我国乡镇政权角色和行为的社会学研究综述》,《社会》第3期。
15.阮荣平、刘璐琳,2012:《农村“宗教热”原因探究:宗教社会风险假说》,《华南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》第11期。
16.孙秀林,2009:《村庄民主、村干部角色及其行为模式》,《社会》第1期。
17.孙秀林,2011:《华南的村治与宗族——一个功能主义的分析路径》,《社会学研究》第1期。
18.孙琼欢,2012:《派性政治:村庄治理的隐形机制》,北京:中国社会科学出版社。
19.万能、原新,2009:《1978年以来中国农民的阶层分化:回顾与反思》,《中国农村观察》第4期。
20.王小宁,2005:《农村公共物品供给制度变迁的路径依赖与创新》,《中国行政管理》第7期。
21.王亚华等,2016:《中国农村公共事务治理的危机与响应》,《清华大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)第6期。
22.温莹莹,2015:《非正式制度与村庄公共物品供给》,北京:中国社会出版社。
23.肖唐镖,2006:《什么人在当村干部?——对村干部社会政治资本的初步分析》,《管理世界》第9期。
24.徐勇、沈乾飞,2015:《破解“形式有权,实际无权”的基层民主难题》,《探索》第1期。
25.袁松,2015:《富人治村:城镇化进程中的乡村权力转型》,北京:中国社会科学出版社。
26.郑明怀,2013:《经济能人竞选村干部的驱动类型分析》,《广西社会科学》第6期。
27.Carol R.,1986,“The Comedy of the Commons:Custom,Commerce,and Inherently Public Property”,University of Chicago Law Review,53(3):711-781.
28.Mattingly,D.,2016,“Elite Capture:How Decentralization and Informal Institutions Weaken Property Rights in China”,World Politics,68(3):383-412.
29.Hadin,G.,1968,“The Tragedy of Commons”,Science,162(3859):1243-1248.
30.Huhe,N.,and M.Tang,2017,“Institutionalizing from the Middle:the Impacts of Provincial Legislation on Rural Grassroots Democracy in China”,Studies in Comparative International Development,52(3):372-393.
31.Olson,M.,1971,The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
32.Ostrom,E.,1990,Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
33.Tsai,L.,2007,“Solidary Groups,Informal Accountability,and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China”,American Political Science Review,101(2):355-372.
34.Wang Y.,C.Chen,and E.Araral,2016,“The Effects of Migration on Collective Action in the Commons:Evidence from Rural China”,World Development,88(3):79-93.
35.Xu,Y.,and Y.Yao,2014,“Informal Institutions,Collective Action,and Public Investment in Rural China”,American Political Science Review,109(2):371-391.
36.Yan X.,2012,“To Get Rich Is Not Only Glorious”:Economic Reform and the New Entrepreneurial Party Secretaries”,The China Quarterly,210(2):335-354.