人力资本属性、高管离职与企业竞争优势
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摘要
已有研究将高管离职仅仅视作组织内脱离行为探讨离职的原因和经济后果,从人力资本在组织与组织之间的流动视角出发,文章重新审视人力资本限制的离职原因和经济后果。基于资源基础理论,文章在细分高管人力资本属性区别的基础上,探讨了通用性和专用性人力资本属性限制对高管离职流动的影响,以及这两种属性的高管离职对企业竞争优势影响的区别。以2011-2013创业板上市公司在IPO之后出现的离职潮时期为研究样本,研究发现,专用性人力资本属性较高的高管离职更受限制,而通用性人力资本属性较高的高管则不会;进一步的研究发现,尽管创业板高管离职普遍会损害企业竞争优势,但通用性人力资本属性较高的高管离职对竞争优势的损害程度较低,而专用性人力资本属性的高管损害较高。通过区分高管人力资本属性,文章从人力资本流动性角度为高管离职补充了资源基础理论的证据。
Primary studies regard the top manager turnover as the disengagement behavior only within organization, given antecedent and consequences for it. This study regard the top manager turnover as the flowing of human focus its human capital restrictions from inter organization, reexamining the antecedent for top manager turnover and its consequences.Based on resource based view, we discusses the impact of general and specific human capital attributes on top manager turnovers, and the difference impact two types human capital attributes top manager demission has on firm competitive advantages, on the basis of specified executives human capital attributes Taking the post-IPO demission trend from 2011 to 2013 in growth enterprises market as the research sample, our research found that exhibitive with higher attributes of specific human capital were more limited in demission, while higher attributes of general human capital were not. Further research shows although the executives departure generally damage firm competitive advantage, the extent from general human capital executives departure were lower, specific human capital executives departure were higher. By distinguishing the human capital attributes of top manager, our research supplements the evidence of resource-based views for top manager departure' from the perspective of human capital liquidity.
Primary studies regard the top manager turnover as the disengagement behavior only within organization, given antecedent and consequences for it. This study regard the top manager turnover as the flowing of human focus its human capital restrictions from inter organization, reexamining the antecedent for top manager turnover and its consequences.Based on resource based view, we discusses the impact of general and specific human capital attributes on top manager turnovers, and the difference impact two types human capital attributes top manager demission has on firm competitive advantages, on the basis of specified executives human capital attributes Taking the post-IPO demission trend from 2011 to 2013 in growth enterprises market as the research sample, our research found that exhibitive with higher attributes of specific human capital were more limited in demission, while higher attributes of general human capital were not. Further research shows although the executives departure generally damage firm competitive advantage, the extent from general human capital executives departure were lower, specific human capital executives departure were higher. By distinguishing the human capital attributes of top manager, our research supplements the evidence of resource-based views for top manager departure' from the perspective of human capital liquidity.
引文
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[19]王锟,李伟.高管政治背景对其离职--业绩敏感性的影响[J].南开管理评论.2012,6:104-110.Wang K,Li W.Political Connections of CEOs and Turnover-performance Sensitivity[J].Nankai Business Review,2012,6:104-110.
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[21]Castanias,R.P.,Helfat,C.E.The Managerial Rents Model:Theory and Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Management,2001,27(6):661-678.
[22]Campbell,B.A.,Coff,R.,Kryscynski,D.Rethinking Sustained Competitive Advantage from Human Capital[J].Academy of Management Review,2012,37(3):376-395.
[23]Helfat,C.E.Firm-specificity in Corporate Applied R&D[J].Organization Science,1994,5(2):173-184.
[24]Pennings,J.M.,Lee,K.,Witteloostuijn,A.V.Human Capital,Social Capital,and Firm Dissolution[J].Academy of management Journal,1998,41(4):425-440.
[25]Wright,P.M.,Mcmahan,G.C.Exploring Human Capital:Putting‘Human’Back into Strategic Human Resource Management[J].Human Resource Management Journal,2011,21(2):93-104.
[26]顾煜,程丹.创业板高管减持与公司业绩实证研究[J].商业研究.2013,55:80-85.Gu Y,Cheng D.An Empirical Analysis of the Senior Managers’Stocks Reducing and Listed Companies Performance in GEM[J].Commercial Research,2013,55:80-85.
[27]Kahneman,D.,Knetsch,J.L.,Thaler,R.H.Anomalies:The Endowment Effect,Loss Aversion,and Status Quo bias[J].Journal of Economic perspectives,1991,5(1):193-206.
[28]Rauch,A.,Rijsdijk,S.A.The Effects of General and Specific Human Capital on LongTerm Growth and Failure of Newly Founded Businesses[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013,37(4):923-941.
[29]Bernstein,S.,Korteweg,A.,Law,S.K.Attracting Early-Stage Investors:Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment[J].Journal of Finance,2017,72(2):509-538.
[30]徐向艺,庞金勇.上市公司主要高管变更后的团队稳定性[J].经济管理.2008,13:42-47.Xu X Y,Pang J Y.Research on TMT Stability after Key Managers’Turnover of Lististed Companies of China[J].Economic Managent,2008,13:42-47.
[31]Harris,D.,Helfat,C..Specificity of CEO Human Capital and Compensation[J].Strategic Management Journal,1997,18(11):895-920.
[32]Balakrishnan,S.,Fox,I.Asset Specificity,Firm Heterogeneity and Capital Structure[J].Strategic Management Journal,1993,14(1):3-16.
[33]游家兴,徐盼盼,陈淑敏.政治关联,职位壕沟与高管变更--来自中国财务困境上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究.2010,4:128-143.You J X,Xu P P,Chen S M.Political Connection,Position Entrenchment and Management Turnover:Empirical Evidence form Special Treatment Listed Companies of China[J].Journal of Financial Research,2010,4:128-143.
[34]Chow,I.H.,Huang J C,Liu S.Strategic HRM in China:Configurations and Competitive Advantage[J].Human Resource Management,2008,47(4):687-706.
[35]Finkelstein,S.Power in Top Management Teams:Dimensions,Measurement,and Validation[J].Academy of Management journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[36]Jenter,D.,Kanaan,F.CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation[J].Journal of Finance,2015,70(5):2155-2184.
[37]于东智.董事会,公司治理与绩效--对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学.2003,3:29-41.Yu D Z.Board of Directors,Corporation Governance and Performance:An Empirical Analysis of Listed Companies in China[J].Social Sciences in China,2003,3:29-41.
[38]Weisbach,M.S.Outside Directors and CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:431-460.
[39]宗文龙,王玉涛,魏紫.股权激励能留住高管吗?[J].会计研究.2013,9:58-63.Zong W L,Wang Y T,Wei Z.Do Equity Compensation Reduce Executive Turnover?Empirical Evidence from China’s Security Market[J].Accounting Research,2013,9:58-63.
[2]张行.CEO离职与公司继任决策研究:基于董事会结构特征的实证分析[J].科研管理.2018,1:108-118.Zhang X.Consequence of CEO Turnover and the Company’s Succession Decision:An Empirical Analysis based on the Features of Board Structure[J].Science Research Management,2018,1:108-118.
[3]Barney,J.Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage[J].Journal of Management,1991,17(1):99-120.
[4]Starr,E.,Ganco,M.,Campbell,B.A.Strategic Human Capital Management in the Context of Cross-Industry and Within-Industry Mobility Frictions[J].Strategic Management Journal,2018,39(8):2226-2254.
[5]Brickley,J.A.Empirical Research on CEO Turnover and Firm-Performance:A Discussion[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,36(1):227-233.
[6]龚玉池.公司绩效与高层更换[J].经济研究.2001,10:75-82.Gong Y C.Corporate Performance and Top Management Turnover[J].Economic Research Journal,2001,10:75-82.
[7]曹廷求,张光利.上市公司高管辞职的动机和效果检验[J].经济研究.2012,6:73-87.Cao T Q,Zhang G L.Study for Motivation and Effects of Executive Resignation in Listed Companies[J].Economic Research Journal,2012,6:73-87.
[8]Jensen,M.C.The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J].Journal of Finance,1993,48(3):831-880.
[9]Faleye,O.,Hoitash,R.,Hoitash,U.The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,101(1):160-181.
[10]Jensen,A.L.,Aaes,H.Reference Interval and Critical Difference for Canine Serum Fructosamine Concentration[J].Veterinary Research Communications,1992,16(5):317-325.
[11]杨德明,赵璨.媒体监督,媒体治理与高管薪酬[J].经济研究.2012,6:116-126.Yang D M,Zhao C.Media Monitoring,Media Governance and Managers’Compensation[J].Economic Research Journal,2012,6:116-126.
[12]Nordqvist,M.,Sharma,P.,Chirico,F.Family Firm Heterogeneity and Governance:AConfiguration Approach[J].Journal of Small Business Management,2014,52(2):192-209.
[13]赵震宇,杨之曙,白重恩.影响中国上市公司高管层变更的因素分析与实证检验[J].金融研究.2007,8A:76-89.Zhao Z Y,Yang Z S,Bai C E.Studies and Empirical Test of Top Management Turnover in Chinese Listed Companies[J].Journal of Financial Research,2007,8A:76-89.
[14]Wang,H.,Zhao,S.,Chen,G.Firm-specific Knowledge Assets and Employment Arrangements:Evidence from CEO Compensation Design and CEO Dismissal[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(9):1875-1894.
[15]Murphy,K.J.Executive Compensation[J].Handbook of Labor Economics.1999,3:2485-2563.
[16]Morck,R.,Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.W.Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of financial economics,1988,20:293-315.
[17]Matta,E.,Beamish,P.W.The Accentuated CEO Career Horizon Problem:Evidence from International Acquisitions[J].Strategic Management Journal,2008,29(7):683-700.
[18]卫旭华,刘咏梅,车小玲.中国上市企业高管离职影响因素的跨层研究[J].管理科学.2013,6:71-82.Wei X H,Liu Y M,Che X L.Multilevel Study of the Influencing Factors of Top Managers’Turnover in Chinese Listed Companies[J].Journal of Management Science,2013,6:71-82.
[19]王锟,李伟.高管政治背景对其离职--业绩敏感性的影响[J].南开管理评论.2012,6:104-110.Wang K,Li W.Political Connections of CEOs and Turnover-performance Sensitivity[J].Nankai Business Review,2012,6:104-110.
[20]Nason,R.S.,Wiklund,J.An Assessment of Resource-based Theorizing on Firm Growth and Suggestions for the Future[J].Journal of Management,2018,44(1):32-60.
[21]Castanias,R.P.,Helfat,C.E.The Managerial Rents Model:Theory and Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Management,2001,27(6):661-678.
[22]Campbell,B.A.,Coff,R.,Kryscynski,D.Rethinking Sustained Competitive Advantage from Human Capital[J].Academy of Management Review,2012,37(3):376-395.
[23]Helfat,C.E.Firm-specificity in Corporate Applied R&D[J].Organization Science,1994,5(2):173-184.
[24]Pennings,J.M.,Lee,K.,Witteloostuijn,A.V.Human Capital,Social Capital,and Firm Dissolution[J].Academy of management Journal,1998,41(4):425-440.
[25]Wright,P.M.,Mcmahan,G.C.Exploring Human Capital:Putting‘Human’Back into Strategic Human Resource Management[J].Human Resource Management Journal,2011,21(2):93-104.
[26]顾煜,程丹.创业板高管减持与公司业绩实证研究[J].商业研究.2013,55:80-85.Gu Y,Cheng D.An Empirical Analysis of the Senior Managers’Stocks Reducing and Listed Companies Performance in GEM[J].Commercial Research,2013,55:80-85.
[27]Kahneman,D.,Knetsch,J.L.,Thaler,R.H.Anomalies:The Endowment Effect,Loss Aversion,and Status Quo bias[J].Journal of Economic perspectives,1991,5(1):193-206.
[28]Rauch,A.,Rijsdijk,S.A.The Effects of General and Specific Human Capital on LongTerm Growth and Failure of Newly Founded Businesses[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013,37(4):923-941.
[29]Bernstein,S.,Korteweg,A.,Law,S.K.Attracting Early-Stage Investors:Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment[J].Journal of Finance,2017,72(2):509-538.
[30]徐向艺,庞金勇.上市公司主要高管变更后的团队稳定性[J].经济管理.2008,13:42-47.Xu X Y,Pang J Y.Research on TMT Stability after Key Managers’Turnover of Lististed Companies of China[J].Economic Managent,2008,13:42-47.
[31]Harris,D.,Helfat,C..Specificity of CEO Human Capital and Compensation[J].Strategic Management Journal,1997,18(11):895-920.
[32]Balakrishnan,S.,Fox,I.Asset Specificity,Firm Heterogeneity and Capital Structure[J].Strategic Management Journal,1993,14(1):3-16.
[33]游家兴,徐盼盼,陈淑敏.政治关联,职位壕沟与高管变更--来自中国财务困境上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究.2010,4:128-143.You J X,Xu P P,Chen S M.Political Connection,Position Entrenchment and Management Turnover:Empirical Evidence form Special Treatment Listed Companies of China[J].Journal of Financial Research,2010,4:128-143.
[34]Chow,I.H.,Huang J C,Liu S.Strategic HRM in China:Configurations and Competitive Advantage[J].Human Resource Management,2008,47(4):687-706.
[35]Finkelstein,S.Power in Top Management Teams:Dimensions,Measurement,and Validation[J].Academy of Management journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[36]Jenter,D.,Kanaan,F.CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation[J].Journal of Finance,2015,70(5):2155-2184.
[37]于东智.董事会,公司治理与绩效--对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学.2003,3:29-41.Yu D Z.Board of Directors,Corporation Governance and Performance:An Empirical Analysis of Listed Companies in China[J].Social Sciences in China,2003,3:29-41.
[38]Weisbach,M.S.Outside Directors and CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:431-460.
[39]宗文龙,王玉涛,魏紫.股权激励能留住高管吗?[J].会计研究.2013,9:58-63.Zong W L,Wang Y T,Wei Z.Do Equity Compensation Reduce Executive Turnover?Empirical Evidence from China’s Security Market[J].Accounting Research,2013,9:58-63.