制造商相对弱势格局下“主制造商-供应商”双方叫价拍卖灰博弈模型
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摘要
高技术产品的研制初期,主制造商受系统集成能力弱、缺少市场话语权、与供应商合作关系不稳固等因素的影响,在项目谈判中往往处于弱势地位,尤其在产品定价问题上常常受到供应商的牵制。针对这一问题,引入体现主制造商和供应商定价博弈中贫信息及有限理性的灰系数,构建了"主制造商-供应商"双方叫价拍卖灰博弈模型,揭示价格谈判过程中的博弈关系,并对模型的交易范围进行了讨论;针对主制造商弱势格局下的博弈问题进行了参数设定和系统仿真,分析了主制造商的最优灰报价和可获得的最大效用;最后,根据模型及其仿真结果分别从前期沟通策略、价格谈判策略和长期合作策略的角度提出了主制造商博弈的策略建议。
In the initial developing stage of some high-tech products,the main manufacturer is always in a disadvantaged position and passive in pricing negotiation because of the lack of systemic integration capability and market share,and its instable relationship with suppliers.The price negotiation problem between the main manufacturer and the supplier is a game problem based on each acceptable price.The final price has a lot to do with the pricing strategies of the two parties,this process can be simplified as a bilateral auction,which shows the feature of "small sample,poor information" and finite rationality of game players.In order to solve this problem,the grey coefficient is introduced to show the poor information and finite rationality in the pricing game between the main manufacturer and the supplier,and a"main manufacturer-supplier"bilateral auction grey game model is constructed.To reveal the game relationship in price negotiation,the equilibrium objective function,the equilibrium strategy condition,the optimal grey quotation,the transaction probability and the expected utility of both parties are analyzed.Then the transaction conditions and the scope of the grey game model are discussed.Through the analysis,it is found that the possible trading scope of the grey game model is larger than that in the classic model.It is known that the transaction loss area of the classic model is mainly due to incomplete information,however,in real transaction,the subjects can improve the transaction efficiency by collecting information and adjusting the game strategy to make part of the incomplete " black information" whitening.Finally,the parameter setting and system simulation are carried out for the game problem under the main manufacturer being at a disadvantage,the optimal grey price and the maximum utility of the main manufacturer are analyzed,and the strategy proposals of the main manufacturer in this game are put forward from the perspective of the early communication strategy,the price negotiation strategy and the long-term cooperation strategy.This study is a new exploration of grey game theory,and provides a scientific strategy support for the price negotiation of the main manufacturers.
In the initial developing stage of some high-tech products,the main manufacturer is always in a disadvantaged position and passive in pricing negotiation because of the lack of systemic integration capability and market share,and its instable relationship with suppliers.The price negotiation problem between the main manufacturer and the supplier is a game problem based on each acceptable price.The final price has a lot to do with the pricing strategies of the two parties,this process can be simplified as a bilateral auction,which shows the feature of "small sample,poor information" and finite rationality of game players.In order to solve this problem,the grey coefficient is introduced to show the poor information and finite rationality in the pricing game between the main manufacturer and the supplier,and a"main manufacturer-supplier"bilateral auction grey game model is constructed.To reveal the game relationship in price negotiation,the equilibrium objective function,the equilibrium strategy condition,the optimal grey quotation,the transaction probability and the expected utility of both parties are analyzed.Then the transaction conditions and the scope of the grey game model are discussed.Through the analysis,it is found that the possible trading scope of the grey game model is larger than that in the classic model.It is known that the transaction loss area of the classic model is mainly due to incomplete information,however,in real transaction,the subjects can improve the transaction efficiency by collecting information and adjusting the game strategy to make part of the incomplete " black information" whitening.Finally,the parameter setting and system simulation are carried out for the game problem under the main manufacturer being at a disadvantage,the optimal grey price and the maximum utility of the main manufacturer are analyzed,and the strategy proposals of the main manufacturer in this game are put forward from the perspective of the early communication strategy,the price negotiation strategy and the long-term cooperation strategy.This study is a new exploration of grey game theory,and provides a scientific strategy support for the price negotiation of the main manufacturers.
引文
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[21]郑悦玲,唐娟,刘志.主制造商-供应商模式下AHP-Shapley利益分配研究[J].安徽工程大学学报,2017,32(1):89-94.
[22]Chatterjee K,Samuelson W.Bargaining under incomplete information[J].Operations Research,1983,31:835-851.
[2]Lambert D M,Knemeyer A M,Gardner J T.Supply chain partnerships:Model validation and implementation[J].Journal of Business Logistics,2004,25(2):21-42.
[3]Ryu S,Min S,Zushi N.The moderating role of trust in manufacturer-supplier relationships[J].Journal of Business&Industrial Marketing,2008,23(1):48-58.
[4]Szwejczewski M,Lemke F,Goffin K.Manufacturersupplier relationships:An empirical study of German manufacturing companies[J].International Journal of Operations&Production Management,2005,25(9):875-897.
[5]Yin S,Nishi T,Grossmann I E.Optimal quantity discount coordination for supply chain optimization with one manufacturer and multiple suppliers under demand uncertainty[J].International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology,2015,76(5-8):1173-1184.
[6]Bhattacharya R.A closed loop supply chain game between a supplier and a manufacturer in a two-stage scenario[J].International Journal of Logistics Systems and Management,2016,23(4):445-475.
[7]Ferro C,Padin C,Svensson G,et al.Trust and commitment as mediators between economic and non-economic satisfaction in manufacturer-supplier relationships[J].Journal of Business&Industrial Marketing,2016,31(1):13-23.
[8]Henke J W J,Parameswaran R,Pisharodi R M.Manufacturer price reduction pressure and supplier relations[J].Journal of Business&Industrial Marketing,2008,23(5):287-300.
[9]Delbufalo E.The effects of suppliers'trust on manufacturers'innovation capability:An analysis of direct versus indirect relationships[J].Production Planning&Control,2017,28(14):1165-1176.
[10]Talluri S,Narasimhan R,Chung W M.Manufacturer cooperation in supplier development under risk[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,207(1):168-173.
[11]侯吉刚,刘益,杨翩翩.供应商参与对制造商产品创新模式影响的分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2008,5:48-51.
[12]李随成,禹文钢.制造商对供应商长期导向的前因作用机理研究[J].管理科学,2011,24(6):79-92.
[13]许民利,沈家静.公平偏好下制造商收益分享与供应商质量投入研究[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(1):30-35.
[14]付红,马永开,唐小我.制造商持股供应商情形下的组装供应链协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(9):2265-2273.
[15]吴文清,刘晓英,赵黎明.消费者学习与政府补贴下的制造商-供应商合作研发[J].系统工程,2015,33(10):1-7.
[16]陈洪转,刘思峰,何利芳.“主制造商-供应商”协同主体双重努力最优合作协调[J].系统工程,2012,30(7):30-34.
[17]陈洪转,方志耕,刘思峰,等.复杂产品主制造商-供应商协同合作最优成本分担激励研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(9):98-105.
[18]陈洪转,王玥.主制造商供应商合作协商定价让步博弈研究[J].工业技术经济,2017,36(5):102-108.
[19]程永波,陈洪转,何利芳,等.复杂装备主制造商-供应商主从合作激励协调Stackelberg模型[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(1):91-96.
[20]易凯凯,朱建军,张明,等.基于不完全信息动态博弈模型的大型客机主制造商-供应商协同合作策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(5):125-134.
[21]郑悦玲,唐娟,刘志.主制造商-供应商模式下AHP-Shapley利益分配研究[J].安徽工程大学学报,2017,32(1):89-94.
[22]Chatterjee K,Samuelson W.Bargaining under incomplete information[J].Operations Research,1983,31:835-851.