基于专用性投资优化的BPO触发策略契约设计
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摘要
为解决业务流程外包(BPO)中的套牢问题,结合触发策略设计与构建了业务流程外包触发策略契约,并利用反向归纳法进行了算法推导与论证。算例结果表明,业务流程外包触发策略契约下的专用性投资水平、整体收益和接发包商收益都有所提高。触发策略契约能更有效地解决业务流程外包中的套牢问题,优化专用性资产投资水平,达到帕累托改进。
In order to resolve hold-up problems in the Business Process Outsourcing,combined with trigger strategy,BPO trigger policy contract was designed and built,and backward induction was used to get the algorithm derivation and demonstration.Numerical results showed that with the application of BPO trigger policy contract,the level of specific investment,the overall revenue and the profit of outsourcers are improved.BPO trigger policy contract offers a more effective solution to the hold-up problem in BPO and optimizes the level of specific assets investment to achieve a Pareto improvement.
In order to resolve hold-up problems in the Business Process Outsourcing,combined with trigger strategy,BPO trigger policy contract was designed and built,and backward induction was used to get the algorithm derivation and demonstration.Numerical results showed that with the application of BPO trigger policy contract,the level of specific investment,the overall revenue and the profit of outsourcers are improved.BPO trigger policy contract offers a more effective solution to the hold-up problem in BPO and optimizes the level of specific assets investment to achieve a Pareto improvement.
引文
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[9]吴国栋,汤世强.供应链专用性投资不足的关系合约算法[J].计算机工程与应用,2007,43(6):194-197.
[10]郝艳,李秉祥.基于信号传递模型的企业投资短视和敲竹杠长期投资行为分析[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(3):19-23.
[11]方世建,魏小燕.合作研发中的敲竹杠问题研究[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(6):178-180.
[12]袁凌,张喜征.带触发策略的组织间信任关系的建构路径模型[J].系统工程,2003(4):16-18.
[2]谢恩,李垣,吴海滨.组织合作中关系专用性投资水平最优化分析[J].运筹与管理,2004,13(5):31-36.
[3]MADHOK A,TALLMAN S B.Resources,transactions and rents:managingvalue through interfirm collaborative relationships[J].Organization Sci-ence,1998,9(3):326-339.
[4]DYER J H.Effective interfirm collaboration:how transactors minimizetransaction costs&maximize transaction value[J].Strategic ManagementJournal,1997,18(1):535-556.
[5]PITCHFORD R,SNYDER C M.A solution to the hold-up problem invol-ving gradual investment[J].Journal of Economic Theory,2004,114(1):88-103.
[6]VON SIEMENS F A.Bargaining under incomplete information,fairness,and the hold-up problem[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organiza-tion,2009,71(2):486-494.
[7]HOPPE E I,SCHMITZ P W.Can contracts solve the hold-up problemEx-perimental evidence[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2011,73(1):186-199.
[8]汤世强,季建华.解决投资套牢问题的关系合约分析[J].工业工程与管理,2006(2):32-37.
[9]吴国栋,汤世强.供应链专用性投资不足的关系合约算法[J].计算机工程与应用,2007,43(6):194-197.
[10]郝艳,李秉祥.基于信号传递模型的企业投资短视和敲竹杠长期投资行为分析[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(3):19-23.
[11]方世建,魏小燕.合作研发中的敲竹杠问题研究[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(6):178-180.
[12]袁凌,张喜征.带触发策略的组织间信任关系的建构路径模型[J].系统工程,2003(4):16-18.