专用性投资、信任与创业企业控制权治理
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摘要
基于控制权收益交互作用视角,研究创业投资模式下的异质性创业企业控制权治理问题,分析控制权共享收益和私人收益综合影响下投资家投资专用性和合作双方信任度对创业企业剩余控制权和特定控制权治理的作用机理,以193家不同产业类型创业企业为样本,运用混合回归模型,实证检验投资专用性、信任及其交互作用对异质性创业企业两类控制权治理的影响。研究结果表明,由于异质性企业的控制权收益类型和大小存在差异,导致投资专用性和信任对不同产业类型创业企业控制权治理的影响存在差异;创业企业家控制权私人收益较大、创业投资家的战略收益较小时,创业投资家获得的剩余控制权与其投入资本的专用性、合作双方间的信任度呈非线性倒U形关系;创业企业家控制权私人收益较小、创业投资家的战略收益较大时,创业投资家获得的剩余控制权与其投入资本的专用性、合作双方间的信任度呈非线性U形关系;投资专用性与合作双方信任度的交互项与创业投资家拥有的剩余控制权和特定控制权负相关,在高新技术创业企业样本中交互效应尤为显著。
This paper studies the problem of control right governance of heterogeneity entrepreneurial firms from venture capitalbacked modes,based on the perspective of interaction effect between different control right benefits. Under the comprehensive influence of sharing and private benefits of control rights,the paper analyses how the investment specificity of venture capitalists( VCs) and trust of cooperation between both sides affect residual control rights and general control right governance in entrepreneurial firms. The paper uses 193 VC-backed firms with different types as sample,and empirically tests the impact of investment specificity of VCs,trust and the interaction between them on two kinds of control rights of heterogeneity firms by mixture regression model. The study shows that because of the differences between different types and sizes of control right benefits of heterogeneity VC-backed firms,the impacts of the investment specificity and trust on different industry VC-backed firms are different.When entrepreneurs private benefits keep high and VCs strategic benefits remain low,there are non-linear inverted U-relationship between specific investment,trust with residual control rights. In contrast,when VCs strategic benefits more than entrepreneurs private benefits,there are non-linear U-relationship between specific investment,trust with residual control rights. The interaction effects of specific investment and trust has negative correlation with residual and general control rights of venture capitalists.This effect is particularly significant in high-tech firms.
This paper studies the problem of control right governance of heterogeneity entrepreneurial firms from venture capitalbacked modes,based on the perspective of interaction effect between different control right benefits. Under the comprehensive influence of sharing and private benefits of control rights,the paper analyses how the investment specificity of venture capitalists( VCs) and trust of cooperation between both sides affect residual control rights and general control right governance in entrepreneurial firms. The paper uses 193 VC-backed firms with different types as sample,and empirically tests the impact of investment specificity of VCs,trust and the interaction between them on two kinds of control rights of heterogeneity firms by mixture regression model. The study shows that because of the differences between different types and sizes of control right benefits of heterogeneity VC-backed firms,the impacts of the investment specificity and trust on different industry VC-backed firms are different.When entrepreneurs private benefits keep high and VCs strategic benefits remain low,there are non-linear inverted U-relationship between specific investment,trust with residual control rights. In contrast,when VCs strategic benefits more than entrepreneurs private benefits,there are non-linear U-relationship between specific investment,trust with residual control rights. The interaction effects of specific investment and trust has negative correlation with residual and general control rights of venture capitalists.This effect is particularly significant in high-tech firms.
引文
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[18]Nicita A,Sepe S M.Incomplete contracts and competition:Another look at fisher body/general motors?[J].European Journal of Law and Economics,2012,34(3):495-514.
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