PPP项目缔约风险控制框架研究——基于信任提升与维持的视角
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摘要
中国管理情境下的PPP项目通常以履约中再谈判的高发率与低效率为特征,其根源在于投资人关系专用性投资所引发的高度的缔约风险,信任在解决该问题上起着弥补与均衡正式契约的重要作用。以信任对事前信息不对称的治理为切入点,指出信任对PPP项目缔约风险的控制作用,体现在抵制事后机会主义和降低缔约成本上;分析了PPP项目中信任的动态演化过程,提出了依据PPP项目缔约过程中信任的动态演化规律来制定缔约风险控制策略的思路,包括以提高初始信任为导向的投资人选择和基于持续性信任动态演化的合同谈判。
PPP projects in the contex of Chinese management are usually characterized by the high incidence and poor efficiency of renegotiation during the performance of contract.It roots in the high contracting risk caused by the investors' relationship specific investment,while trust can complement and balance the formal contract in controlling the contracting risk.This paper takes reducing information asymmetry as the breakthrough point.Firstly,it indicates that the controlling effect of trust on the contracting risk in PPP projects is the resisting of ex post opportunism and reducing of the contracting cost.Secondly,the dynamic evolving process of the trust in PPP projects is presented.Finally,according to the evolution law of trust during the contracting in PPP projects,the propositional strategies for the government to control the contracting risk are presented,including the selection of investor oriented to promote the initial trust and the negotiation based on dynamic evolution of continuous trust.
PPP projects in the contex of Chinese management are usually characterized by the high incidence and poor efficiency of renegotiation during the performance of contract.It roots in the high contracting risk caused by the investors' relationship specific investment,while trust can complement and balance the formal contract in controlling the contracting risk.This paper takes reducing information asymmetry as the breakthrough point.Firstly,it indicates that the controlling effect of trust on the contracting risk in PPP projects is the resisting of ex post opportunism and reducing of the contracting cost.Secondly,the dynamic evolving process of the trust in PPP projects is presented.Finally,according to the evolution law of trust during the contracting in PPP projects,the propositional strategies for the government to control the contracting risk are presented,including the selection of investor oriented to promote the initial trust and the negotiation based on dynamic evolution of continuous trust.
引文
[1]威廉姆森.市场与层级制:分析与反托拉斯含义[M].蔡晓月,孟俭,译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2011.
[2]Kumaraswamy M M,Zhang X Q.Governmental role in BOT-led infrastructure development[J].International Journal of Project Management,2001,19(4):195-205.
[3]Yeo K T,Robert L K T.Positive management of differences for risk reduction in BOT projects[J].International Journal of Project Management,2000,18(4):257-265.
[4]威廉姆森.比较经济组织:对离散组织结构选择的分析[M]∥威廉姆森,马思滕.交易成本经济学:经典名篇选读.李自杰,蔡铭,译.北京:人民出版社,2010:99-129.
[5]格罗斯曼,哈特.所有权的成本和收益:纵向一体化和横向一体化理论[M]∥威廉姆森,马思滕.交易成本经济学:经典名篇选读.李自杰,蔡铭,译.北京:人民出版社,2010:161-187.
[6]科斯.企业的性质[M]∥威廉姆森,马思滕.交易成本经济学:经典名篇选读[M].李自杰,蔡铭,译.北京:人民出版社,2010:3-18.
[7]克莱因,克劳福德,阿尔钦.纵向一体化、可占用租金与竞争性缔约过程[M]∥威廉姆森,马思滕.交易成本经济学:经典名篇选读[M].李自杰,蔡铭,译.北京:人民出版社,2010:71-98.
[8]Zheng Jurong,Roehrichl J K,Michael A.Lewis.The dynamics of contractual and relational governance:Evidence from long-term public-private procurement arrangements[J].Journal of Purchasing&Supply Management,2008(14):43-54.
[9]尹贻林,赵华,严玲,邓娇娇.公共项目合同治理与关系治理的理论整合研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011(13):1-5.
[10]Poppo Laura,Todd Zenger.Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements[J].Strategic Management Journal,2002,23(8):707-725.
[11]Jin Xiao-Hua,Yng Ling Florence Yean.Model for fostering trust and building relationships in China’s construction industry[J].Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2005,131(11):1224-1232.
[12]Hedley Smyth.The credibility gap in stakeholder management:ethics and evidence of relationship management[J].Construction Management and Economics,2008,26(6):633-643.
[13]Dyer J H,Chu W.The role of trustworthiness in reducing transaction costs and improving performance:Empirical evidence from the United States,Japan,and Korea[J].Organization Science,2003,14(1):57-68.
[14]Schoorman D,Mayer R C,Davis J H.An integrative model of organizational trust[J].Academy of Management Review,2007,32(2):344-354.
[15]Das T,Teng Bing-sheng.Trust,Control and Risk in Strategic Alliances:An Integrated Framework[J].Organization Studies,2001,22(2):251-283.
[16]寿志钢,苏晨汀,杨志林,周南.零售商的能力与友善如何影响供应商的关系行为:基于信任理论的实证研究[J].管理世界,2008(2):97-109.
[17]Black C,Akintoye A,Fitzgerald E.An analysis of success factors and benefits of partnering in construction[J].International Journal of Project Management,2000,18(6):423-434.
[18]张晗,谷里虹.政府-民间(公-私)合作成功的关键因素研究:以CNS合作项目为例[J].管理学报,2011,8(11):1583-1588.
[19]Wong Wei Kei,Cheung Sai On,Yiu Tak Wing,Pang Hoi Yan.A framework for trust in construction contracting[J].International Journal of Project Management,2008,26(8):821-829.
[20]Cheung Sai On,Wong Wei Kei,Yiu Tak Wing,Pang Hoi Yan.Developing a trust inventory for construction contracting[J].International Journal of Project Management,2011,29(2):184-196.
[21]Kadefors Anna.Trust in project relationships-inside the black box[J].International Journal of Project Management,2004,22(3):175-182.
[22]曹玉玲,李随成.企业间信任的影响因素模型及实证研究[J].科研管理,2011,32(1):137-146.
[23]Wong Peter Shek Pui,Cheung Sai On.Structural equation model on trust and partnering success[J].Journal of Management in Engineering,2005,21(2):70-80.
[24]Pinto J K,Slevin D P,English B.Trust in projects:an empirical assessment of owner/contractor relationships[J].International Journal of Project Management,2009,27(6):638-648.
[25]廖成林,乔宪木.虚拟企业信任关系:决定因素与机理[J].重庆大学学报,2004(5):139-143.
[26]鲁耀斌,周涛.B2C环境下影响消费者网上初始信任因素的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(6):96-101.
[27]王涛,顾新.基于社会资本的知识链成员间相互信任产生机制的博弈分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010(1):76-81.
[28]Albertus Laan.Building trust:The case of the construction industry[D].Enschede,Netherlands:University of Twente,2008.
[29]叶瑛,姜彦福.创业投资机构的信任影响新创企业绩效的跨案例研究[J].管理世界,2009(10):152-163.
[30]陈明亮,汪贵浦,邓生宇,孙元.初始网络信任和持续网络信任形成与作用机制比较[J].科研管理,2008,29(5):187-195.
[31]Wong Peter S,Cheung Sai On,Ho Peter K.Contractor as trust initiator in construction partneringprisoner’s dilemma perspective[J].Journal of construction engineering and management,2005,131(10):1045-1053.
[33]格斯奈里.阿罗—德布鲁范式与现代契约理论:涉及信息和时间特定问题的探讨[M]∥沃因,韦坎德.契约经济学.李风圣,主译.北京:经济科学出版社,1999.15-52.
①Hart和Moore认为,由于交易费用或信息非对称的存在,交易双方不可能缔结一份完全的状态依存的契约,因此,契约性控制权可分为特定控制权和剩余控制权,前者是指那种能在事前通过契约加以明确规定的决策权,后者是指那种事前没有在契约中明确规定的决策权。
②PPP项目通常投资规模大,建设周期长,并且政府部门与投资人双方交易过程不仅包括建设期,还包括5至30年不等的回购期或经营期,因此,PPP项目的契约通常具有长期性。
③多数研究认为,信任是一个多维度的概念,信任总体水平则是信任的多个维度以某一比例的综合。
[2]Kumaraswamy M M,Zhang X Q.Governmental role in BOT-led infrastructure development[J].International Journal of Project Management,2001,19(4):195-205.
[3]Yeo K T,Robert L K T.Positive management of differences for risk reduction in BOT projects[J].International Journal of Project Management,2000,18(4):257-265.
[4]威廉姆森.比较经济组织:对离散组织结构选择的分析[M]∥威廉姆森,马思滕.交易成本经济学:经典名篇选读.李自杰,蔡铭,译.北京:人民出版社,2010:99-129.
[5]格罗斯曼,哈特.所有权的成本和收益:纵向一体化和横向一体化理论[M]∥威廉姆森,马思滕.交易成本经济学:经典名篇选读.李自杰,蔡铭,译.北京:人民出版社,2010:161-187.
[6]科斯.企业的性质[M]∥威廉姆森,马思滕.交易成本经济学:经典名篇选读[M].李自杰,蔡铭,译.北京:人民出版社,2010:3-18.
[7]克莱因,克劳福德,阿尔钦.纵向一体化、可占用租金与竞争性缔约过程[M]∥威廉姆森,马思滕.交易成本经济学:经典名篇选读[M].李自杰,蔡铭,译.北京:人民出版社,2010:71-98.
[8]Zheng Jurong,Roehrichl J K,Michael A.Lewis.The dynamics of contractual and relational governance:Evidence from long-term public-private procurement arrangements[J].Journal of Purchasing&Supply Management,2008(14):43-54.
[9]尹贻林,赵华,严玲,邓娇娇.公共项目合同治理与关系治理的理论整合研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011(13):1-5.
[10]Poppo Laura,Todd Zenger.Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements[J].Strategic Management Journal,2002,23(8):707-725.
[11]Jin Xiao-Hua,Yng Ling Florence Yean.Model for fostering trust and building relationships in China’s construction industry[J].Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2005,131(11):1224-1232.
[12]Hedley Smyth.The credibility gap in stakeholder management:ethics and evidence of relationship management[J].Construction Management and Economics,2008,26(6):633-643.
[13]Dyer J H,Chu W.The role of trustworthiness in reducing transaction costs and improving performance:Empirical evidence from the United States,Japan,and Korea[J].Organization Science,2003,14(1):57-68.
[14]Schoorman D,Mayer R C,Davis J H.An integrative model of organizational trust[J].Academy of Management Review,2007,32(2):344-354.
[15]Das T,Teng Bing-sheng.Trust,Control and Risk in Strategic Alliances:An Integrated Framework[J].Organization Studies,2001,22(2):251-283.
[16]寿志钢,苏晨汀,杨志林,周南.零售商的能力与友善如何影响供应商的关系行为:基于信任理论的实证研究[J].管理世界,2008(2):97-109.
[17]Black C,Akintoye A,Fitzgerald E.An analysis of success factors and benefits of partnering in construction[J].International Journal of Project Management,2000,18(6):423-434.
[18]张晗,谷里虹.政府-民间(公-私)合作成功的关键因素研究:以CNS合作项目为例[J].管理学报,2011,8(11):1583-1588.
[19]Wong Wei Kei,Cheung Sai On,Yiu Tak Wing,Pang Hoi Yan.A framework for trust in construction contracting[J].International Journal of Project Management,2008,26(8):821-829.
[20]Cheung Sai On,Wong Wei Kei,Yiu Tak Wing,Pang Hoi Yan.Developing a trust inventory for construction contracting[J].International Journal of Project Management,2011,29(2):184-196.
[21]Kadefors Anna.Trust in project relationships-inside the black box[J].International Journal of Project Management,2004,22(3):175-182.
[22]曹玉玲,李随成.企业间信任的影响因素模型及实证研究[J].科研管理,2011,32(1):137-146.
[23]Wong Peter Shek Pui,Cheung Sai On.Structural equation model on trust and partnering success[J].Journal of Management in Engineering,2005,21(2):70-80.
[24]Pinto J K,Slevin D P,English B.Trust in projects:an empirical assessment of owner/contractor relationships[J].International Journal of Project Management,2009,27(6):638-648.
[25]廖成林,乔宪木.虚拟企业信任关系:决定因素与机理[J].重庆大学学报,2004(5):139-143.
[26]鲁耀斌,周涛.B2C环境下影响消费者网上初始信任因素的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(6):96-101.
[27]王涛,顾新.基于社会资本的知识链成员间相互信任产生机制的博弈分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010(1):76-81.
[28]Albertus Laan.Building trust:The case of the construction industry[D].Enschede,Netherlands:University of Twente,2008.
[29]叶瑛,姜彦福.创业投资机构的信任影响新创企业绩效的跨案例研究[J].管理世界,2009(10):152-163.
[30]陈明亮,汪贵浦,邓生宇,孙元.初始网络信任和持续网络信任形成与作用机制比较[J].科研管理,2008,29(5):187-195.
[31]Wong Peter S,Cheung Sai On,Ho Peter K.Contractor as trust initiator in construction partneringprisoner’s dilemma perspective[J].Journal of construction engineering and management,2005,131(10):1045-1053.
[33]格斯奈里.阿罗—德布鲁范式与现代契约理论:涉及信息和时间特定问题的探讨[M]∥沃因,韦坎德.契约经济学.李风圣,主译.北京:经济科学出版社,1999.15-52.
①Hart和Moore认为,由于交易费用或信息非对称的存在,交易双方不可能缔结一份完全的状态依存的契约,因此,契约性控制权可分为特定控制权和剩余控制权,前者是指那种能在事前通过契约加以明确规定的决策权,后者是指那种事前没有在契约中明确规定的决策权。
②PPP项目通常投资规模大,建设周期长,并且政府部门与投资人双方交易过程不仅包括建设期,还包括5至30年不等的回购期或经营期,因此,PPP项目的契约通常具有长期性。
③多数研究认为,信任是一个多维度的概念,信任总体水平则是信任的多个维度以某一比例的综合。