独立董事地理距离与财务报告质量——来自上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
利用手工收集的独立董事与上市公司之间的地理距离数据,实证检验了独立董事地理距离对公司财务报告质量的影响。研究发现,独立董事距离上市公司越远,公司的财务报告质量越低;独立董事距离上市公司越远,导致独立董事参会次数越少,进而影响公司财务报告质量,这是地理距离影响独立董事履职,发挥监督作用的直接证据。其次,通过手工收集高铁、机场开通数据,发现高铁、机场的开通提供交通便利性,能够削弱独立董事地理距离对财务报告质量的影响。同时考虑了独立董事独立性问题,采用多个变量度量财务报告质量、考虑自选择问题等,结果仍然支持假设。该研究发现,丰富了独立董事监督作用的研究文献,也有助于从经济地理角度理解独立董事监督对上市公司的影响。
Using the data of geographic distance between independent directors and companies, this paper explores the geographic distance effect on corporate financial reporting quality. The results show that the longer distance between independent directors and companies, the worse listed companies' financial reporting quality is. The geographic distance affects independent directors' willing to attend board meeting, which finally worsens financial reporting quality. By collecting the data of high speed railways and airports, this paper finds the launching of new high speed railways and airports can mitigate the negative effect of geographic distance on corporate financial reporting quality, as high speed railways and airports make traveling more convenient for independent directors.Taking into account of the independence of directors and self-selection issues, and measuring financial reporting quality using multiple variables, the hypothesis remains valid. The findings enrich the literature on the supervision role of independent directors, and help understand the influence of independent directors' supervision on listed companies from the perspective of economic geography.
Using the data of geographic distance between independent directors and companies, this paper explores the geographic distance effect on corporate financial reporting quality. The results show that the longer distance between independent directors and companies, the worse listed companies' financial reporting quality is. The geographic distance affects independent directors' willing to attend board meeting, which finally worsens financial reporting quality. By collecting the data of high speed railways and airports, this paper finds the launching of new high speed railways and airports can mitigate the negative effect of geographic distance on corporate financial reporting quality, as high speed railways and airports make traveling more convenient for independent directors.Taking into account of the independence of directors and self-selection issues, and measuring financial reporting quality using multiple variables, the hypothesis remains valid. The findings enrich the literature on the supervision role of independent directors, and help understand the influence of independent directors' supervision on listed companies from the perspective of economic geography.
引文
胡奕明,唐松莲.2008.独立董事与上市公司盈余信息质量[J].管理世界(9):149-160.
刘文军.2014.审计师的地理位置是否影响审计质量?[J].审计研究(1):79-87.
孙光国,杨金凤.2012.财务报告质量评价研究:文献回顾、述评与未来展望[J].会计研究(3):31-38.
孙亮,刘春.2014.公司为什么聘请异地独立董事?[J].管理世界(9):131-142.
王兵.2007.独立董事监督了吗?——基于中国上市公司盈余质量的视角[J].金融研究(1):109-121.
Barker R. 1988. The Market for Information-Evidence from Finance Directors, Analysts and Fund Managers[J]. Accounting and Business Research29(l):3-20.
Baron R, Kenny D. 1986. The Moderator-mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research:Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology51(6):1173-1182.
Boubakri N, Guedhami 0, Saffar W. 2016. Geographic Location, Foreign Ownership, and Cost of Equity Capital:Evidence from Privatization[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance 38:363-381.
Chhaochharia V, Kumar A, Niessen-Ruenzi A. 2012. Local Investors and Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54(1):42-67.
Coval J D, Moskowitz T J. 2001. The Geography of Investment:Informed Trading and Asset Prices[J]. Journal of Political Economy109(4):811-841.
Fama E, Jensen M. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law&Economics 26(2):301-325.
Harris M, Raviv A. 2008. A Theory of Board Control and Size[J]. Review of Financial Studies 21(4):1797-1832.
Jensen K, Kim J, Yi H. 2015. The Geography of US Auditors:Information Quality and Monitoring Costs by Local Versus Non-Local Auditors[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 44(3):513-549.
Masulis R W, Mobbs S. 2014. Independent Director Incentives:Where do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy?[J].Journal of Financial Economics 111(2):406-429.Ye K. 2014. Independent Director Cash Compensation and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 33(4):391-400.
(1)本文采用地理距离变量Disjy进行PSM配对,其结果与以上结果类似,并不会影响实证结论。
刘文军.2014.审计师的地理位置是否影响审计质量?[J].审计研究(1):79-87.
孙光国,杨金凤.2012.财务报告质量评价研究:文献回顾、述评与未来展望[J].会计研究(3):31-38.
孙亮,刘春.2014.公司为什么聘请异地独立董事?[J].管理世界(9):131-142.
王兵.2007.独立董事监督了吗?——基于中国上市公司盈余质量的视角[J].金融研究(1):109-121.
Barker R. 1988. The Market for Information-Evidence from Finance Directors, Analysts and Fund Managers[J]. Accounting and Business Research29(l):3-20.
Baron R, Kenny D. 1986. The Moderator-mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research:Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology51(6):1173-1182.
Boubakri N, Guedhami 0, Saffar W. 2016. Geographic Location, Foreign Ownership, and Cost of Equity Capital:Evidence from Privatization[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance 38:363-381.
Chhaochharia V, Kumar A, Niessen-Ruenzi A. 2012. Local Investors and Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54(1):42-67.
Coval J D, Moskowitz T J. 2001. The Geography of Investment:Informed Trading and Asset Prices[J]. Journal of Political Economy109(4):811-841.
Fama E, Jensen M. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law&Economics 26(2):301-325.
Harris M, Raviv A. 2008. A Theory of Board Control and Size[J]. Review of Financial Studies 21(4):1797-1832.
Jensen K, Kim J, Yi H. 2015. The Geography of US Auditors:Information Quality and Monitoring Costs by Local Versus Non-Local Auditors[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 44(3):513-549.
Masulis R W, Mobbs S. 2014. Independent Director Incentives:Where do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy?[J].Journal of Financial Economics 111(2):406-429.Ye K. 2014. Independent Director Cash Compensation and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 33(4):391-400.
(1)本文采用地理距离变量Disjy进行PSM配对,其结果与以上结果类似,并不会影响实证结论。