关于制度环境、政治关联、融资约束与企业研发投入的多重关系模型与实证研究
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摘要
将制度环境、政治关联、融资约束与企业研发投入纳入同一研究框架,并藉此构建了一个关于制度环境、政治关联、融资约束与企业研发投入的多重关系模型,以2012～2015年中国A股民营高新技术上市企业为样本,进行了系列相关实证研究。研究表明:(1)融资约束与企业研发投入负相关,融资约束程度越高,企业研发投入越低;(2)政治关联与企业研发投入正相关,政治关联对企业研发投入具有促进作用;(3)政治关联与融资约束负相关,政治关联有助于缓解企业的融资约束;(4)政治关联对融资约束与企业研发投入之间的负向关系能够起到正向调节作用;(5)随着制度环境的完善,政治关联对融资约束的缓解作用不再显著,政治关联对融资约束与企业研发投入之间关系的调节作用亦会弱化。
In this study,the institutional environment,political connections,financing constraints and corporate R&D investment are included in the same research framework,thereby a multiple relationship model of the institutional environment,political connections,financing constraints and R&D investment is constructed.Using the A-share private high-tech listed companies during the period2012～2015 as samples,a series of empirical studies are conducted.The research results show that:(1)The financing constraints are negatively related to the R&D investment;the higher the degree of financing constraints,the lower the R&D investment of the company.(2)The political connections are positively related to the R&D investment of the company;In other words,the political connections have a positive effect on the R&D investment of the company.(3)The political connections are negatively related to financing constraints;Political connections can help mitigate the financing constraints to enterprises.(4)The political connections can positively moderate the negative relationship between financing constraints and corporate R&D investment.(5)With the improvement of the institutional environment,the mitigative effect of political connections on financing constraints will no longer be significant,and the moderating effect of political connections on the relationship between financing constraints and corporate R&D investment will also be weakened.
In this study,the institutional environment,political connections,financing constraints and corporate R&D investment are included in the same research framework,thereby a multiple relationship model of the institutional environment,political connections,financing constraints and R&D investment is constructed.Using the A-share private high-tech listed companies during the period2012～2015 as samples,a series of empirical studies are conducted.The research results show that:(1)The financing constraints are negatively related to the R&D investment;the higher the degree of financing constraints,the lower the R&D investment of the company.(2)The political connections are positively related to the R&D investment of the company;In other words,the political connections have a positive effect on the R&D investment of the company.(3)The political connections are negatively related to financing constraints;Political connections can help mitigate the financing constraints to enterprises.(4)The political connections can positively moderate the negative relationship between financing constraints and corporate R&D investment.(5)With the improvement of the institutional environment,the mitigative effect of political connections on financing constraints will no longer be significant,and the moderating effect of political connections on the relationship between financing constraints and corporate R&D investment will also be weakened.
引文
[1]CHAN K S,DANG V Q T,YAN I K M.Chinese Firms’Political Connection,Ownership,and Financing Constraints[J].Economics Letters,2012,115(2):164-167.
[2]LUO D,YING Q.Political Connections and Bank Lines of Credit[J].Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,2014,50(3):5-21.
[3]CULL R,LI W,SUN B,et al.Government Connections and Financial Constraints:Evidence from a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,32(2):271-294.
[4]FU J,SHIMAMOTO D,TODO Y.Can Firms with Political Connections Borrow More than Those without?Evidence from Firm-Level Data for Indonesia[J].Journal of Asian Economics,2017,52(1):45-55.
[5]FACCIO M,MASULIS R W,MCCONNELL J.Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2 597-2 635.
[6]WU W,WU C,RUI O M.Ownership and the Value of Political Connections:Evidence from China[J].European Financial Management,2012,18(4):695-729.
[7]LIN K J,TAN J,ZHAO L,et al.In the Name of Charity:Political Connections and Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility in a Transition Economy[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,32(2):327-346.
[8]CHARUMILIND C,KALI R,WIWATTANAKANTANG Y.Connected Lending:Thailand before the Financial Crisis[J].Journal of Business,2006,79(1):181-218.
[9]康志勇.融资约束、政府支持与中国本土企业研发投入[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(5):61-70.
[10]谢乔昕.环境规制扰动、政企关系与企业研发投入[J].科学学研究,2016,34(5):713-719.
[11]谢家智,刘思亚,李后建.政治关联、融资约束与企业研发投入[J].财经研究,2014,40(8):81-93.
[12]STEIN J C.Chapter 2-Agency,Information and Corporate Investment[J].Handbook of the Economics of Finance,2003,1(3):111-165.
[13]张璇,刘贝贝,汪婷,等.信贷寻租、融资约束与企业创新[J].经济研究,2017,52(5):161-174.
[14]GRANOVETTER M.Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness[J].American Journal of Sociology,1985,91(3):481-510.
[15]BURT R S.Structural Holes:The Social Structure of Competition[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2009.
[16]GALUNIC C,ERTUG G,GARGIULO M.The Positive Externalities of Social Capital:Benefiting from Senior Brokers[J].Academy of Management Journal,2012,55(5):1 213-1 231.
[17]STUART L, HART G D.A Natural-ResourceBased View of the Firm:Fifteen Years After[J].Journal of Management,2011,37(5):1 464-1 479.
[18]周海涛,张振刚.政府研发资助方式对企业创新投入与创新绩效的影响研究[J].管理学报,2015,12(12):1 797-1 804.
[19]KHWAJA A I,MIAN A.Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms?Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005,120(4):1 371-1 411.
[20]BOYREAU-DEBRAY G,WEI S J.Pitfalls of a State-Dominated Financial System:The Case of China[R].Cambridge:National Bureau of Economic Research,2005.
[21]LI H,MENG L,WANG Q,et al.Political Connections,Financing and Firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms[J].Journal of Development Economics,2008,87(2):283-299.
[22]CLAESSENS S,FEIJEN E,LAEVEN L.Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3):554-580.
[23]黄珺,朱辉.政治背景、社会责任信息披露与银行信贷[J].管理学报,2014,11(4):615-623.
[24]胡旭阳.民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例[J].管理世界,2006(5):107-113.
[25]周开国,卢允之,杨海生.融资约束、创新能力与企业协同创新[J].经济研究,2017,52(7):94-108.
[26]李维安,徐业坤.政治关联形式、制度环境与民营企业生产率[J].管理科学,2012,25(2):1-12.
[27]CHEN H,CHEN J Z,LOBO G J,et al.Association between Borrower and Lender State Ownership and Accounting Conservatism[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2010,48(5):973-1 014.
[28]范建红,陈怀超.董事会社会资本对企业研发投入的影响研究——董事会权力的调节效应[J].研究与发展管理,2015,27(5):22-33.
[29]李维安,王鹏程,徐业坤.慈善捐赠、政治关联与债务融资——民营企业与政府的资源交换行为[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):4-14.
[30]FAZZARI S M,HUBBARD R G,PETERSEN B C,et al.Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988,1(1):141-206.
[31]KAPLAN S N,ZINGALES L.Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(1):169-215.
[32]王小鲁,樊纲,余文静.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
(1)将总样本带入不同的模型后,由于模型之间在变量选取上存在差异,故剔除缺失值后保留下来的观测值会有所不同。根据数据剔除原则,若某企业在某一年度缺失部分变量的数据,则其在该年度的所有变量数据均不予保留。由此,即使各模型的观测值不同,但子样本中保留的样本企业均在所有变量上保持数据的完整性。亦即,观测值不同,并不会影响变量之间的相对关系。
[2]LUO D,YING Q.Political Connections and Bank Lines of Credit[J].Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,2014,50(3):5-21.
[3]CULL R,LI W,SUN B,et al.Government Connections and Financial Constraints:Evidence from a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,32(2):271-294.
[4]FU J,SHIMAMOTO D,TODO Y.Can Firms with Political Connections Borrow More than Those without?Evidence from Firm-Level Data for Indonesia[J].Journal of Asian Economics,2017,52(1):45-55.
[5]FACCIO M,MASULIS R W,MCCONNELL J.Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2 597-2 635.
[6]WU W,WU C,RUI O M.Ownership and the Value of Political Connections:Evidence from China[J].European Financial Management,2012,18(4):695-729.
[7]LIN K J,TAN J,ZHAO L,et al.In the Name of Charity:Political Connections and Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility in a Transition Economy[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,32(2):327-346.
[8]CHARUMILIND C,KALI R,WIWATTANAKANTANG Y.Connected Lending:Thailand before the Financial Crisis[J].Journal of Business,2006,79(1):181-218.
[9]康志勇.融资约束、政府支持与中国本土企业研发投入[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(5):61-70.
[10]谢乔昕.环境规制扰动、政企关系与企业研发投入[J].科学学研究,2016,34(5):713-719.
[11]谢家智,刘思亚,李后建.政治关联、融资约束与企业研发投入[J].财经研究,2014,40(8):81-93.
[12]STEIN J C.Chapter 2-Agency,Information and Corporate Investment[J].Handbook of the Economics of Finance,2003,1(3):111-165.
[13]张璇,刘贝贝,汪婷,等.信贷寻租、融资约束与企业创新[J].经济研究,2017,52(5):161-174.
[14]GRANOVETTER M.Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness[J].American Journal of Sociology,1985,91(3):481-510.
[15]BURT R S.Structural Holes:The Social Structure of Competition[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2009.
[16]GALUNIC C,ERTUG G,GARGIULO M.The Positive Externalities of Social Capital:Benefiting from Senior Brokers[J].Academy of Management Journal,2012,55(5):1 213-1 231.
[17]STUART L, HART G D.A Natural-ResourceBased View of the Firm:Fifteen Years After[J].Journal of Management,2011,37(5):1 464-1 479.
[18]周海涛,张振刚.政府研发资助方式对企业创新投入与创新绩效的影响研究[J].管理学报,2015,12(12):1 797-1 804.
[19]KHWAJA A I,MIAN A.Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms?Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005,120(4):1 371-1 411.
[20]BOYREAU-DEBRAY G,WEI S J.Pitfalls of a State-Dominated Financial System:The Case of China[R].Cambridge:National Bureau of Economic Research,2005.
[21]LI H,MENG L,WANG Q,et al.Political Connections,Financing and Firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms[J].Journal of Development Economics,2008,87(2):283-299.
[22]CLAESSENS S,FEIJEN E,LAEVEN L.Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3):554-580.
[23]黄珺,朱辉.政治背景、社会责任信息披露与银行信贷[J].管理学报,2014,11(4):615-623.
[24]胡旭阳.民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例[J].管理世界,2006(5):107-113.
[25]周开国,卢允之,杨海生.融资约束、创新能力与企业协同创新[J].经济研究,2017,52(7):94-108.
[26]李维安,徐业坤.政治关联形式、制度环境与民营企业生产率[J].管理科学,2012,25(2):1-12.
[27]CHEN H,CHEN J Z,LOBO G J,et al.Association between Borrower and Lender State Ownership and Accounting Conservatism[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2010,48(5):973-1 014.
[28]范建红,陈怀超.董事会社会资本对企业研发投入的影响研究——董事会权力的调节效应[J].研究与发展管理,2015,27(5):22-33.
[29]李维安,王鹏程,徐业坤.慈善捐赠、政治关联与债务融资——民营企业与政府的资源交换行为[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):4-14.
[30]FAZZARI S M,HUBBARD R G,PETERSEN B C,et al.Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988,1(1):141-206.
[31]KAPLAN S N,ZINGALES L.Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(1):169-215.
[32]王小鲁,樊纲,余文静.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
(1)将总样本带入不同的模型后,由于模型之间在变量选取上存在差异,故剔除缺失值后保留下来的观测值会有所不同。根据数据剔除原则,若某企业在某一年度缺失部分变量的数据,则其在该年度的所有变量数据均不予保留。由此,即使各模型的观测值不同,但子样本中保留的样本企业均在所有变量上保持数据的完整性。亦即,观测值不同,并不会影响变量之间的相对关系。