生产合作声誉与信用合作道德风险控制
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摘要
依据专业合作社内开展信用合作所具有的互联性交易特征,利用关联博弈分析工具,研究了合作社与社员之间的生产合作声誉对上述困境的改善。研究证明,专业合作社内开展信用合作,借助专业合作社与社员之间已有的生产合作声誉,能够实现对社员信用合作道德风险的进一步抑制。同时,社员在生产合作上获取的超额收益以及社员借款规模分别对社员信用合作道德风险抑制起到提升和阻碍作用。
Based on the characteristics of interconnectional-transaction in credit cooperatives in professional cooperatives,this paper studies the improvement of dilemma by the cooperation of cooperatives and members. The research proves that credit cooperatives are carried out in professional cooperatives,and the moral hazard of credit cooperation between members and cooperatives can be restrained by the reputation of production cooperation between professional cooperatives and members. At the same time,the excess returns of production cooperation and the amount of loan in the effectiveness to enhance or inhibit moral hazard in members credit cooperation.
Based on the characteristics of interconnectional-transaction in credit cooperatives in professional cooperatives,this paper studies the improvement of dilemma by the cooperation of cooperatives and members. The research proves that credit cooperatives are carried out in professional cooperatives,and the moral hazard of credit cooperation between members and cooperatives can be restrained by the reputation of production cooperation between professional cooperatives and members. At the same time,the excess returns of production cooperation and the amount of loan in the effectiveness to enhance or inhibit moral hazard in members credit cooperation.
引文
[1]葛永波,赵国庆,王鸿哲.村镇银行经营绩效影响因素研究——基于山东省的调研数据[J].农业经济问题,2015(9):79-88.
[2]何广文.农民专业合作社金融服务模式探析[J].中国农村信用合作,2009(3):26-28.
[3]洪正.新型农村金融机构改革可行吗?——基于监督效率视角的分析[J].经济研究,2011(2):44-58.
[4]薛桂霞,孙炜琳.对农民专业合作社开展信用合作的思考[J].农业经济问题,2013(4):76-80.
[5]苑鹏,彭莹莹.农民专业合作社开展信用合作的现状研究[J].农村经济,2013(4):3-6.
[6]张德元,张亚军.关于农民资金互助合作组织的思考与分析[J].经济学家,2008(1):40-47.
[7]陈东平,倪佳伟,周月书.行动者网络理论下农民资金互助组织形成机制分析[J].贵州社会科学,2013(6):116-121.
[8]陈东平,张雷,高名姿.互联性交易与股份合作制专业合作社内信用合作契约治理研究——以旺庄果品专业合作社为例[J].农业经济问题,2017(5):28-35+110.
[9]BROUSSEAU E,GLACHANT J M.The Economics of Contracts-Theories and Applications[J].Ulb Institutional Repository,2004,519(21):7583-7586.
[10]BRAVERMAN A,STIGLITZ J E.Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets.[J].American Economic Review,1982,72(4):695-715.
[11]BELL C,ZUSMAN P.A Bargaining Approach to Cropsharing Contracts[J].American Economic Review,1976,66(4):578-88.
[12]MITRA P K.A theory of interlinked rural transactions[J].Journal of Public Economics,1983,20(2):167-191.
[13]德布拉吉·瑞.发展经济学[M].陶然,等,译.北京.北京大学出版社,2002:531-541.
[14]王永钦.市场互联性、关系型合约与经济转型[J].经济研究,2006(6):79-91.
[15]米运生,曾泽莹,何璟.农村互联性贷款的存在逻辑与自我履约——基于声誉视角的理论分析[J].经济科学,2016(3):100-113.
[16]FUDENBERG D,KREPS D M.Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents[J].Review of Economic Studies,1987,54(4):541-568.
[17]MILGROM P R,NORTH D C,WEINGAST B R.The Role of Institutions in The Revival of Trade:The Law Merchant,Private Judges,and The Champagne Fairs[J].Economics&Politics,1990,2(1):1-23.
[18]TADELIS S.What’s in a Name?Reputation as a Tradeable Asset[J].American Economic Review,1999,89(3):548-563.
[19]COLE H L,KEHOE P J.Reputation Spillover Across Relationships with Enduring and Transient Beliefs:Reviving reputation Models of Debt[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,1996,116(116):175-177.
[20]SPAGNOLO G.Social relations and cooperation in organizations[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1999,38(1):1-25.
[21]青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M]周黎安,译.上海.上海远东出版社,2002:45-48
[22]KREPS D M,WILSON R.Reputation and imperfect information[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1982,27(2):253-279.
[23]YIN R K.The case study anthology[M]∥The case study anthology.Sage Publications,2004.
[24]EISENHARDT K M.Better Stories and Better Constructs:The Case for Rigor and Comparative Logic[J].Academy of Management Review,1991,16(3):620-627.
[25]HERRIOTT R E,FIRESTONE W A.Multisite Qualitative Policy Research:Optimizing Description and Generalizability[J].Educational Researcher,1983,12(2):14-19.
[26]张照新.支持合作社成为监管主体提高财政支农政策效能[J].中国农民合作社,2017(3):25-26.
[27]邓衡山,王文烂.合作社的本质规定与现实检视——中国到底有没有真正的农民合作社?[J].中国农村经济,2014(7):15-26.
(1)具体内容详见《山东省农民专业合作社信用互助业务试点管理暂行办法》。
(1)冷酷战略是指一旦农户违约,将永远失去未来从银行获得信贷的收益。
(1)复制性法则包括逐项复制(产生相同的结果)和差别复制(由于可预知的原因而产生的与前一研究不同的结果)
(2)隐性质押指的是虽然社员在与合作社签订借款协议时,没有明确说明用储存土豆进行质押,但是社员在销售马铃薯时,合作社会直接扣除借款资金。
(1)数据来源于中国银行业监督管理委员会网站。
[2]何广文.农民专业合作社金融服务模式探析[J].中国农村信用合作,2009(3):26-28.
[3]洪正.新型农村金融机构改革可行吗?——基于监督效率视角的分析[J].经济研究,2011(2):44-58.
[4]薛桂霞,孙炜琳.对农民专业合作社开展信用合作的思考[J].农业经济问题,2013(4):76-80.
[5]苑鹏,彭莹莹.农民专业合作社开展信用合作的现状研究[J].农村经济,2013(4):3-6.
[6]张德元,张亚军.关于农民资金互助合作组织的思考与分析[J].经济学家,2008(1):40-47.
[7]陈东平,倪佳伟,周月书.行动者网络理论下农民资金互助组织形成机制分析[J].贵州社会科学,2013(6):116-121.
[8]陈东平,张雷,高名姿.互联性交易与股份合作制专业合作社内信用合作契约治理研究——以旺庄果品专业合作社为例[J].农业经济问题,2017(5):28-35+110.
[9]BROUSSEAU E,GLACHANT J M.The Economics of Contracts-Theories and Applications[J].Ulb Institutional Repository,2004,519(21):7583-7586.
[10]BRAVERMAN A,STIGLITZ J E.Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets.[J].American Economic Review,1982,72(4):695-715.
[11]BELL C,ZUSMAN P.A Bargaining Approach to Cropsharing Contracts[J].American Economic Review,1976,66(4):578-88.
[12]MITRA P K.A theory of interlinked rural transactions[J].Journal of Public Economics,1983,20(2):167-191.
[13]德布拉吉·瑞.发展经济学[M].陶然,等,译.北京.北京大学出版社,2002:531-541.
[14]王永钦.市场互联性、关系型合约与经济转型[J].经济研究,2006(6):79-91.
[15]米运生,曾泽莹,何璟.农村互联性贷款的存在逻辑与自我履约——基于声誉视角的理论分析[J].经济科学,2016(3):100-113.
[16]FUDENBERG D,KREPS D M.Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents[J].Review of Economic Studies,1987,54(4):541-568.
[17]MILGROM P R,NORTH D C,WEINGAST B R.The Role of Institutions in The Revival of Trade:The Law Merchant,Private Judges,and The Champagne Fairs[J].Economics&Politics,1990,2(1):1-23.
[18]TADELIS S.What’s in a Name?Reputation as a Tradeable Asset[J].American Economic Review,1999,89(3):548-563.
[19]COLE H L,KEHOE P J.Reputation Spillover Across Relationships with Enduring and Transient Beliefs:Reviving reputation Models of Debt[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,1996,116(116):175-177.
[20]SPAGNOLO G.Social relations and cooperation in organizations[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1999,38(1):1-25.
[21]青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M]周黎安,译.上海.上海远东出版社,2002:45-48
[22]KREPS D M,WILSON R.Reputation and imperfect information[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1982,27(2):253-279.
[23]YIN R K.The case study anthology[M]∥The case study anthology.Sage Publications,2004.
[24]EISENHARDT K M.Better Stories and Better Constructs:The Case for Rigor and Comparative Logic[J].Academy of Management Review,1991,16(3):620-627.
[25]HERRIOTT R E,FIRESTONE W A.Multisite Qualitative Policy Research:Optimizing Description and Generalizability[J].Educational Researcher,1983,12(2):14-19.
[26]张照新.支持合作社成为监管主体提高财政支农政策效能[J].中国农民合作社,2017(3):25-26.
[27]邓衡山,王文烂.合作社的本质规定与现实检视——中国到底有没有真正的农民合作社?[J].中国农村经济,2014(7):15-26.
(1)具体内容详见《山东省农民专业合作社信用互助业务试点管理暂行办法》。
(1)冷酷战略是指一旦农户违约,将永远失去未来从银行获得信贷的收益。
(1)复制性法则包括逐项复制(产生相同的结果)和差别复制(由于可预知的原因而产生的与前一研究不同的结果)
(2)隐性质押指的是虽然社员在与合作社签订借款协议时,没有明确说明用储存土豆进行质押,但是社员在销售马铃薯时,合作社会直接扣除借款资金。
(1)数据来源于中国银行业监督管理委员会网站。