摘要
以绿色制造商和零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为研究对象,在政府对制造商研发补贴背景下,采用博弈论进行理论建模。建立了以政府、制造商和零售商为主体的三阶段博弈模型,运用数值仿真法进行了分析。研究表明:①政府对制造商进行补贴,社会福利水平比不补贴时要高;②政府对制造商进行补贴,能够促进产品绿色度的提高;③随着政府补贴系数的增大,社会福利水平也在不断提高;④随着消费者敏感系数增大,消费者剩余和社会福利水平也在不断增加。
Taking the secondary green supply chain composed of a green manufacturer and a retailer as the objective, and under the background of government subsidies for manufacturers' research and development, a three-stage game model covering the government, the manufacturer, and the retailer was established using the theoretical modeling method. Then, the numerical simulation method is used to analyze the problem. The results show that social welfare is better and the greenness of products will be promoted when the government subsidizes the manufacturer. Besides, social welfare will be improved as the coefficient of government subsidy increases. In addition, consumer surplus and social welfare will also increase as the coefficient of consumer sensitivity increases.
引文
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