基于复杂网络演化博弈的企业低碳创新合作行为网络演化机理研究
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摘要
针对企业低碳创新合作所面临的复杂问题,基于现实复杂网络结构特征,运用演化博弈理论研究有限理性下企业低碳创新合作行为网络演化机理,利用Matlab仿真技术探究无标度网络载体上微观因素对低碳创新合作行为的影响。研究结果表明:低碳创新利益分配、协同效益和违约惩罚对低碳创新合作行为网络演化结果的影响最为显著,网络规模越大网络演化速度越慢,网络规模越小对协同系数和利益分配系数的敏感性越强,网络规模越大对技术溢出系数和违约惩罚的敏感性越强。研究结论可以为企业低碳创新合作策略制定提供解决依据。
In view of the complex problems in low-carbon innovation cooperation faced by China 's enterprises,evolutionary game theory is used to study the evolution mechanism of low carbon innovation cooperation behavior of enterprises under bounded rationality based on the characteristics of complex network structure. The Matlab simulation technology is employed to explore the impact of micro factors on the cooperative behavior of low-carbon innovation on scale-free network. The results show that the low-carbon innovation synergy benefit and default penalty and distribution of interests have a significant effect on the evolution of low carbon innovation cooperative behavior network. Network size is negatively related to network evolution velocity,and smaller scale networks are more sensitive to the synergistic coefficient and benefit distribution coefficient,and greater scale networks are more sensitive to the technology spillover coefficient and the default penalty. The conclusions provide a basis for the strategy formulation of low-carbon innovation cooperation.
In view of the complex problems in low-carbon innovation cooperation faced by China 's enterprises,evolutionary game theory is used to study the evolution mechanism of low carbon innovation cooperation behavior of enterprises under bounded rationality based on the characteristics of complex network structure. The Matlab simulation technology is employed to explore the impact of micro factors on the cooperative behavior of low-carbon innovation on scale-free network. The results show that the low-carbon innovation synergy benefit and default penalty and distribution of interests have a significant effect on the evolution of low carbon innovation cooperative behavior network. Network size is negatively related to network evolution velocity,and smaller scale networks are more sensitive to the synergistic coefficient and benefit distribution coefficient,and greater scale networks are more sensitive to the technology spillover coefficient and the default penalty. The conclusions provide a basis for the strategy formulation of low-carbon innovation cooperation.
引文
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[35]陈真玲,王文举.环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析[J].管理评论,2017,29(5):226-236.
[36]张宏娟,范如国.基于复杂网络演化博弈的传统产业集群低碳演化模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(12):41-47.
[37] Small M,judd K,Zhang L. How is that complex network complex?[J]. Circuits and Systems,2014,27(8):1263-1266.
[38]徐莹莹,綦良群.基于复杂网络演化博弈的企业集群低碳技术创新扩散研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(8):16-24.
[39]范如国,张应青,罗会军.考虑公平偏好的产业集群复杂网络低碳演化博弈模型及其仿真分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(S1):763-770.
[40]鲜于波,梅琳.适应性预期、复杂网络与标准扩散动力学—基于计算经济学的研究[J].管理科学,2007,20(4):62-72.
[41]刁丽琳.合作创新中知识窃取和保护的演化博弈研究[J].科学学研究,2012,30(5):721-728.
[42]黄玮强,姚爽,庄新田.基于复杂社会网络的创新扩散多智能体仿真研究[J].科学学研究,2013,31(2):310-320.
[2]曹霞,张路蓬.利益驱动对创新网络合作行为演化的影响机理及仿真—基于复杂网络拓扑结构视角[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(6):160-169.
[3]孙晓华,李传杰.有效需求规模、双重需求结构与产业创新能力—来自中国装备制造业的证据[J].科研管理,2010,31(1):93-103.
[4]原毅军,耿殿贺.中国装备制造业技术研发效率的实证研究[J].中国软科学,2010,10(3):51-57.
[5] Axelrod R M. The evolution of cooperation[M]. New York:Basic Book,1984.
[6] Francis B,Melchior S. Stability and complexity of interfirm cooperation:the case of multi-point alliances[J].European Management Journal,2001,19(6):619-628.
[7] Xu X F,Ruan A Q. The construction of shapley value in cooperative game and its application on enterprise alliance[J]. Physics Procedia,2012,24(2):1377-1384.
[8]周贵川,张黎明.资源型企业间合作技术创新影响因素的博弈分析[J].管理世界,2014,3(1):184-185.
[9]彭佑元,程燕萍,梅文文,陈红斌.资源型产业与非资源型产业均衡发展机理—基于合作创新的演化博弈模型分析[J].经济问题,2016,10(2):80-85.
[10] Jackson M O,Watts A. The evolution of social and economic network[J]. Journal of Economic Theory,2002,106(2):265-295.
[11] Nowak M A,Tarnita C E,Antal T. Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations[J]. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B:Biological Sciences,2010,365(1537):19-30.
[12] Hauert C,M Doebeli. Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game[J].Nature,2004,428(6983):643-646.
[13] Santos F C,Pacheco J M. Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations[J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2006, 103(9):3490-3494.
[14]曹霞,刘国巍.资源配置导向下产学研合作创新网络协同演化路径[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(5):769-777.
[15] Biely C,Dragosits K,Thurner S. Prisoner’s dilemma on coevolving networks under perfect rationality[J].Physical D,2006,228(1):40-48.
[16] Zimmermann M G,Eguiluz V M,Miguel M S. Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic network[J]. Physical Review E,2004,69(5):1-4.
[17] Antoncic B,Prodan I. Alliances,corporate technological entrepreneurship and firm performance:testing a model on manufacturing firms[J]. Technovation,2008,28(5):257-265.
[18] Harrison F,EI Mouden C. Exploring the effects of working for endowments on behavior in standard economic games[J]. Plos One,2011,6(16):28-31.
[19]时茜茜,朱建波,盛昭瀚.重大工程供应链协同合作利益分配研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(5):42-51.
[20] Ernst F and Simon G. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments[J]. American Economic Review,2000,90(4):980-994.
[21]曹霞,张路蓬.基于利益分配的创新网络合作密度演化研究[J].系统工程学报,2016,31(1):1-12.
[22] Mukherjee A,Muga H. An integrative framework for studying sustainable practices and its adoption in the AEC industry:a case study[J]. Journal of engineering and technology management,2010,27(4):197-214.
[23] Gong Y H,Xue D Z. Collaborative innovation game analysis of ICT low carbon technology industry chain under different cooperation modes[J]. Systems Engineering,2016,34(11):39-46.
[24] Hoen Kmr,Tan T,Fransoo J C. Effect of carbon emission regulations on transport mode selection under demand[J]. Flexible services and manufacturing journal,2014,26(2):170-195.
[25]臧欣昱,马永红.协同创新视角下产学研合作行为决策机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2018,27(3):93-103.
[26]单英华,李忠富.基于演化博弈的住宅建筑企业技术合作创新机理[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(5):673-681.
[27]高孟立.合作创新中机会主义行为的相互性及治理机制研究[J].科学学研究,2017,35(9):1422-1433.
[28]杜欣.网络视角下联盟组合创新合作行为的演化与创新绩效研究[D].电子科技大学,2017.
[29]唐丽艳,刘旭华,王国红,邢蕊.企业资源依赖性与合作创新行为的关系研究[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(2):165-172.
[30]朱雪春,陈万明.实践社群知识流动的可持续性研究—基于进化博弈的视角[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2015,17(5):56-62.
[31]张宝生,王晓红.虚拟科技创新团队知识转移稳定性研究—基于演化博弈视角[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(5):169-175.
[32]罗剑锋.基于演化博弈理论的企业间合作违约惩罚机制[J].系统工程,2012,(1):27-31.
[33]曹海旺,窦迅,薛朝改,王傲东.政府激励下秸秆发电供应链的演化博弈模型与分析[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(1):89-95.
[34]马翔,张国兴.基于非对称演化博弈的京冀雾霾协同治理联盟稳定性分析[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(5):45-52.
[35]陈真玲,王文举.环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析[J].管理评论,2017,29(5):226-236.
[36]张宏娟,范如国.基于复杂网络演化博弈的传统产业集群低碳演化模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(12):41-47.
[37] Small M,judd K,Zhang L. How is that complex network complex?[J]. Circuits and Systems,2014,27(8):1263-1266.
[38]徐莹莹,綦良群.基于复杂网络演化博弈的企业集群低碳技术创新扩散研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(8):16-24.
[39]范如国,张应青,罗会军.考虑公平偏好的产业集群复杂网络低碳演化博弈模型及其仿真分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(S1):763-770.
[40]鲜于波,梅琳.适应性预期、复杂网络与标准扩散动力学—基于计算经济学的研究[J].管理科学,2007,20(4):62-72.
[41]刁丽琳.合作创新中知识窃取和保护的演化博弈研究[J].科学学研究,2012,30(5):721-728.
[42]黄玮强,姚爽,庄新田.基于复杂社会网络的创新扩散多智能体仿真研究[J].科学学研究,2013,31(2):310-320.