我国商业信用再配置的动机检验及其治理效应分析——来自上市公司信贷漏损的证据
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摘要
以2008年~2014年A股制造业上市公司为样本,以供应商进行商业信用再配置的信贷漏损行为为视角,证明了商业信用供给并非供应商根据自身信贷优势主动实施的逐利行为,而是在买方市场条件下因客户占据强势地位被动进行的授信行为,是强势买方对供应商实施的信用侵占;其次,证明了宽松的货币政策有助于降低强势买方的信用侵占意愿,弱化被动性再配置水平,即货币政策作为宏观调控手段具有缓解微观厂商之间商业信用侵占的能力;最后,证明了技术创新可以通过强化供应商产品市场竞争力来帮助其摆脱强势买方的商业信用侵占,进而降低被动性再配置水平,即鼓励企业实施创新驱动战略对扭曲型信贷漏损具有治理意义。
Using a panel data of Chinese manufacturing firms over the period of 2008-2014,the paper makes a revisit on the motivation of trade credit redistribution from the perspective of supply chain relationship and finds that: trade credit extension is compulsively driven by buyer power rather than spontaneously driven by arbitrage motive; redistribution effect will increase with customer concentration only in tight monetary policy,which means that tight monetary policy has a positive impact on the degree of involuntary redistribution of trade credit; only for firms with lower R&D expenditure,the redistribution effect will increase with customer concentration,which means that investment in innovation will contribute to suppliers' competition ability,and in return it will hedge the buyer power and reduce compulsive provision. This finding introduces the innovation investment into the framework of efficiency analysis of capital reallocation.
Using a panel data of Chinese manufacturing firms over the period of 2008-2014,the paper makes a revisit on the motivation of trade credit redistribution from the perspective of supply chain relationship and finds that: trade credit extension is compulsively driven by buyer power rather than spontaneously driven by arbitrage motive; redistribution effect will increase with customer concentration only in tight monetary policy,which means that tight monetary policy has a positive impact on the degree of involuntary redistribution of trade credit; only for firms with lower R&D expenditure,the redistribution effect will increase with customer concentration,which means that investment in innovation will contribute to suppliers' competition ability,and in return it will hedge the buyer power and reduce compulsive provision. This finding introduces the innovation investment into the framework of efficiency analysis of capital reallocation.
引文
[1]MELTZER A H.Mercantile credit,monetary policy,and size of firms[J].Review of Economics&Statistics,1960,42(4):429-437.
[2]SCHWARTZ R A.An economic model of trade credit[J].Journal of Financial&Quantitative Analysis,1974,9(4):643-657.
[3]安强身.金融漏损、效率修正与“反哺效应”---中国转轨经济金融低效率与经济高增长研究的新视角[J].财经研究,2008(4):4-15.
[4]MCGUINNESS G,HOGAN T.Bank credit and trade credit:evidence from SMEs over the financial crisis[J].International Small Business Journal,2014,34(4):412-445.
[5]于博.货币政策、所有制差异与商业信用再配置---兼论新常态背景下供给侧治理的微观路径[J].广东财经大学学报,2016(3):45-55.
[6]PETERSEN M A,RAJAN R G.Trade credit:theories and evidence[J].Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(3):661-691.
[7]JAIN N.Monitoring costs and trade credit[J].Quarterly Review of Economics&Finance,2001,41(1):89-110.
[8]VAN HOREN N.Customer market power and the provision of trade credit:evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia[R].Policy Research Working Paper Series NO.4284,The World Bank,2007.
[9]ELLINGSEN T,JACOBSON T,SCHEDVIN E V.Trade creidt:contract-level evidence contradicts current theories[R].Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No.315,2016.
[10]FABBIR D,KLAPPER L F.Bargaining power and trade credit[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,41:66-80.
[11]PIERCY N F,LANE N.The hidden risks in strategic account management strategy[J].Journal of Business Strategy,2006,27(1):18-26.
[12]FABBRI D,MENICHINI A M.Trade credit,collateral liquidation,and borrowing constraints[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(3):413-432.
[13]BIAIS B,GOLLIER C.Trade credit and credit rationing.[J].Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(4):903-937.
[14]ATANASOVA C.How do firms choose between intermediary and supplier finance?[J].Financial Management,2012,41(1):207-228.
[15]COULIBALY B,SAPRIZA H,ZLATE A.Financial frictions,trade credit,and the 2008-09 global financial crisis[J].International Review of Economics&Finance,2013,26:25-38.
[16]NILSEN J H.Trade credit and the bank lending channel[J].Journal of Money Credit&Banking,2002,34(1):226-253.
[17]GUARIGLIA A,MATEUT S.Credit channel,trade credit channel,and inventory investment:evidence from a panel of UK firms[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2006,30(10):2835-2856.
[18]CULL R,XU L C,ZHU T.Formal finance and trade credit during China's transition[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(2):173-192.
[19]YANG X.The role of trade credit in the recent subprime financial crisis[J].Journal of Economics&Business,2011,63(5):517-529.
[20]余明桂,潘红波.所有权性质,行业信用与信贷资源配置效率[J].经济管理,2010(8):106-117.
[21]LIN T T,CHOU J H.Trade credit and bank loan:evidence from Chinese firms[J].International Review of Economics&Finance,2015,36:17-29.
[22]李四海,邹萍,宋献中.货币政策、信贷资源配置与金融漏损[J].经济科学,2015(3):77-88.
[23]牛培路,白俊.金融发展、银行信贷与商业信用再分配[J].金融论坛,2013(10):34-42.
[24]刘小鲁.我国商业信用的资源再配置效应与强制性特征---基于工业企业数据的实证检验[J].中国人民大学学报,2012(1):68-77.
[25]UCHIDA H,UDELL G F,WATANABE W.Are trade creditors relationship lenders?[J].Japan&the World Economy,2013,25-26(3):24-38.
[26]金碚.债务支付拖欠对当前经济及企业行为的影响[J].经济研究,2006(5):13-19.
[27]张杰,刘志彪,张少军.制度扭曲与中国本土企业的出口扩张[J].世界经济,2008(10):3-11.
[28]张新民,王珏,祝继高.市场地位、商业信用与企业经营性融资[J].会计研究,2012(8):58-65.
[29]HERMES N,KIHANGA E,LENSINK R,et al.The impact of trade credit on customer switching:evidence from the Tanzanian rice market[J].Journal of Development Study,2012,48(3):363-376.
[30]DHALIWAL DAN,J SCOTT JUDD,MATTHEW SERFLIN,et al.Customer concentration risk and the cost of equity capital[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,61(1):23-48.
[31]HOBERG G,PHILIPS G.Real and financial industry booms and busts[J].The Journal of Finance,2010,65(1):45-86.
[32]CHIU WAN-CHIEN,JUAN IGNACIO PEA,CHIH-WEI WANG.Industry characteristics and financial risk contagion[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2015,50:411-427.
[33]米运生,姜百臣,牟小容.经营模式、组织形式、资本结构的交互影响与农业企业成长:基于温氏集团的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2008(8):132-142.
[34]黄志忠,谢军.宏观货币政策、区域金融发展和企业融资约束---货币政策传导机制的微观证据[J].会计研究,2013(1):63-69.
[35]陆正飞,杨德明.商业信用:替代性融资,还是买房市场?[J].管理世界,2011(4):6-14.
[36]刘啟仁,黄建忠.产业创新如何影响企业加成率[J].世界经济,2016(11):28-53.
[37]曹裕,熊寿遥,胡韩莉.企业生命周期下智力资本与创新绩效关系研究[J].科研管理,2016(10):69-78.
[38]蒲文燕,张洪辉.基于融资风险的现金持有与企业技术创新投入的关系研究[J].中国管理科学,2016(5):38-45.
[39]ALMEIDA H,CAMPELLO M.Financial constraints,asset tangibility,and corporate investment[J].Review of Financial Studies,2007,20(5):1429-1460.
(1)模型(1)中“核心变量”及“控制变量”的具体定义及计量方式参见表1。
(2)参照陆正飞和杨德明(2011)[35]的方法,计算得到2008年~2014年各季度的MP(M2增长率-GDP增长率-CPI增长率),该值表示货币政策的相对松紧水平。定义虚拟变量MP,将上述计算值最大的3年设定为货币政策宽松期(MP=1),最小的4年设定为货币政策紧缩期(MP=0)。根据计算结果,2008年~2014年的前3年为货币政策宽松期,后4年为货币政策紧缩期。
(1)在创新投资的分组设计方面,本文以“研发支出/销售收入”来计算创新投资水平(Inno),并在此基础上定义虚拟变量InnoD ummy:当Inno大于行业均值时,InnoD ummy赋值为1,代表高创新投资分组;否则为0,代表低创新投资分组。
(2)其来源参见Almeida等(2007)[39]。
(1)时间截至2011年是为了保证每个样本企业的样本量大于3年。
[2]SCHWARTZ R A.An economic model of trade credit[J].Journal of Financial&Quantitative Analysis,1974,9(4):643-657.
[3]安强身.金融漏损、效率修正与“反哺效应”---中国转轨经济金融低效率与经济高增长研究的新视角[J].财经研究,2008(4):4-15.
[4]MCGUINNESS G,HOGAN T.Bank credit and trade credit:evidence from SMEs over the financial crisis[J].International Small Business Journal,2014,34(4):412-445.
[5]于博.货币政策、所有制差异与商业信用再配置---兼论新常态背景下供给侧治理的微观路径[J].广东财经大学学报,2016(3):45-55.
[6]PETERSEN M A,RAJAN R G.Trade credit:theories and evidence[J].Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(3):661-691.
[7]JAIN N.Monitoring costs and trade credit[J].Quarterly Review of Economics&Finance,2001,41(1):89-110.
[8]VAN HOREN N.Customer market power and the provision of trade credit:evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia[R].Policy Research Working Paper Series NO.4284,The World Bank,2007.
[9]ELLINGSEN T,JACOBSON T,SCHEDVIN E V.Trade creidt:contract-level evidence contradicts current theories[R].Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No.315,2016.
[10]FABBIR D,KLAPPER L F.Bargaining power and trade credit[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,41:66-80.
[11]PIERCY N F,LANE N.The hidden risks in strategic account management strategy[J].Journal of Business Strategy,2006,27(1):18-26.
[12]FABBRI D,MENICHINI A M.Trade credit,collateral liquidation,and borrowing constraints[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(3):413-432.
[13]BIAIS B,GOLLIER C.Trade credit and credit rationing.[J].Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(4):903-937.
[14]ATANASOVA C.How do firms choose between intermediary and supplier finance?[J].Financial Management,2012,41(1):207-228.
[15]COULIBALY B,SAPRIZA H,ZLATE A.Financial frictions,trade credit,and the 2008-09 global financial crisis[J].International Review of Economics&Finance,2013,26:25-38.
[16]NILSEN J H.Trade credit and the bank lending channel[J].Journal of Money Credit&Banking,2002,34(1):226-253.
[17]GUARIGLIA A,MATEUT S.Credit channel,trade credit channel,and inventory investment:evidence from a panel of UK firms[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2006,30(10):2835-2856.
[18]CULL R,XU L C,ZHU T.Formal finance and trade credit during China's transition[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(2):173-192.
[19]YANG X.The role of trade credit in the recent subprime financial crisis[J].Journal of Economics&Business,2011,63(5):517-529.
[20]余明桂,潘红波.所有权性质,行业信用与信贷资源配置效率[J].经济管理,2010(8):106-117.
[21]LIN T T,CHOU J H.Trade credit and bank loan:evidence from Chinese firms[J].International Review of Economics&Finance,2015,36:17-29.
[22]李四海,邹萍,宋献中.货币政策、信贷资源配置与金融漏损[J].经济科学,2015(3):77-88.
[23]牛培路,白俊.金融发展、银行信贷与商业信用再分配[J].金融论坛,2013(10):34-42.
[24]刘小鲁.我国商业信用的资源再配置效应与强制性特征---基于工业企业数据的实证检验[J].中国人民大学学报,2012(1):68-77.
[25]UCHIDA H,UDELL G F,WATANABE W.Are trade creditors relationship lenders?[J].Japan&the World Economy,2013,25-26(3):24-38.
[26]金碚.债务支付拖欠对当前经济及企业行为的影响[J].经济研究,2006(5):13-19.
[27]张杰,刘志彪,张少军.制度扭曲与中国本土企业的出口扩张[J].世界经济,2008(10):3-11.
[28]张新民,王珏,祝继高.市场地位、商业信用与企业经营性融资[J].会计研究,2012(8):58-65.
[29]HERMES N,KIHANGA E,LENSINK R,et al.The impact of trade credit on customer switching:evidence from the Tanzanian rice market[J].Journal of Development Study,2012,48(3):363-376.
[30]DHALIWAL DAN,J SCOTT JUDD,MATTHEW SERFLIN,et al.Customer concentration risk and the cost of equity capital[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,61(1):23-48.
[31]HOBERG G,PHILIPS G.Real and financial industry booms and busts[J].The Journal of Finance,2010,65(1):45-86.
[32]CHIU WAN-CHIEN,JUAN IGNACIO PEA,CHIH-WEI WANG.Industry characteristics and financial risk contagion[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2015,50:411-427.
[33]米运生,姜百臣,牟小容.经营模式、组织形式、资本结构的交互影响与农业企业成长:基于温氏集团的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2008(8):132-142.
[34]黄志忠,谢军.宏观货币政策、区域金融发展和企业融资约束---货币政策传导机制的微观证据[J].会计研究,2013(1):63-69.
[35]陆正飞,杨德明.商业信用:替代性融资,还是买房市场?[J].管理世界,2011(4):6-14.
[36]刘啟仁,黄建忠.产业创新如何影响企业加成率[J].世界经济,2016(11):28-53.
[37]曹裕,熊寿遥,胡韩莉.企业生命周期下智力资本与创新绩效关系研究[J].科研管理,2016(10):69-78.
[38]蒲文燕,张洪辉.基于融资风险的现金持有与企业技术创新投入的关系研究[J].中国管理科学,2016(5):38-45.
[39]ALMEIDA H,CAMPELLO M.Financial constraints,asset tangibility,and corporate investment[J].Review of Financial Studies,2007,20(5):1429-1460.
(1)模型(1)中“核心变量”及“控制变量”的具体定义及计量方式参见表1。
(2)参照陆正飞和杨德明(2011)[35]的方法,计算得到2008年~2014年各季度的MP(M2增长率-GDP增长率-CPI增长率),该值表示货币政策的相对松紧水平。定义虚拟变量MP,将上述计算值最大的3年设定为货币政策宽松期(MP=1),最小的4年设定为货币政策紧缩期(MP=0)。根据计算结果,2008年~2014年的前3年为货币政策宽松期,后4年为货币政策紧缩期。
(1)在创新投资的分组设计方面,本文以“研发支出/销售收入”来计算创新投资水平(Inno),并在此基础上定义虚拟变量InnoD ummy:当Inno大于行业均值时,InnoD ummy赋值为1,代表高创新投资分组;否则为0,代表低创新投资分组。
(2)其来源参见Almeida等(2007)[39]。
(1)时间截至2011年是为了保证每个样本企业的样本量大于3年。