新常态下商业银行信贷风险管理问题研究
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摘要
随着我国经济的不断发展,新型的经济模式已经得到了飞速的发展,并且已经适应了以往的传统型商业银行的经济模式,尤其是在信贷方面,也取得了突飞猛进的发展。针对当前商业银行信贷中的风险问题,最主要的就是找出出现问题的原因,对当前新常态下的问题进行仔细的分析,不仅能够对当前的信贷风险进行控制,同时对我国的商业银行的发展也有着非常重要的意义。就信贷交易双方存在的信息不对称性产生的利率选择效应进行模型推导,得出信贷利率过高,会产生劣质客户驱逐优质客户现象和信贷错配问题,进而导致逆向选择与道德风险问题的产生,加剧商业银行的信贷风险。基于此,本文主要对当前新常态下商业银行信贷风险管理的问题进行分析,并且提出了解决这些问题的针对性措施,仅供参考。
With the continuous development of China's economy, the new economic model has been developed rapidly, and has been adapted to the traditional commercial banks in the economic model, especially in credit, also achieved rapid development. Aiming at the current risk problem of commercial bank credit, the most important thing is to find out the cause of the problem. A careful analysis of the current problems under the new normal can not only control the current credit risk but also play an important role in the development of China's commercial banks. This paper deduces the interest rate selection effect caused by the information asymmetry between the two sides of the credit transaction, and concludes that the high credit interest rate will cause the inferior customers to expel the high-quality customers and the problem of credit mismatch. This will lead to adverse selection and moral hazard, and aggravate the credit risk of commercial banks. Based on this, this article mainly analyzes the problems of credit risk management of commercial banks under the new normal condition and puts forward the pertinent measures to solve these problems for reference purposes.
With the continuous development of China's economy, the new economic model has been developed rapidly, and has been adapted to the traditional commercial banks in the economic model, especially in credit, also achieved rapid development. Aiming at the current risk problem of commercial bank credit, the most important thing is to find out the cause of the problem. A careful analysis of the current problems under the new normal can not only control the current credit risk but also play an important role in the development of China's commercial banks. This paper deduces the interest rate selection effect caused by the information asymmetry between the two sides of the credit transaction, and concludes that the high credit interest rate will cause the inferior customers to expel the high-quality customers and the problem of credit mismatch. This will lead to adverse selection and moral hazard, and aggravate the credit risk of commercial banks. Based on this, this article mainly analyzes the problems of credit risk management of commercial banks under the new normal condition and puts forward the pertinent measures to solve these problems for reference purposes.
引文
[1]王军只,毛笑蓉,王晓菲,张义伟,杨杰,王亮.新常态下商业银行资本、信贷行为与经济周期关系——来自中国银行业的经验证据[J].金融发展评论,2015(11):97-111.
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[3]于博.货币政策、所有制差异与商业信用再配置——兼论新常态背景下供给侧治理的微观路径[J].广东财经大学学报,2016,3103:45-55.
[4]陆岷峰,季子钊.新常态下提升商业银行互联网化战略研究——基于拓宽银行利差区间分析[J].农村金融研究,2016(08):28-33.
[5]陆岷峰,虞鹏飞.经济“新常态”背景下中国金融业发展策略研究[J].天津商业大学学报,2015,3501:3-9,23.