农业社会化服务与机会主义行为:以农机手作业服务为例
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摘要
农业社会化服务是推动农业经济发展和规模化经营的主要动力源,但是农业的自然属性容易导致社会化服务供给者作出损人利己的机会主义行为。以农业机械社会化服务为例,对农机手机会主义行为的产生机理、一般策略难以奏效和次优策略选择进行理论分析与实证检验。研究结果表明:农机手存在实施机会主义行为的动机;契约、组织化是有效降低机会主义行为的理论策略;我国的小农经营状况和农机合作社自由退出属性使得通过契约和组织化来降低农机手机会主义行为的效果并不明显;现行条件下降低农机手机会主义行为的次优选择是引入中介组织,但必须降低由此而产生的交易费用、提高分工效率。
Agricultural social service is one of the main impetus to promote agricultural economic development and large-scale operation. However, the natural attributes of agriculture tend to lead to social service providers making opportunistic behaviors that harm others. Taking agricultural machinery social service as an example, this paper conducted theoretical analysis and empirical test on the mechanism of agricultural machinery drivers' opportunistic behavior, the ineffectiveness of general strategies to reduce opportunistic behaviors and the selection of sub-optimal strategy. The results showed that agricultural machinery drivers have incentives to implement opportunistic behavior; contract and organization are the theoretical strategies to effectively reduce opportunistic behaviors; the small-scale farmer management situation in China and the free exit attribute of agricultural machinery cooperatives make the effect of reducing the agricultural machinery drivers' opportunistic behavior through contract and organization is not obvious; and under the current conditions, the sub-optimal strategy to reduce agricultural machinery drivers' opportunistic behavior is to develop and expand agricultural service intermediary organizations,and it is necessary to reduce the transaction costs incurred and improve the efficiency of division.
Agricultural social service is one of the main impetus to promote agricultural economic development and large-scale operation. However, the natural attributes of agriculture tend to lead to social service providers making opportunistic behaviors that harm others. Taking agricultural machinery social service as an example, this paper conducted theoretical analysis and empirical test on the mechanism of agricultural machinery drivers' opportunistic behavior, the ineffectiveness of general strategies to reduce opportunistic behaviors and the selection of sub-optimal strategy. The results showed that agricultural machinery drivers have incentives to implement opportunistic behavior; contract and organization are the theoretical strategies to effectively reduce opportunistic behaviors; the small-scale farmer management situation in China and the free exit attribute of agricultural machinery cooperatives make the effect of reducing the agricultural machinery drivers' opportunistic behavior through contract and organization is not obvious; and under the current conditions, the sub-optimal strategy to reduce agricultural machinery drivers' opportunistic behavior is to develop and expand agricultural service intermediary organizations,and it is necessary to reduce the transaction costs incurred and improve the efficiency of division.
引文
[1]蔡键,唐忠.华北平原农业机械化发展及其服务市场形成[J].改革,2016(10):65-72.
[2]常崇信,王拴怀.关于农机经营体制的探讨[J].北京社会科学,1987(1):123-128.
[3]许锦英.农机服务产业化是稳定家庭承包责任制、发展农业生产力的重要途径[J].中国农村经济,1998(9):66-68.
[4]王克芳,王德成.市场经济条件下农业机械化发展的机遇与道路[J].世界经济,1996(5):76-77.
[5]苑鹏,丁忠兵.小农户与现代农业发展的衔接模式:重庆梁平例证[J].改革,2018(6):106-114.
[6]任辉,杨印生,小池正之.泰国的农机作业委托以及影响因素分析[J].农业机械学报,2001(4):105-108.
[7]仝志辉,侯宏伟.农业社会化服务体系:对象选择与构建策略[J].改革,2015(1):132-139.
[8]黄守宏.民工荒引发的农业农村问题及应对思路[J].人口与发展,2008(3):22-23.
[9]郭鸿鹏,陈立辉,杨印生.我国农机作业委托决策支持系统研究[J].农机化研究,2006(2):39-42.
[10]杨印生,郭鸿鹏.农机作业委托系统中介人问题的制度经济学解说[J].农业经济问题,2004(2):58-60.
(1)农机手是指专门为农民提供有偿机械服务的人员,一般是当地拥有农业机械的农民。
(1)契约分为两类:口头契约和书面契约。尽管口头契约普遍存在于我国农村地区,是农户与其他主体确定产权的主要方式之一,但考虑到本文的契约签订情况是用于分析农户与农机手是否有通过合约设计出符合双方利益的工资制度安排,口头契约较难实现这种相对复杂的制度安排,因此只调研书面契约的签订情况。
[2]常崇信,王拴怀.关于农机经营体制的探讨[J].北京社会科学,1987(1):123-128.
[3]许锦英.农机服务产业化是稳定家庭承包责任制、发展农业生产力的重要途径[J].中国农村经济,1998(9):66-68.
[4]王克芳,王德成.市场经济条件下农业机械化发展的机遇与道路[J].世界经济,1996(5):76-77.
[5]苑鹏,丁忠兵.小农户与现代农业发展的衔接模式:重庆梁平例证[J].改革,2018(6):106-114.
[6]任辉,杨印生,小池正之.泰国的农机作业委托以及影响因素分析[J].农业机械学报,2001(4):105-108.
[7]仝志辉,侯宏伟.农业社会化服务体系:对象选择与构建策略[J].改革,2015(1):132-139.
[8]黄守宏.民工荒引发的农业农村问题及应对思路[J].人口与发展,2008(3):22-23.
[9]郭鸿鹏,陈立辉,杨印生.我国农机作业委托决策支持系统研究[J].农机化研究,2006(2):39-42.
[10]杨印生,郭鸿鹏.农机作业委托系统中介人问题的制度经济学解说[J].农业经济问题,2004(2):58-60.
(1)农机手是指专门为农民提供有偿机械服务的人员,一般是当地拥有农业机械的农民。
(1)契约分为两类:口头契约和书面契约。尽管口头契约普遍存在于我国农村地区,是农户与其他主体确定产权的主要方式之一,但考虑到本文的契约签订情况是用于分析农户与农机手是否有通过合约设计出符合双方利益的工资制度安排,口头契约较难实现这种相对复杂的制度安排,因此只调研书面契约的签订情况。