税收竞争与环境污染:机理分析与实证检验
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摘要
基于2003—2016年30个省、市、自治区数据,以环境联邦主义、中国式财政分权为理论依据,以税收收入为切入点,测算税收竞争对工业"三废"的影响。实证结果显示:税收竞争对工业"三废"的影响存在异质性,即税收竞争与工业废水排放量存在负相关,与工业SO2排放量存在正相关,与工业固体废弃物的相关性不明确;税收竞争对工业"三废"的关系还受到地区经济发展的影响。研究还表明,以人均GDP为识别变量,工业"三废"与税收竞争的模型中存在门槛效应,进一步揭示了地区经济、税收竞争与环境污染的实质关系。
On the basis of data of 30 provincial regions from 2003 to 2016,this paper takes tax revenue as the entry point to estimate the impact of tax competition on emission of three types of industrial wastes with the theoretical basis of environmental federalism and China fiscal decentralization. The empirical results show that the influence of tax competition on three types of industrial wastes is heterogeneous. That is that the tax competition is negatively correlated with industrial wastewater discharge,positively correlated with industrial SO2 discharge,and not clearly correlated with industrial solid waste. The connection between tax competition and industrial wastes is also affected by regional economic development. The research shows that there is a threshold effect in the model of the three types of wastes and tax competition by using GDP per capita as an identifier variable,which further reveals the exact relationship between regional economy,tax competition and environmental pollution.
On the basis of data of 30 provincial regions from 2003 to 2016,this paper takes tax revenue as the entry point to estimate the impact of tax competition on emission of three types of industrial wastes with the theoretical basis of environmental federalism and China fiscal decentralization. The empirical results show that the influence of tax competition on three types of industrial wastes is heterogeneous. That is that the tax competition is negatively correlated with industrial wastewater discharge,positively correlated with industrial SO2 discharge,and not clearly correlated with industrial solid waste. The connection between tax competition and industrial wastes is also affected by regional economic development. The research shows that there is a threshold effect in the model of the three types of wastes and tax competition by using GDP per capita as an identifier variable,which further reveals the exact relationship between regional economy,tax competition and environmental pollution.
引文
[1]中华人民共和国生态环境部.2017中国生态环境状况公报[EB/OL].(2018-05-31)[2019-01-02]. http://www.mee. gov. cn/gkml/sthjbgw/qt/201805/t20180531_442212. htm.
[2]Markusen J R. The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of International Trade[J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(2):169-189.
[3]List J A,Gerking S. Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States[J]. Journal of Regional Science,2000,40(3):453-471.
[4]张根能,董伟婷,张珩月.地方政府税收竞争对环境污染影响的比较研究———基于全国及区域视角[J].生态经济,2017(1):28-32.
[5]李香菊,贺娜.税收对环境污染的影响分析———基于财政分权视角[J].中国地质大学学报(社会科学版),2017(6):54-66.
[6]Oates W E,Schwab R M. Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions:Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?[J]. Journal of Public Economics,1988,35(3):333-354.
[7]Wildasin D E. Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility:Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,1989,25(2):193-212.
[8]王娟,王伟域.税收与环境污染问题实证研究[J].税务研究,2016(4):50-54.
[9]刘文玉.中国地方政府税收竞争对环境污染的影响研究———基于全国及区域视角[J].江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2018(4):81-89.
[10]张宏翔.政府间的税收竞争与环境污染的非线性关系研究———基于面板门槛模型的实证分析[J].西安财经学院学报,2018(6):13-21.
[11]崔亚飞,刘小川.中国省级税收竞争与环境污染———基于1998—2006年面板数据的分析[J].财经研究,2010(4):46-55.
[12]姚公安.地方税收竞争与辖区工业污染的关系[J].税务与经济,2014(6):83-88.
[13]刘洁,李文.征收碳税对中国经济影响的实证[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011(9):99-104.
[14]范丹,梁佩凤,刘斌,幺晓桐,潘跃.中国环境税费政策的双重红利效应———基于系统GMM与面板门槛模型的估计[J].中国环境科学,2018(9):3576-3583.
[15]Oates W. E. Fiscal Federalism[M]. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovic,1972:5.
[16]王德祥,李昕.德国合作型财政联邦制和分税制模式及启示[J].江西财经大学学报,2017(6):13-20.
[17]国家统计局.中国统计年鉴[Z].北京:中国统计出版社,2017.
[18]胡金炎,王晴.我国金融发展与二氧化碳排放———基于1998—2015年省级面板数据的研究[J].山东社会科学,2018(4):118-124.
(1)模型4~6中以人均GDP取对数为门槛识别,根据Stata计算得出门槛值后,此处及下文均通过取对数的方法还原得出人均GDP的绝对值。
(1)东部地区:北京、天津、河北、辽宁、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东和海南;中部地区:山西、吉林、黑龙江、安徽、江西、河南、湖北、湖南;西部地区:四川、重庆、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏、新疆、内蒙古和广西。
[2]Markusen J R. The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of International Trade[J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(2):169-189.
[3]List J A,Gerking S. Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States[J]. Journal of Regional Science,2000,40(3):453-471.
[4]张根能,董伟婷,张珩月.地方政府税收竞争对环境污染影响的比较研究———基于全国及区域视角[J].生态经济,2017(1):28-32.
[5]李香菊,贺娜.税收对环境污染的影响分析———基于财政分权视角[J].中国地质大学学报(社会科学版),2017(6):54-66.
[6]Oates W E,Schwab R M. Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions:Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?[J]. Journal of Public Economics,1988,35(3):333-354.
[7]Wildasin D E. Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility:Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,1989,25(2):193-212.
[8]王娟,王伟域.税收与环境污染问题实证研究[J].税务研究,2016(4):50-54.
[9]刘文玉.中国地方政府税收竞争对环境污染的影响研究———基于全国及区域视角[J].江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2018(4):81-89.
[10]张宏翔.政府间的税收竞争与环境污染的非线性关系研究———基于面板门槛模型的实证分析[J].西安财经学院学报,2018(6):13-21.
[11]崔亚飞,刘小川.中国省级税收竞争与环境污染———基于1998—2006年面板数据的分析[J].财经研究,2010(4):46-55.
[12]姚公安.地方税收竞争与辖区工业污染的关系[J].税务与经济,2014(6):83-88.
[13]刘洁,李文.征收碳税对中国经济影响的实证[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011(9):99-104.
[14]范丹,梁佩凤,刘斌,幺晓桐,潘跃.中国环境税费政策的双重红利效应———基于系统GMM与面板门槛模型的估计[J].中国环境科学,2018(9):3576-3583.
[15]Oates W. E. Fiscal Federalism[M]. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovic,1972:5.
[16]王德祥,李昕.德国合作型财政联邦制和分税制模式及启示[J].江西财经大学学报,2017(6):13-20.
[17]国家统计局.中国统计年鉴[Z].北京:中国统计出版社,2017.
[18]胡金炎,王晴.我国金融发展与二氧化碳排放———基于1998—2015年省级面板数据的研究[J].山东社会科学,2018(4):118-124.
(1)模型4~6中以人均GDP取对数为门槛识别,根据Stata计算得出门槛值后,此处及下文均通过取对数的方法还原得出人均GDP的绝对值。
(1)东部地区:北京、天津、河北、辽宁、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东和海南;中部地区:山西、吉林、黑龙江、安徽、江西、河南、湖北、湖南;西部地区:四川、重庆、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏、新疆、内蒙古和广西。