叠加还是补充:私营企业主的政治纽带与雇佣前官员现象研究
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摘要
分析中国私营企业调查2016年的数据可发现,私营企业主自身政治纽带的强弱与雇佣前官员行为之间存在一定关系。私营企业主雇佣具有政府背景的高管与企业主的政治纽带显著相关,这是一种锦上添花的叠加模式。在进一步细分企业主政治纽带强弱后,发现雇佣前官员可能给政治纽带相对弱势的私营企业主增强组织整体政治资源,形成了一种补充效应。企业规模和形象、管制性行业、地区差异和营商环境获得感在雇佣前官员上具有显著效应。这一逻辑的揭示有助于我们从资源配置的角度,理解中国党政官员的"下海"行为与私营企业治理结构配置之间的关系,为做好私营企业管理技术人员这一新的社会阶层人士的统战工作、打造亲清新型政商关系提供参考。
Using data of a nationwide survey of Chinese private enterprises in 2016,this study finds that the employment of former bureaucrats in Chinese private enterprises has relationship with entrepreneurs' political connection. Owners of private enterprises with stronger political background are more likely to employ former bureaucrats into management,like enhancing existing political advantage to the firm. A closer scrutiny based on more nascent typology of political connection,however,finds that owners with relative weaker political background in the strong politically connected group are more preferred to hire former bureaucrats. This can be interpreted as a compensation effect. Size,image of the firm,regulated industries,region,and subjective evaluation of local business environment are also significant factors. We argue that not to understand the logic of employing former bureaucrats in private enterprises in a linear way is a key to unite those managers and professionals,as one key element of"members of new social class",to build a more friendly state business environment in China.
Using data of a nationwide survey of Chinese private enterprises in 2016,this study finds that the employment of former bureaucrats in Chinese private enterprises has relationship with entrepreneurs' political connection. Owners of private enterprises with stronger political background are more likely to employ former bureaucrats into management,like enhancing existing political advantage to the firm. A closer scrutiny based on more nascent typology of political connection,however,finds that owners with relative weaker political background in the strong politically connected group are more preferred to hire former bureaucrats. This can be interpreted as a compensation effect. Size,image of the firm,regulated industries,region,and subjective evaluation of local business environment are also significant factors. We argue that not to understand the logic of employing former bureaucrats in private enterprises in a linear way is a key to unite those managers and professionals,as one key element of"members of new social class",to build a more friendly state business environment in China.
引文
(1)按照齐玉副部长的回答,近年来公务员队伍总体保持稳定,平均每年辞职人数仅占公务员总数的0.1%或者0.1%稍微多一点;按700多万公务员计算,每年辞职者1万左右,因此,不存在所谓“辞职下海潮”这种情况。虽然绝对数不多,但公务员辞职“下海”现象之所以引发关注,可能与相对比例在一段时间有较大上升有关,也与舆论环境和预期有关。作为少数可得的全国性数据,智联招聘发布的《2015春季人才流动分析报告》提出,公务员群体成为跨界跳槽最活跃的群体,政府(公共事业/非营利机构)的白领跨行业跳槽人数比上一年同期上涨34%。参见http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/zb/zb1/wzsl.htm。2018年9月30日。
(2)章敬平:《权变:从官员下海到商人从政》,浙江人民出版社,2004年版。
(3)Carolyn Hsu, “Cadres, Getihu, and Good Businesspeople: Making Sense of Entrepreneurs in Early Post-Socialist China”, in Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development, Vol.35,2006,pp.1～38; Xiaogang Wu, “Communist Cadres and Market Opportunities: Entry into Self-employment in China, 1978～1996”, in Social Forces, Vol.85,2006, pp.389～411.范晓光、吕鹏:《中国私营企业主的社会构成:阶层与同期群差异》,《中国社会科学》,2017年第4期。李路路:《转型社会中的私营企业主——社会来源及企业发展研究》,中国人民大学出版社,1998年版。
(4)李黄珍:《2015春季人才流动分析》,《职业》,2015年第13期。
(5)Kim,J.H.,“Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment”, Economics of Governance, Vol.14,No.2, 2013.
(6)Haveman, H.A.and N.Jia, et al, “The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China”, Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.62, No.1, 2016).Lin, L.W.and C.J.Milhaupt, “We are The(national) Champions: Understanding The Mechanisms of State Capitalismin China”, Stanford Law Review, Vol.65, No.4,2013., Wang, Y.(2013), “Betting on a Princeling”, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.52.No.4,2013.
(7)吕鹏:《外企中方高管:远离政治的社会新阶层?》,《江苏行政学院学报》,2008年第4期。吴文锋、吴冲锋、刘晓薇:《中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与公司价值》,《经济研究》,2008年第7期。
(8)Haveman, H.A.and N.Jia, et al.,“The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.62,No.1,2016.
(9)Fan, J.P.H.and T.J.Wong, et al.,“Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and The Post-IPO Performance of China's Partially Privatized Firms”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.84, No.2,2007.
(10)张建琦、黄文锋:《职业经理人进入民营企业影响因素的实证研究》,《经济研究》,2003年第10期。
(11)马磊:《连锁董事网:研究回顾与反思》,《社会学研究》,2014年第1期。
(12)吴益兵、周欢、李佳音、林波:《谁在选聘官员背景独立董事?》,《当代会计评论》,2016年第2期;余玉苗、周莹莹、潘珺:《聘请退休政府官员背景独立董事给上市公司带来好处了吗?》,《经济评论》,2015年第1期。
(13)Vidal, J.B.I.and M.Draca, et al.,“Revolving Door Lobbyists”, The American Economic Review, Vol.102,No.7,2012.
(14)Kim, J.H.“Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment”, Economics of Governance, Vol.14, No.2,2013; Michael, U., The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and The Rise of Business Political Activity in The U.S.and U.K., New York, Oxford University Press.1984; Mills, C.W., The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, 1956; Murray, J.“Interlock Globally, Act Domestically: Corporate Political Unity in The 21st Century”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.122,No.6,2017; Schwartz, M., The Power Structure of American Business, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985; Zweigenhaft, R.and G.Domhoff, The New CEOs: Women, African American, Latino, and Asian American Leaders of Fortune 500 Companies, Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.,2011.
(15)Mizoguchi, T.and N.V.Quyen,“Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol.14,No.5,2012.
(16)Blumenthal,T.,“The Practice of Amakudari within The Japanese Employment System”, Asian Survey ,Vol.25,No.3,1985.
(17)Rhyu,S.Y.,“The Political Dynamics of Informal Networks in South Korea: The Case of Parachute Appointment”, Pacific Review,Vol.21,No.1,2008.
(18)Haveman,H.A.and N.Jia,et al,“The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China”, Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.62,No.1,2016; 杨瑞龙、王元等:《“准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据》,《管理世界》,2013年第3期。
(19)Miwa,Y.and J.M.Ramseyer,“Who Appoints Them,What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,Vol.14,No.2,2005.
(20)Calder,K.E.,“Elites in an Equalizing Role: Ex-Bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in The Japanese Government-Business Relationship”, Comparative Politics,Vol.21,No.4,1989.
(21)Fan,J.P.H.and T.J.Wong,et al.,“Politically Connected CEOs,Corporate Governance,and The Post-IPO Performance of China's Partially Privatized Firm”, Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.84,No.2,2007.
(22)C hen J.and Dickson B.J.,“Allies of The State: Democratic Support and Regime Support among China's Private Entrepreneurs”,The China Quarterly,Vol.196,No.1,2008; Li H.,Meng L.,Wang Q.,Zhou L.A,“Political Connections,Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms”,Journal of Development Economics,Vol.87,No.2,2008.
(23)陈光金:《中国私营企业主的形成机制、地位认同和政治参与》,《黑龙江社会科学》,2011年第1期。
(24)Dickson B., Wealth into Power: The Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector, Cambridge University Press,New York.2008.
(25)张建琦、黄文锋:《职业经理人进入民营企业影响因素的实证研究》,《经济研究》,2003年第10期。
(26)李维安:《中国上市公司治理指数与公司绩效的实证分析——基于中国1149家上市公司的研究》,《管理世界》,2006年第3期;梁彤缨、曹剑辞:《中国民营上市公司股权结构特征分析》,《工业技术经济》,2006年第1期;吕鹏:《私营企业主任人大代表或政协委员的因素分析》,《社会学研究》,2013年第4期;宋力、韩亮亮:《民营上市公司股权结构特征分析》,《南开管理评论》,2004年第4期。
(27)Schaede U.,“The ‘Old Boy’ Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan”, Journal of Japanese Studies,Vol.21,No.2,1995.
(28)Helland E.and Sykuta M.,“Regulation and The Evolution of Corporate Boards: Monitoring,Advising,or Window Dressing?” Journal of Law & Economics,Vol.47,No.1,2004; 王立文:《影响上市公司董事会构成的因素分析——基于中国民营上市公司的实证分析》,《统计与信息论坛》,2011年第3期; 吴益兵、周欢、李佳音、林波:《谁在选聘官员背景独立董事?——基于独立董事关系资源职能的视角》,《当代会计评论》,2016年第2期。
(29)余玉苗、周莹莹、潘珺:《聘请退休政府官员背景独立董事给上市公司带来好处了吗?》,《经济评论》,2015年第1期。
(30)Li H., Meng L.and Zhang J., “Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics? Evidence from China”,Economic Inquiry,Vol.44,No.3,2006.
(31)传统的地区划分方法只有东中西部,最近几年在一些统计中,国家统计局单独将东北三省提出。鉴于最近一段时间东北的民营经济发展引发各方关注,我们这次也将东北地区单独划出进行分析。因此,东部地区包括北京、天津、河北、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东、广西、海南;中部地区包括山西、内蒙古、安徽、江西、河南、湖北、湖南;西部地区包括重庆、四川、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、宁夏、青海、新疆;东北包括黑龙江、吉林和辽宁。
(32)Schaede U.,“The ‘Old Boy’ Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan”,Journal of Japanese Studies,Vol.21,No.2,1995.
(33)Haveman H.A.,Jia N.,Shi J.and Wang Y.,“The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China”,Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.62,No.1,2016.
(34)但由于数据的限制,本文并未对企业主雇佣官员的后果做出定论;这属于另外一篇论文处理的问题。一些定量研究发现,市场经济越发达,雇佣前政府官员为企业带来的收益越高(Wang,Y., “Beiting on a Princeling”, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.52, No.2, 2013.)。我们自己的田野调查则发现,一些企业主可能通过雇佣前政府官员来不当地利用他们的资源,但也有企业主通过这种雇佣行为的正当渠道(比如更有质量的政府公关)来减轻营商环境中的负面因素给企业带来的不利影响。因此,政企之间人才的流动的后果,首先是因企而异的一个情境性问题。政企人才流动的后果,根本上取决于整体政治环境的改善;同时也取决于企业自身的制度建设(如公司治理反商业腐败等)。现在,反腐败斗争取得压倒性胜利,政治生态得到根本改善,这些为人才流动朝着良性的政企互动方向发展提供了重要的基础制度。
(35)当然,对于日韩的制度也有一些反对的意见(Kawai N.& Ko J.H.,“The Dark Sides of Institutionalized Informal Connections: Evidence from The Japanese Banking Sector in The Post-bubble Crisis Era”, International Journal of Business,Vol.17,2012.),认为这一制度事实上造成了腐败,甚至阻碍了创新和自主。目前两个国家都对官员去企业任职有着严格的监督监管制度。观察这些制度形成的过程,可以发现政企之间人才流动在不同历史阶段的影响是不同的;有学者指出,不同发展阶段需要政府介入的程度有所不同(陈玮:《政府介入与发展阶段:发展策略的新制度分析》,《政治学研究》,2017年第6期; 陈玮、耿曙:《发展型国家的兴与衰:国家能力、产业政策与发展阶段》,《经济社会体制比较》,2017年第2期)。企业和政府之间的人才流动会带来技术和知识的共享,同时提高行政与市场效率,对于全社会而言是“锦上添花”;但如果监管不到位,很可能助长“权力寻租”,蚕食全社会的社会资本,导致政治腐败、市场效率低下。笔者特别感谢匿名评审人提出的这一意见。
(36)Salant D.J.,“Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation”,Rand Journal of Economics,Vol.26,No.3,2000.
(2)章敬平:《权变:从官员下海到商人从政》,浙江人民出版社,2004年版。
(3)Carolyn Hsu, “Cadres, Getihu, and Good Businesspeople: Making Sense of Entrepreneurs in Early Post-Socialist China”, in Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development, Vol.35,2006,pp.1～38; Xiaogang Wu, “Communist Cadres and Market Opportunities: Entry into Self-employment in China, 1978～1996”, in Social Forces, Vol.85,2006, pp.389～411.范晓光、吕鹏:《中国私营企业主的社会构成:阶层与同期群差异》,《中国社会科学》,2017年第4期。李路路:《转型社会中的私营企业主——社会来源及企业发展研究》,中国人民大学出版社,1998年版。
(4)李黄珍:《2015春季人才流动分析》,《职业》,2015年第13期。
(5)Kim,J.H.,“Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment”, Economics of Governance, Vol.14,No.2, 2013.
(6)Haveman, H.A.and N.Jia, et al, “The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China”, Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.62, No.1, 2016).Lin, L.W.and C.J.Milhaupt, “We are The(national) Champions: Understanding The Mechanisms of State Capitalismin China”, Stanford Law Review, Vol.65, No.4,2013., Wang, Y.(2013), “Betting on a Princeling”, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.52.No.4,2013.
(7)吕鹏:《外企中方高管:远离政治的社会新阶层?》,《江苏行政学院学报》,2008年第4期。吴文锋、吴冲锋、刘晓薇:《中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与公司价值》,《经济研究》,2008年第7期。
(8)Haveman, H.A.and N.Jia, et al.,“The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.62,No.1,2016.
(9)Fan, J.P.H.and T.J.Wong, et al.,“Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and The Post-IPO Performance of China's Partially Privatized Firms”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.84, No.2,2007.
(10)张建琦、黄文锋:《职业经理人进入民营企业影响因素的实证研究》,《经济研究》,2003年第10期。
(11)马磊:《连锁董事网:研究回顾与反思》,《社会学研究》,2014年第1期。
(12)吴益兵、周欢、李佳音、林波:《谁在选聘官员背景独立董事?》,《当代会计评论》,2016年第2期;余玉苗、周莹莹、潘珺:《聘请退休政府官员背景独立董事给上市公司带来好处了吗?》,《经济评论》,2015年第1期。
(13)Vidal, J.B.I.and M.Draca, et al.,“Revolving Door Lobbyists”, The American Economic Review, Vol.102,No.7,2012.
(14)Kim, J.H.“Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment”, Economics of Governance, Vol.14, No.2,2013; Michael, U., The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and The Rise of Business Political Activity in The U.S.and U.K., New York, Oxford University Press.1984; Mills, C.W., The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, 1956; Murray, J.“Interlock Globally, Act Domestically: Corporate Political Unity in The 21st Century”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.122,No.6,2017; Schwartz, M., The Power Structure of American Business, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985; Zweigenhaft, R.and G.Domhoff, The New CEOs: Women, African American, Latino, and Asian American Leaders of Fortune 500 Companies, Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.,2011.
(15)Mizoguchi, T.and N.V.Quyen,“Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol.14,No.5,2012.
(16)Blumenthal,T.,“The Practice of Amakudari within The Japanese Employment System”, Asian Survey ,Vol.25,No.3,1985.
(17)Rhyu,S.Y.,“The Political Dynamics of Informal Networks in South Korea: The Case of Parachute Appointment”, Pacific Review,Vol.21,No.1,2008.
(18)Haveman,H.A.and N.Jia,et al,“The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China”, Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.62,No.1,2016; 杨瑞龙、王元等:《“准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据》,《管理世界》,2013年第3期。
(19)Miwa,Y.and J.M.Ramseyer,“Who Appoints Them,What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,Vol.14,No.2,2005.
(20)Calder,K.E.,“Elites in an Equalizing Role: Ex-Bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in The Japanese Government-Business Relationship”, Comparative Politics,Vol.21,No.4,1989.
(21)Fan,J.P.H.and T.J.Wong,et al.,“Politically Connected CEOs,Corporate Governance,and The Post-IPO Performance of China's Partially Privatized Firm”, Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.84,No.2,2007.
(22)C hen J.and Dickson B.J.,“Allies of The State: Democratic Support and Regime Support among China's Private Entrepreneurs”,The China Quarterly,Vol.196,No.1,2008; Li H.,Meng L.,Wang Q.,Zhou L.A,“Political Connections,Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms”,Journal of Development Economics,Vol.87,No.2,2008.
(23)陈光金:《中国私营企业主的形成机制、地位认同和政治参与》,《黑龙江社会科学》,2011年第1期。
(24)Dickson B., Wealth into Power: The Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector, Cambridge University Press,New York.2008.
(25)张建琦、黄文锋:《职业经理人进入民营企业影响因素的实证研究》,《经济研究》,2003年第10期。
(26)李维安:《中国上市公司治理指数与公司绩效的实证分析——基于中国1149家上市公司的研究》,《管理世界》,2006年第3期;梁彤缨、曹剑辞:《中国民营上市公司股权结构特征分析》,《工业技术经济》,2006年第1期;吕鹏:《私营企业主任人大代表或政协委员的因素分析》,《社会学研究》,2013年第4期;宋力、韩亮亮:《民营上市公司股权结构特征分析》,《南开管理评论》,2004年第4期。
(27)Schaede U.,“The ‘Old Boy’ Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan”, Journal of Japanese Studies,Vol.21,No.2,1995.
(28)Helland E.and Sykuta M.,“Regulation and The Evolution of Corporate Boards: Monitoring,Advising,or Window Dressing?” Journal of Law & Economics,Vol.47,No.1,2004; 王立文:《影响上市公司董事会构成的因素分析——基于中国民营上市公司的实证分析》,《统计与信息论坛》,2011年第3期; 吴益兵、周欢、李佳音、林波:《谁在选聘官员背景独立董事?——基于独立董事关系资源职能的视角》,《当代会计评论》,2016年第2期。
(29)余玉苗、周莹莹、潘珺:《聘请退休政府官员背景独立董事给上市公司带来好处了吗?》,《经济评论》,2015年第1期。
(30)Li H., Meng L.and Zhang J., “Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics? Evidence from China”,Economic Inquiry,Vol.44,No.3,2006.
(31)传统的地区划分方法只有东中西部,最近几年在一些统计中,国家统计局单独将东北三省提出。鉴于最近一段时间东北的民营经济发展引发各方关注,我们这次也将东北地区单独划出进行分析。因此,东部地区包括北京、天津、河北、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东、广西、海南;中部地区包括山西、内蒙古、安徽、江西、河南、湖北、湖南;西部地区包括重庆、四川、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、宁夏、青海、新疆;东北包括黑龙江、吉林和辽宁。
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(34)但由于数据的限制,本文并未对企业主雇佣官员的后果做出定论;这属于另外一篇论文处理的问题。一些定量研究发现,市场经济越发达,雇佣前政府官员为企业带来的收益越高(Wang,Y., “Beiting on a Princeling”, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.52, No.2, 2013.)。我们自己的田野调查则发现,一些企业主可能通过雇佣前政府官员来不当地利用他们的资源,但也有企业主通过这种雇佣行为的正当渠道(比如更有质量的政府公关)来减轻营商环境中的负面因素给企业带来的不利影响。因此,政企之间人才的流动的后果,首先是因企而异的一个情境性问题。政企人才流动的后果,根本上取决于整体政治环境的改善;同时也取决于企业自身的制度建设(如公司治理反商业腐败等)。现在,反腐败斗争取得压倒性胜利,政治生态得到根本改善,这些为人才流动朝着良性的政企互动方向发展提供了重要的基础制度。
(35)当然,对于日韩的制度也有一些反对的意见(Kawai N.& Ko J.H.,“The Dark Sides of Institutionalized Informal Connections: Evidence from The Japanese Banking Sector in The Post-bubble Crisis Era”, International Journal of Business,Vol.17,2012.),认为这一制度事实上造成了腐败,甚至阻碍了创新和自主。目前两个国家都对官员去企业任职有着严格的监督监管制度。观察这些制度形成的过程,可以发现政企之间人才流动在不同历史阶段的影响是不同的;有学者指出,不同发展阶段需要政府介入的程度有所不同(陈玮:《政府介入与发展阶段:发展策略的新制度分析》,《政治学研究》,2017年第6期; 陈玮、耿曙:《发展型国家的兴与衰:国家能力、产业政策与发展阶段》,《经济社会体制比较》,2017年第2期)。企业和政府之间的人才流动会带来技术和知识的共享,同时提高行政与市场效率,对于全社会而言是“锦上添花”;但如果监管不到位,很可能助长“权力寻租”,蚕食全社会的社会资本,导致政治腐败、市场效率低下。笔者特别感谢匿名评审人提出的这一意见。
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