可想象性与可能性（英文）
|
摘要
本文的讨论围绕着"想象障碍迷思"这一议题,即为什么人们对某些反事实情境存在想象障碍,而展开。本文首先对BrianWeatherson的"In-Virtue-Of Hypothesis"给出了批评,并提出人们对某些反事实情境存在想象障碍是因为那些反事实情境在概念上是不可能的——概念上不可能的情境,也仅有概念上不可能的情境才是不能被想象的。针对这种对可想象性与可能性关系的理解,本文也讨论了一些可能的反驳并指出这些反驳的不成功之处。
Recently there is a heated discussion on the puzzle of imaginative resistance, i.e. the puzzle of why it is difficult to imagine certain counterfactual scenarios. After examining Brian Weatherson's "In-Virtue-Of Hypothesis", I put forward an alternative hypothesis that all and only conceptual impossibilities are unimaginable. I argue that my account has some theoretical advantages over the In-Virtue-Of hypothesis. I consider some challenges to my hypothesis and then attempt to show that those objections are unsuccessful.
Recently there is a heated discussion on the puzzle of imaginative resistance, i.e. the puzzle of why it is difficult to imagine certain counterfactual scenarios. After examining Brian Weatherson's "In-Virtue-Of Hypothesis", I put forward an alternative hypothesis that all and only conceptual impossibilities are unimaginable. I argue that my account has some theoretical advantages over the In-Virtue-Of hypothesis. I consider some challenges to my hypothesis and then attempt to show that those objections are unsuccessful.
引文
[1] D. Chalmers, 2002,“Does conceivability entail possibility”, in T. S. Gendler and J.Hawthorne(eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, pp. 145–201, Oxford:Clarendon Press.
[2] T. Gendler, 2000,“The puzzle of imaginative resistance”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(2):55–81.
[3] K. Walton, 2006,“On the(so-called)puzzle of imaginative resistance”, in S. Nichols et al.(eds.), The Architecture of the Imagination, pp. 137–148, Oxford:Clarendon Press.
[4] K. Walton and M. Tanner, 1994,“Morals in fiction and fictional morality”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 68:27–66.
[5] B. Weatherson, 2004,“Morality, fiction, and possibility”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 4(3):1–27.
[6] S. Yablo, 2002,“Coulda, woulda, shoulda”, in T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne(eds.),Conceivability and Possibility, pp. 441–492, Oxford:Clarendon Press.
1It is worth noting that Weatherson himself mainly uses the In-Virtue-Of hypothesis to explain his so-called “alethic puzzle”.([5])But he also holds that this hypothesis can be used to explain the imaginative puzzle in a similar way. Since I won’t discuss the alethic puzzle in my paper, I will only focus on whether the hypothesis can explain the imaginative puzzle.
[2] T. Gendler, 2000,“The puzzle of imaginative resistance”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(2):55–81.
[3] K. Walton, 2006,“On the(so-called)puzzle of imaginative resistance”, in S. Nichols et al.(eds.), The Architecture of the Imagination, pp. 137–148, Oxford:Clarendon Press.
[4] K. Walton and M. Tanner, 1994,“Morals in fiction and fictional morality”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 68:27–66.
[5] B. Weatherson, 2004,“Morality, fiction, and possibility”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 4(3):1–27.
[6] S. Yablo, 2002,“Coulda, woulda, shoulda”, in T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne(eds.),Conceivability and Possibility, pp. 441–492, Oxford:Clarendon Press.
1It is worth noting that Weatherson himself mainly uses the In-Virtue-Of hypothesis to explain his so-called “alethic puzzle”.([5])But he also holds that this hypothesis can be used to explain the imaginative puzzle in a similar way. Since I won’t discuss the alethic puzzle in my paper, I will only focus on whether the hypothesis can explain the imaginative puzzle.