论德国监事会合规职责的制度内涵
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摘要
在德国企业的实践中,合规的重要性与日俱增。监事会相应承担起若干与之相关的特定职责。《德国公司治理准则》建议企业设置合规管理体系、披露该体系的基本特征并为员工和第三人建立提示系统。监事会既有义务在董事会和经营管理层履行组织义务并保障在内部合规的过程中对其实施监督,也应保证自身符合合规的各项要求。前者指监事会须对经营管理进行伴随性、支持性或形成性三个层次的监督;后者则关注监事会中利益冲突的披露和化解、监事会决议存在瑕疵时的处理方式、顾问合同的缔结以及监事之间的相互监督。
Compliance is becoming increasingly important in the practice of German enterprises.The board of supervisors shall take a number of specific responsibilities related thereto.The German Corporate Governance Code recommends that enterprises should set up a compliance management system,disclose the basic features of the system and set up aprompt system for employees and the third parties.The board of supervisors not only has the obligation to supervise the board of directors and the business management in the process of fulfilling the organizational obligations and to ensure internal compliance with the process of its implementation of supervision,but also has the obligation to make sure that it meets the requirements of compliance.The former means that the board of supervisors must supervise the operation and management at three levels,which conclude incidental level,supportive level and formative level.The latter,however,focuses on the disclosure and resolution of conflicts of interest in the board of supervisors,the way to deal with defects in the resolutions of the board of supervisors,the conclusion of consulting contracts and mutual supervision between the supervisors.
Compliance is becoming increasingly important in the practice of German enterprises.The board of supervisors shall take a number of specific responsibilities related thereto.The German Corporate Governance Code recommends that enterprises should set up a compliance management system,disclose the basic features of the system and set up aprompt system for employees and the third parties.The board of supervisors not only has the obligation to supervise the board of directors and the business management in the process of fulfilling the organizational obligations and to ensure internal compliance with the process of its implementation of supervision,but also has the obligation to make sure that it meets the requirements of compliance.The former means that the board of supervisors must supervise the operation and management at three levels,which conclude incidental level,supportive level and formative level.The latter,however,focuses on the disclosure and resolution of conflicts of interest in the board of supervisors,the way to deal with defects in the resolutions of the board of supervisors,the conclusion of consulting contracts and mutual supervision between the supervisors.
引文
(1)Arbeitskreis Aufsichtsrat und Compliance,L03-Compliance-Leitfaden für den Aufsichtsrat,DICO-Deutsches Institut für Compliance,2015,www.dico-ev.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/L03_Compliance_Aufsichtsrat_40S_2016_WEB.pdf(Stand:2.3.2018).
(2)Pressemitteilung der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex v.14.2.2017,www.dcgk.de/de/kommission/die-kommission-im-dialog/deteilansicht/kodexaenderungen-2017-beschlossen-vorsitzwechsel-zum-1-maerz.html.
(1)Hauschka,Moosmayer,L9sler,u.a.,Corporate Compliance,3.Aufl.,2016,§1Rn.31;《准则》制定者不是立法者,因此只能在现行法框架内行为而不得创设新的义务。
(2)Fleischer,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§91Rn.47f.S.a.v.Busekist/Hein CCZ 2012,S.43.
(3)Busekist,Hein,CCZ 2012,S.43.
(4)Fleischer,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§91Rn.54.
(5)Fleischer,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§91Rn.55.
(1)Hauschka,Moosmayer,L9sler,u.a.,Corporate Compliance,3.Aufl.,2016,§42.
(2)"Neubürger-Entscheidung"des LG München I NZG 2014,S.345.
(3)Blassl,WM 2017,S.993.
(4)Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§111Rn.20.
(5)马库斯·路德、盖尔德·克里格尔、德克·菲尔泽:《监事会的权利与义务》(中文版第二版),杨大可译,上海人民出版社,2020年将出版,第74页。
(6)详见路德书,边码79以下。
(7)例如在股份公司中,监事会有义务依《股份法》第171条审查年度决算。
(8)详见路德书,边码103以下。
(9)详见路德书,边码112以下。
(1)类似观点详见路德书,边码92以下;Siepelt,Pütz,CCZ 2018,78ff.
(2)Pütz,Arbeitshilfe für Aufsichtsrate Nr.15,Compliance der Hans-B9ckler-Stiftung,2011,S.8,abrufbar unter:https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_ah_ar_15.pdf(Stand 2.3.2018).
(1)BGH 21.4.1997-II ZR 175/95=NJW 1997,S.1927.
(2)Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§111Rn.74ff.
(3)关于监事会的信息权,详见杨大可:《德国股份有限公司监事会信息权制度评析及启示》,载《德国研究》,2015年第1期,第70-81页。
(4)HaBler,BB 2017,S.1604.
(5)Spindler,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§90Rn.37.
(6)(7)HaBler,BB 2017,S.1606.
(1)最早来源于Deutscher Aktienindex,是由德意志交易所集团(Deutsche B9rse Group)推出的一个蓝筹股指数。该指数中包含30家主要的德国公司。DAX指数是全欧洲与英国伦敦金融时报100指数齐名的重要证券指数,也是世界证券市场中的重要指数之一。
(2)Spindler,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§111Rn.36.
(3)Hüffer,Koch,AktG,12.Aufl.,2016,§111Rn.21.
(4)Arbeitskreis Aufsichtsrat und Compliance,S.23.
(5)HaBler,BB 2017,S.1606.
(6)关于德国风险管理体系,详见杨大可:《论风险管理体系概念在法律层面的引入---以监事会的完善为目标》,载《当代法学》,2015年第1期,第94-102页。
(7)Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§107Rn.165ff.
(1)Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2016,Ziff.5Rn.296;Kremer,Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex,6.Aufl.,2016,Rn.1465.
(2)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.2Rn.4.
(3)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.2Rn.5.
(4)Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2016,Ziff.5Rn.301.
(5)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.2Rn.20.
(6)BGH NZG 2012,S.1064;Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2016,Ziff.5Rn.302;Wilsing,DCGKKommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.3Rn.2.
(7)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.2Rn.20.
(1)BGH NJW 1975,S.1412;Bisle,GWR 2013,S.200.
(2)Bisle,GWR 2013,S.200.
(3)BGH NJW 1993,S.2307.
(4)Hüffer,Koch,AktG,12.Aufl.,2016,§114Rn.1;Spindler,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§114Rn.1.
(5)Fuhrmann NZG 2017,S.291.
(6)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.4Rn.2.
(7)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.4Rn.2.
(8)Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2012,Rn.307.
(1)Fuhrmann,NZG 2017,S.298.
(2)Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2012,Rn.307.
(3)BGH NZG 2012,S.1064(?Fresenius").
(4)Ruoff,BB 2013,S.899.
(5)Spindler,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§116Rn.53;Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§116Rn.35.
(6)Grunewald,NZG 2013,S.841;v.Werder,Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex,6.Aufl.,2016,Rn.1497ff.
(7)Spindler,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§116Rn.53.
(8)Habersack,MüKoAktG,4,Aufl.,2014,§103Rn.41.
(9)BAG NZG 2009,S.669.
(10)主要指仅将股票以外的其他有价证券在《有价证券交易法》第2条第5款规定的有组织的市场上予以放行的公司。
(11)Baur,Holle,NZG 2017,S.171aE.
(1)康采恩:是德语konzern的音译,原意为多种企业集团,这是一种规模庞大而复杂的资本主义垄断组织形式。
(2)Blassl,WM 2017,S.992f.;Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,Vor§95Rn.1.
(3)Arnold,ZGR 2014,S.79;Hüffer,Koch,AktG,12.Aufl.,2016,§76Rn.16.
(4)Hüffer,Koch,AktG,12.Aufl.,2016,§111Rn.4.
(5)关于董事会和监事会在合规审查过程中的具体合作模式,详见杨大可:《德国公司合规审查实践中董/监事会的分级合作及启示》,载《证券市场导报》,2016年第11期,第69-78页。
(2)Pressemitteilung der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex v.14.2.2017,www.dcgk.de/de/kommission/die-kommission-im-dialog/deteilansicht/kodexaenderungen-2017-beschlossen-vorsitzwechsel-zum-1-maerz.html.
(1)Hauschka,Moosmayer,L9sler,u.a.,Corporate Compliance,3.Aufl.,2016,§1Rn.31;《准则》制定者不是立法者,因此只能在现行法框架内行为而不得创设新的义务。
(2)Fleischer,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§91Rn.47f.S.a.v.Busekist/Hein CCZ 2012,S.43.
(3)Busekist,Hein,CCZ 2012,S.43.
(4)Fleischer,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§91Rn.54.
(5)Fleischer,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§91Rn.55.
(1)Hauschka,Moosmayer,L9sler,u.a.,Corporate Compliance,3.Aufl.,2016,§42.
(2)"Neubürger-Entscheidung"des LG München I NZG 2014,S.345.
(3)Blassl,WM 2017,S.993.
(4)Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§111Rn.20.
(5)马库斯·路德、盖尔德·克里格尔、德克·菲尔泽:《监事会的权利与义务》(中文版第二版),杨大可译,上海人民出版社,2020年将出版,第74页。
(6)详见路德书,边码79以下。
(7)例如在股份公司中,监事会有义务依《股份法》第171条审查年度决算。
(8)详见路德书,边码103以下。
(9)详见路德书,边码112以下。
(1)类似观点详见路德书,边码92以下;Siepelt,Pütz,CCZ 2018,78ff.
(2)Pütz,Arbeitshilfe für Aufsichtsrate Nr.15,Compliance der Hans-B9ckler-Stiftung,2011,S.8,abrufbar unter:https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_ah_ar_15.pdf(Stand 2.3.2018).
(1)BGH 21.4.1997-II ZR 175/95=NJW 1997,S.1927.
(2)Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§111Rn.74ff.
(3)关于监事会的信息权,详见杨大可:《德国股份有限公司监事会信息权制度评析及启示》,载《德国研究》,2015年第1期,第70-81页。
(4)HaBler,BB 2017,S.1604.
(5)Spindler,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§90Rn.37.
(6)(7)HaBler,BB 2017,S.1606.
(1)最早来源于Deutscher Aktienindex,是由德意志交易所集团(Deutsche B9rse Group)推出的一个蓝筹股指数。该指数中包含30家主要的德国公司。DAX指数是全欧洲与英国伦敦金融时报100指数齐名的重要证券指数,也是世界证券市场中的重要指数之一。
(2)Spindler,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§111Rn.36.
(3)Hüffer,Koch,AktG,12.Aufl.,2016,§111Rn.21.
(4)Arbeitskreis Aufsichtsrat und Compliance,S.23.
(5)HaBler,BB 2017,S.1606.
(6)关于德国风险管理体系,详见杨大可:《论风险管理体系概念在法律层面的引入---以监事会的完善为目标》,载《当代法学》,2015年第1期,第94-102页。
(7)Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§107Rn.165ff.
(1)Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2016,Ziff.5Rn.296;Kremer,Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex,6.Aufl.,2016,Rn.1465.
(2)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.2Rn.4.
(3)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.2Rn.5.
(4)Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2016,Ziff.5Rn.301.
(5)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.2Rn.20.
(6)BGH NZG 2012,S.1064;Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2016,Ziff.5Rn.302;Wilsing,DCGKKommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.3Rn.2.
(7)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.2Rn.20.
(1)BGH NJW 1975,S.1412;Bisle,GWR 2013,S.200.
(2)Bisle,GWR 2013,S.200.
(3)BGH NJW 1993,S.2307.
(4)Hüffer,Koch,AktG,12.Aufl.,2016,§114Rn.1;Spindler,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§114Rn.1.
(5)Fuhrmann NZG 2017,S.291.
(6)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.4Rn.2.
(7)Wilsing,DCGK-Kommentar,2012,Ziff.5.5.4Rn.2.
(8)Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2012,Rn.307.
(1)Fuhrmann,NZG 2017,S.298.
(2)Bicker,Preute,Frankfurter Kommentar DCGK,2012,Rn.307.
(3)BGH NZG 2012,S.1064(?Fresenius").
(4)Ruoff,BB 2013,S.899.
(5)Spindler,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§116Rn.53;Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,§116Rn.35.
(6)Grunewald,NZG 2013,S.841;v.Werder,Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex,6.Aufl.,2016,Rn.1497ff.
(7)Spindler,AktG,3.Aufl.,2015,§116Rn.53.
(8)Habersack,MüKoAktG,4,Aufl.,2014,§103Rn.41.
(9)BAG NZG 2009,S.669.
(10)主要指仅将股票以外的其他有价证券在《有价证券交易法》第2条第5款规定的有组织的市场上予以放行的公司。
(11)Baur,Holle,NZG 2017,S.171aE.
(1)康采恩:是德语konzern的音译,原意为多种企业集团,这是一种规模庞大而复杂的资本主义垄断组织形式。
(2)Blassl,WM 2017,S.992f.;Habersack,MüKoAktG,4.Aufl.,2014,Vor§95Rn.1.
(3)Arnold,ZGR 2014,S.79;Hüffer,Koch,AktG,12.Aufl.,2016,§76Rn.16.
(4)Hüffer,Koch,AktG,12.Aufl.,2016,§111Rn.4.
(5)关于董事会和监事会在合规审查过程中的具体合作模式,详见杨大可:《德国公司合规审查实践中董/监事会的分级合作及启示》,载《证券市场导报》,2016年第11期,第69-78页。