商誉信息会影响企业债务期限结构吗?——基于债权人的视角
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摘要
基于我国沪深A股非金融类上市企业2008～2016年的数据,本文从债权人的视角研究商誉增加和商誉减值信息对企业债务期限结构的影响,同时还按产权性质分组检验了商誉增加和商誉减值信息与企业债务期限结构的关系。研究发现,商誉增加信息对企业债务期限结构产生显著正向影响,商誉减值信息对企业债务期限结构产生显著负向影响。进一步的研究显示,当企业的产权性质为非国有企业时,商誉增加信息和商誉减值信息对企业债务期限结构的影响更为显著。研究结论表明,商誉信息通过影响债权人信贷决策行为进而影响了企业的债务期限结构,商誉信息发挥了其在企业资源配置中的作用。
Based on the data of A-Shares non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2016, this paper studies the effect of increase in goodwill and goodwill impairment information on the debt maturity structure of companies from the perspective of creditors. At the same time, the relationship among goodwill increase, goodwill impairment information and the debt maturity structure of companies is examined by property rights grouping. It is found that the increase of goodwill has a positive impact on the debt maturity structure of companies, and goodwill impairment information has negative influence on the debt maturity structure of companies. Further research shows that when the property rights of enterprises are non-state-owned enterprises, the information of goodwill increase and goodwill impairment has a more significant impact on the debt maturity structure of companies. The research conclusion shows that goodwill information plays a role in enterprise resource allocation by influencing creditors' credit decision-making behaviors and thus affecting the debt maturity structure of enterprises.
Based on the data of A-Shares non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2016, this paper studies the effect of increase in goodwill and goodwill impairment information on the debt maturity structure of companies from the perspective of creditors. At the same time, the relationship among goodwill increase, goodwill impairment information and the debt maturity structure of companies is examined by property rights grouping. It is found that the increase of goodwill has a positive impact on the debt maturity structure of companies, and goodwill impairment information has negative influence on the debt maturity structure of companies. Further research shows that when the property rights of enterprises are non-state-owned enterprises, the information of goodwill increase and goodwill impairment has a more significant impact on the debt maturity structure of companies. The research conclusion shows that goodwill information plays a role in enterprise resource allocation by influencing creditors' credit decision-making behaviors and thus affecting the debt maturity structure of enterprises.
引文
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[23]卢煜,曲晓辉.商誉减值的盈余管理动机——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2016,(07):87-99.
[24]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2006,(10):100-107.
[25]廖秀梅.会计信息的信贷决策有用性:基于所有权制度制约的研究[J].会计研究,2007,(05):31-38.
[26]肖作平,廖理.公司治理影响债务期限水平吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2008,(11):143-156.
[27]杨鑫,李明辉,刘力涵.审计师质量、产权性质与债务期限结构[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,(04):101-113.
[28]叶建芳,何开刚,杨庆,等.不可核实的商誉减值测试估计与审计费用[J].审计研究,2016,(01):76-84.
[29]方红星,刘淑花.盈余管理与企业债务期限[J].财经问题研究,2017,(05):57-64.
[2]Holthausen,R.W,Leftwich,R.W.The Economic Consequences of Accounting Choice Implications of Costly Contracting and Monitoring[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1983,5(2):77-117.
[3]Frankel,R.,Seethamraju,C.,Zach,T.GAAP Goodwill and Debt Contracting Efficiency:Evidence from Net-worth Covenants[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2008,13(1):87-118.
[4]Allen,F.,Qian,J.,Qian,M.Law,Finance,and Economic Growth in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[5]Barclay,M.J.,Smith,C.W.The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt[J].Journal of Finance,1995,50(2):609-631.
[6]Jensen,M.C.,Meckling,W.H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].1976,3(4):305-360.
[7]Jensen,M.C.Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[8]García-Teruel,P.J.,Martínez-Solano,P.,SánchezBallesta,J.P.The Role of Accruals Quality in the Access to Bank Debt[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2014,38(C):186-193.
[9]Myers,S.C.Determinants of Corporate Borrowing[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5(2):147-175.
[10]Lee,C.The Effect of SFAS 142 on the Ability of Goodwill to Predict Future Cash Flows[J].Journal of Accounting&Public Policy,2011,30(3):236-255.
[11]Filip,A.,Jeanjean,T.,Paugam,L.Using Real Activities to Avoid Goodwill Impairment Losses:Evidence and Effect on Future Performance[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2015,42(3-4):515-554.
[12]Bens,D.A.,Heltzer,W.,Segal,B.The Information Content of Goodwill Impairments and the Adoption of SFAS 142[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2007,26:527-555.
[13]Ramanna,K.,Watts,R.L.Evidence on the Use of Unverifiable Estimates in Required Goodwill Impairment[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2012,17(4):749-780.
[14]Bharath,S.T.,Sunder,J.,Sunder,S.V.Accounting Quality and Debt Contracting[J].Accounting Review,2008,83(1):1-28.
[15]Fan,J.P.H.,Titman,S.,Twite,G.An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices[R].Nber Working Papers,2011,47(1):23-56.
[16]Faccio,M.,Masulis,R.W.,Mcconnell,J.J.Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[17]高榴,袁诗淼.上市公司并购重组商誉及其减值问题探析[J].证券市场导报,2017,(12):58-64.
[18]徐经长,张东旭,刘欢欢.并购商誉信息会影响债务资本成本吗?[J].中央财经大学学报,2017,(03):109-118.
[19]葛家澍,杜兴强.中级财务会计学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2007.
[20]谢纪刚,张秋生.股份支付、交易制度与商誉高估——基于中小板公司并购的数据分析[J].会计研究,2013,(12):47-52.
[21]程凤朝,刘家鹏.上市公司并购重组定价问题研究[J].会计研究,2011,(11):40-46.
[22]吴虹雁,刘强.商誉减值会计经济后果分析[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2014,(09):53-65.
[23]卢煜,曲晓辉.商誉减值的盈余管理动机——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2016,(07):87-99.
[24]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2006,(10):100-107.
[25]廖秀梅.会计信息的信贷决策有用性:基于所有权制度制约的研究[J].会计研究,2007,(05):31-38.
[26]肖作平,廖理.公司治理影响债务期限水平吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2008,(11):143-156.
[27]杨鑫,李明辉,刘力涵.审计师质量、产权性质与债务期限结构[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,(04):101-113.
[28]叶建芳,何开刚,杨庆,等.不可核实的商誉减值测试估计与审计费用[J].审计研究,2016,(01):76-84.
[29]方红星,刘淑花.盈余管理与企业债务期限[J].财经问题研究,2017,(05):57-64.