考虑个性化增值服务的BOPS交叉渠道运营研究
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摘要
基于制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型,考虑引入个性化增值服务对线上交易、线下取货(buy online and pick up in store)的BOPS交叉渠道运营影响问题。结果显示无论在双线同价还是不同价下,个性化增值服务的引入不会影响制造商的批发价和利润,但会增长零售商和供应链利润,且这种增长在不同价下更明显。个性化增值服务的引入增长了均衡价格和线上成交量,减少了零售商线下运营成本,改善了线上下运营的衔接能力,更好地实现了O2O本意。最后,运用算例分析验证了结果。
Based on the Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as the leader,the cross-channel operation problem of introducing personalized value-added service under the new O2 O mode "buy online and pick up in store(BOPS)" was discussed.The results of current evidence show that whether the online and offline prices are the same or not,the introduction of personalized value-added service does not affect the wholesale price and profit of the manufacturer,but rather it increases the profits of the retailer and the supply chain.This increase is more obvious in the case of different prices online and offline.The introduction of personalized value-added service not only increases the equilibrium price and online trading volume but also reduces operating costs and improves the ability to connect online and offline of the retailer,which better meet the original intention of O2 O.Finally,these findings were verified by numerical simulation.
Based on the Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as the leader,the cross-channel operation problem of introducing personalized value-added service under the new O2 O mode "buy online and pick up in store(BOPS)" was discussed.The results of current evidence show that whether the online and offline prices are the same or not,the introduction of personalized value-added service does not affect the wholesale price and profit of the manufacturer,but rather it increases the profits of the retailer and the supply chain.This increase is more obvious in the case of different prices online and offline.The introduction of personalized value-added service not only increases the equilibrium price and online trading volume but also reduces operating costs and improves the ability to connect online and offline of the retailer,which better meet the original intention of O2 O.Finally,these findings were verified by numerical simulation.
引文
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[2] Rampell A.Why online to offline commerce is a trillion dollar opportunity[EB/OL].(2011-08-7)[2018-07-10].https://techcrunch.com/2010/08/07/why-online2offline-commerce-is-a-trillion-dollar-opportunity/
[3] Li H,Shen Q W,Bart Y.Local Market Characteristics and Online-to-Offline Commerce:An Empirical Analysis of Groupon[J].Management Science,2018,64(4):1860-1878.
[4] Gao F,Su X M.Omnichannel Retail Operations with Buy-Online-and-Pick-up-in-Store[J].Management Science,2017,63(8):2478-2492.
[5] Soysal G,Krishnamurthi L.How Does Adoption of the Outlet Channel Impact Customers’ Spending in the Retail Stores:Conflict or Synergy?[J].Management Science,2016,62(9):2457-2764.
[6] 赵礼强,徐家旺.基于电子市场的供应链双渠道冲突与协调的契约设计[J].中国管理科学,2014,(5):61-68.
[7] 吴晓志,陈宏,解东川,等.多因素扰动下同价双渠道供应链协调应对突发事件[J].运筹与管理,2015,(6):95-102+127.
[8] 王虹,周晶.不同价格模式下的双渠道供应链决策研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,(6):84-90.
[9] 吴晓志,陈法,张俊.考虑在线补贴的零售商水平O2O供应链协调[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(Special Issue):479-484.
[10] 孙林岩.服务型制造—理论与实践[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2009.
[11] 肖剑,但斌,张旭梅.双渠道供应链中制造商与零售商的服务合作定价策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2010,(12):2203-2211.
[12] 陈远高,刘南.具有服务差异的双渠道供应链竞争策略[J].计算机集成制造系统,2010,(11):2484-2489.
[13] Liu Y M,Ding C J,Fan C,et al.Pricing Decision under Dual-Channel Structure considering Fairness and Free-Riding Behavior[J].Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society,2014,2014:1-10.
[14] Gao F,Su X M.Omnichannel Service Operations with Online and Offline Self-Order Technologies[J].Management Science,2018,64(8):3595-3608.
[15] 罗美玲,李刚,孙林岩.基于增值服务的双渠道供应链竞争[J].工业工程与管理,2011,16(3):37-44.