装备采购项目目标价格合同激励效用研究
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摘要
为提高目标价格合同在装备采购领域的应用效果,基于军方和承制单位期望效用,应用委托-代理理论建立了按完工效果直接给予报酬合同、按固定份额分成合同、按约定公式分成合同等三类目标价格合同模式的激励模型,并采用规划方法给出了模型最优解,实现了军方和承制单位在不同合同条件下的效用度量和测算,为实践中军方设计既吸引承制单位参与又扩大自身效用的目标价格合同提供了参考,同时也为推进目标价格合同在装备采购领域的适用奠定了基础。
To improve the applications of target price contract in equipment acquisition projects, three kinds of contract incentives models are created on the basis of expected utilities of the army and the contractors in light of the principal-agent theory. The three models involve cost-plus fee defined by performance contract, cost-plus fixed percentage fee contract, and share distribution formula contract. The optimal solutions of these contracts are calculated using programming method, and comparison of the different utilities are made. The contract incentives model and utilities calculations may facilitate the army in concluding contracts that could both encourage the contractors and increase the owner′s utilities, and thus promote the application of target price contract in equipment acquisition projects.
To improve the applications of target price contract in equipment acquisition projects, three kinds of contract incentives models are created on the basis of expected utilities of the army and the contractors in light of the principal-agent theory. The three models involve cost-plus fee defined by performance contract, cost-plus fixed percentage fee contract, and share distribution formula contract. The optimal solutions of these contracts are calculated using programming method, and comparison of the different utilities are made. The contract incentives model and utilities calculations may facilitate the army in concluding contracts that could both encourage the contractors and increase the owner′s utilities, and thus promote the application of target price contract in equipment acquisition projects.
引文
[1]BERENDS T C.Cost plus incentive fee contractingexperiences and structuring[J].International Journal of Project Management,2000,18:165-171.
[2]JON B,JOHN P.How practitioners set share fraction in target cost contracts[J].International Journal of Project Management,2002,20:59-66.
[3]刘俊颖,刘瑞平,陈晨.目标价格合同激励模式及失效原因探究[J].国际经济合作,2009(9):58-62.LIU Jun-ying,LIU Rui-ping,CHEN Chen.Study on incentive mode and invalid causes of target price contract[J].International Economic Cooperation,2009(9):58-62.(in Chinese)
[4]訾书宇,魏汝祥,金虎.最优目标价格合同优化设计方法[J].海军工程大学学报,2014,26(2):49-53.ZI Shu-yu,WEI Ru-xiang,JIN Hu.Optimal design method of target price contract[J].Journal of Naval University of Engineering,2014,26(2):49-53.(in Chinese)
[5]CHAPMAN C,WARD S.Developing and implementing a balanced incentive and risk sharing contract[J].Construction Management and Economics,2008,26(6):659-669.
[6]SCHERER F M.The theory of contractual incentives for cost reduction[J].Quarterly Journal of E-conomics,1964,10(1):53-73.
[2]JON B,JOHN P.How practitioners set share fraction in target cost contracts[J].International Journal of Project Management,2002,20:59-66.
[3]刘俊颖,刘瑞平,陈晨.目标价格合同激励模式及失效原因探究[J].国际经济合作,2009(9):58-62.LIU Jun-ying,LIU Rui-ping,CHEN Chen.Study on incentive mode and invalid causes of target price contract[J].International Economic Cooperation,2009(9):58-62.(in Chinese)
[4]訾书宇,魏汝祥,金虎.最优目标价格合同优化设计方法[J].海军工程大学学报,2014,26(2):49-53.ZI Shu-yu,WEI Ru-xiang,JIN Hu.Optimal design method of target price contract[J].Journal of Naval University of Engineering,2014,26(2):49-53.(in Chinese)
[5]CHAPMAN C,WARD S.Developing and implementing a balanced incentive and risk sharing contract[J].Construction Management and Economics,2008,26(6):659-669.
[6]SCHERER F M.The theory of contractual incentives for cost reduction[J].Quarterly Journal of E-conomics,1964,10(1):53-73.