职务科技成果转化收益分配比例与科研人员激励——基于委托-代理理论视角
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摘要
基于委托-代理视角,通过构建模型研究职务科技成果转化收益分配比例与科研人员激励问题,旨在为我国职务科技成果转化收益分配政策提供理论参考。研究发现,职务科技成果转化收益分配比例与科研人员激励力度并非简单的正相关关系;职务科技成果转化收益分配比例受到显性知识与隐性知识比重衡量的科技成果转化难易程度的影响,与科研人员努力成本和风险规避意愿等个人特征有关,与科技人才评价体系完善程度等影响信息不对称水平的因素有关。利用MATLAB软件对以上结果进行仿真分析,并提出具体的政策建议。
This paper addresses the issues of income distribution of the commercialization of research findings and the incentive mechanism for scientists by building models based on principal-agent theory. It aims at providing theoretical reference for relevant policy making. This study shows it is far more than simple positive correlation between the income distribution and the incentive. The distribution proportion is partly dependent on the complexity level of commercializing the service technical research findings,which is measured by both explicit and implicit knowledge. It also depends on personal features such as the cost of efforts invested by the scientist and their risk-aversion wishes. In addition,the perfection level of talent evaluation system influences the equal accessibility to the information,which plays a role as well. This research makes a simulation analysis of the above results by means of MATLAB and thereof proposes some policy-making suggestions.
This paper addresses the issues of income distribution of the commercialization of research findings and the incentive mechanism for scientists by building models based on principal-agent theory. It aims at providing theoretical reference for relevant policy making. This study shows it is far more than simple positive correlation between the income distribution and the incentive. The distribution proportion is partly dependent on the complexity level of commercializing the service technical research findings,which is measured by both explicit and implicit knowledge. It also depends on personal features such as the cost of efforts invested by the scientist and their risk-aversion wishes. In addition,the perfection level of talent evaluation system influences the equal accessibility to the information,which plays a role as well. This research makes a simulation analysis of the above results by means of MATLAB and thereof proposes some policy-making suggestions.
引文
[1]万志前,朱照照.论职务科技成果转化收益分配的约定优先原则[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017(3):124-131.
[2]郭英远,张胜.科技人员参与科技成果转化收益分配的激励机制研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,36(7):146-154.
[3]POLANYI M. Personal knowledge[M]. London:Routledge&Kegan Paul,1958.
[4]NONAKA I,TAKEUCHI H. The knowledge-creating company:how Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation[M]. London:Oxford University Press,1995.
[5]WONG W,RADCLIFFE D F. The tacit nature of design knowledge[J].Technology Analysis&Strategic Management,2000,12(4):493-512.
[6]肖宝,顾新,王涛.不同转化方式下科研人员参与收益分配研究[J].科学管理研究,2016,34(5):21-24.
[7]管丽丽,林玉双,林琛琛.美国哈佛大学科技成果转化收益分配方式解析和借鉴[J].科技管理研究,2014(4):29-32.
[8]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1996:235-262.
[9]齐晓东,李兆友.技术创新中的政府激励导向:基于委托代理视角[J].东北大学学报(社会科学版),2013,15(5):478-483.
[10]钟和平.企业技术工人的创新激励合约研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,2011(12):31-34.
[11]万青,陈万明,胡思华.知识型员工创新激励及其影响因素研究:基于声誉机制及多任务多期委托代理的视角[J].研究与发展管理,2011,23(6):55-63.
[12]陈柳.信任、声誉与产学研合作模式[J].科技管理研究,2015(12):233-250.
[13]刘泽双,潘丽丽,申飞鹏.声誉价值损失量对科研契约履约率的影响[J].经济管理,2007,29(18):29-32.
[14]翟青.企业技术创新激励理论的评述及启示[J].生产力研究,2010(1):195-197.
[15]伊兰伯格,史密斯.现代劳动经济学:理论与公共政策[M]. 8版.北京:中国人民大学,2007:183.
[16]孙耀吾,王利强,朱雄鹰.信息不完全下高技术企业研发投资决策建模优化与仿真[J].系统工程,2016,34(6):24-30.
[17]徐升华,芦亮.校企研发合作模式下的知识转移博弈与仿真分析[J]. 2010(6):68-74.
[18]储节旺,李章超. SECI及其衍生模型评析[J].新世纪图书馆,2017(3):63-67.
[2]郭英远,张胜.科技人员参与科技成果转化收益分配的激励机制研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,36(7):146-154.
[3]POLANYI M. Personal knowledge[M]. London:Routledge&Kegan Paul,1958.
[4]NONAKA I,TAKEUCHI H. The knowledge-creating company:how Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation[M]. London:Oxford University Press,1995.
[5]WONG W,RADCLIFFE D F. The tacit nature of design knowledge[J].Technology Analysis&Strategic Management,2000,12(4):493-512.
[6]肖宝,顾新,王涛.不同转化方式下科研人员参与收益分配研究[J].科学管理研究,2016,34(5):21-24.
[7]管丽丽,林玉双,林琛琛.美国哈佛大学科技成果转化收益分配方式解析和借鉴[J].科技管理研究,2014(4):29-32.
[8]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1996:235-262.
[9]齐晓东,李兆友.技术创新中的政府激励导向:基于委托代理视角[J].东北大学学报(社会科学版),2013,15(5):478-483.
[10]钟和平.企业技术工人的创新激励合约研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,2011(12):31-34.
[11]万青,陈万明,胡思华.知识型员工创新激励及其影响因素研究:基于声誉机制及多任务多期委托代理的视角[J].研究与发展管理,2011,23(6):55-63.
[12]陈柳.信任、声誉与产学研合作模式[J].科技管理研究,2015(12):233-250.
[13]刘泽双,潘丽丽,申飞鹏.声誉价值损失量对科研契约履约率的影响[J].经济管理,2007,29(18):29-32.
[14]翟青.企业技术创新激励理论的评述及启示[J].生产力研究,2010(1):195-197.
[15]伊兰伯格,史密斯.现代劳动经济学:理论与公共政策[M]. 8版.北京:中国人民大学,2007:183.
[16]孙耀吾,王利强,朱雄鹰.信息不完全下高技术企业研发投资决策建模优化与仿真[J].系统工程,2016,34(6):24-30.
[17]徐升华,芦亮.校企研发合作模式下的知识转移博弈与仿真分析[J]. 2010(6):68-74.
[18]储节旺,李章超. SECI及其衍生模型评析[J].新世纪图书馆,2017(3):63-67.