我国社会工作者工资决定机制研究——基于对深圳市社会工作实践的分析
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摘要
我国社会工作者工资决定机制存在两种现象,一方面低工资导致优秀社工退出社工行业,另一方面主管部门积极推动政府出台相关举措试图挽留社工。这种"退出-挽留机制"具有被动性、非制度化、弱规范性和区域差异性等特点,它表面上增加了社工的工资,但是实际上延缓了对实质问题的解决,长期下去只会使社工行业的问题积重难返,因此,必须尽快用新的机制取而代之。新的工资决定机制包含两个要点,一是用制度化的工资指导标准和问责机制来体现政府责任,二是用社工呼吁和退出的权利来体现社工的主体地位。我们把这一新的工资决定机制称为"退出-呼吁机制"。社工服务的积极外部性、非市场性和从属性决定了社工工资只能大体维持在社会平均工资水平。
In the process of social work professionalization in China,low wages have driven outstanding social workers out of the social work area; while authorities concerned have actively promoted the government to introduce relevant measures to persuade social workers to stay,which is called exit-retention mechanism.This mechanism is characterized by passivity,non-institutionalization,weak norms and regional differences. It seemingly increases the wages of social workers; but it actually delays the resolution of the substantive problems. In the long run,it will only make it more difficult to solve the problems of the social work industry.Therefore,it should be replaced by a new mechanism as soon as possible. The new mechanism which is called exit-voice mechanism uses the institutionalized wage guidance standards and accountability mechanism to reflect the responsibility of the government on one hand,and on the other hand,it uses the right of social workers to voice and exit to reflect the dominant position of social workers. The positive externality,nonmarket and subordination of social work services have determined that the wages of social workers can only maintain roughly at the average social wage level.
In the process of social work professionalization in China,low wages have driven outstanding social workers out of the social work area; while authorities concerned have actively promoted the government to introduce relevant measures to persuade social workers to stay,which is called exit-retention mechanism.This mechanism is characterized by passivity,non-institutionalization,weak norms and regional differences. It seemingly increases the wages of social workers; but it actually delays the resolution of the substantive problems. In the long run,it will only make it more difficult to solve the problems of the social work industry.Therefore,it should be replaced by a new mechanism as soon as possible. The new mechanism which is called exit-voice mechanism uses the institutionalized wage guidance standards and accountability mechanism to reflect the responsibility of the government on one hand,and on the other hand,it uses the right of social workers to voice and exit to reflect the dominant position of social workers. The positive externality,nonmarket and subordination of social work services have determined that the wages of social workers can only maintain roughly at the average social wage level.
引文
[1]宋晶.工资决定理论:古典经济学与现代经济学的比较[J].财经问题研究,2011(3).
[2]胡靖春.新古典工资决定理论的缺陷与马克思工资决定理论的替代性解决[J].湖北经济学院学报,2010(3).
[3]周业安,宋紫峰.工资决定的行为与制度分析[J].学术月刊,2006(12).
[4]参见邢春冰.不同所有制企业的工资决定机制考察[J].经济研究,2005(6);汪雯.转型经济下不同所有制企业工资决定行为的实证比较[J].经济科学,2008(2);余向华,陈雪娟.垄断与行业工资差距问题研究---基于中国行业工资决定因素的微观计量分析[J].税务与经济,2010(4);王晓丽.城市劳动力市场分割与工资决定[J].人口与经济,2013(5);杨继东,杨其静.工会、政治关联与工资决定---基于中国企业调查数据的分析[J].世界经济文汇,2013(2);刘章发,田贵贤.信息不对称、劳资议价与均衡工资决定[J].经济评论,2017(4).
[5]徐道稳.我国社会工作行政化发展模式及其转型[J].社会科学,2017(10).
[6]李志远.解读马克思关于资本主义工资决定的历史和道德因素[J].马克思主义与现实,2008(3).
[7]柴茂昌.中国公务员工资水平决定机制研究[M].经济科学出版社,2017.
[8]徐道稳.我国社会工作立法的重点议题[J].国家行政学院学报,2017(5).
[9]美]艾伯特·赫希曼.退出、呼吁与忠诚:对企业、组织和国家衰退的回应[M].卢昌崇译,上海世纪出版集团,2015年.
[10]Barth,M.C.(2003).Social work labor market:A first look.Social Work,48(1),9-19.
[11]Irene,Y.H.NG(2010).What if Social Workers Were Paid More?Administration in Social Work,34:351-360.
[12]杨发祥,叶淑静.社工薪酬的结构性困境与可能出路---以珠三角地区为例[J].江苏行政学院学报,2016(5).
(1)民政部等12个部门《关于加强社会工作专业岗位开发与人才激励保障的意见》(民发[2016] 186号)。
(1)我国各行业工资数据参见http://data. stats. gov. cn/easyquery. htm? cn=C01。
(2)美国各行业工资数据参见https://www. bls. gov/oes/current/oes_nat. htm。
(1)根据《国民经济行业分类(GB/T4754-2017)》,卫生和社会工作行业中的社会工作包括提供住宿社会工作和不提供住宿社会工作。前者包括干部休养所、护理机构服务、精神康复服务、老年人、残疾人养护服务、临终关怀服务、孤残儿童收养和庇护服务等;后者包括社会看护与帮助服务、康复辅具适配服务等。
[2]胡靖春.新古典工资决定理论的缺陷与马克思工资决定理论的替代性解决[J].湖北经济学院学报,2010(3).
[3]周业安,宋紫峰.工资决定的行为与制度分析[J].学术月刊,2006(12).
[4]参见邢春冰.不同所有制企业的工资决定机制考察[J].经济研究,2005(6);汪雯.转型经济下不同所有制企业工资决定行为的实证比较[J].经济科学,2008(2);余向华,陈雪娟.垄断与行业工资差距问题研究---基于中国行业工资决定因素的微观计量分析[J].税务与经济,2010(4);王晓丽.城市劳动力市场分割与工资决定[J].人口与经济,2013(5);杨继东,杨其静.工会、政治关联与工资决定---基于中国企业调查数据的分析[J].世界经济文汇,2013(2);刘章发,田贵贤.信息不对称、劳资议价与均衡工资决定[J].经济评论,2017(4).
[5]徐道稳.我国社会工作行政化发展模式及其转型[J].社会科学,2017(10).
[6]李志远.解读马克思关于资本主义工资决定的历史和道德因素[J].马克思主义与现实,2008(3).
[7]柴茂昌.中国公务员工资水平决定机制研究[M].经济科学出版社,2017.
[8]徐道稳.我国社会工作立法的重点议题[J].国家行政学院学报,2017(5).
[9]美]艾伯特·赫希曼.退出、呼吁与忠诚:对企业、组织和国家衰退的回应[M].卢昌崇译,上海世纪出版集团,2015年.
[10]Barth,M.C.(2003).Social work labor market:A first look.Social Work,48(1),9-19.
[11]Irene,Y.H.NG(2010).What if Social Workers Were Paid More?Administration in Social Work,34:351-360.
[12]杨发祥,叶淑静.社工薪酬的结构性困境与可能出路---以珠三角地区为例[J].江苏行政学院学报,2016(5).
(1)民政部等12个部门《关于加强社会工作专业岗位开发与人才激励保障的意见》(民发[2016] 186号)。
(1)我国各行业工资数据参见http://data. stats. gov. cn/easyquery. htm? cn=C01。
(2)美国各行业工资数据参见https://www. bls. gov/oes/current/oes_nat. htm。
(1)根据《国民经济行业分类(GB/T4754-2017)》,卫生和社会工作行业中的社会工作包括提供住宿社会工作和不提供住宿社会工作。前者包括干部休养所、护理机构服务、精神康复服务、老年人、残疾人养护服务、临终关怀服务、孤残儿童收养和庇护服务等;后者包括社会看护与帮助服务、康复辅具适配服务等。