摘要
所有权与管理权的分离,造成了现代公司的委托代理问题,管理者有可能会利用自身资源做出损害股东利益的行为。基于此,本文首先介绍了高管薪酬与资本结构的相关概念与研究内容,其次根据A股上市公司的相关数据,以上司公司为例,通过数据分析方式、文献研究方式,对高管薪酬激励与企业资本结构之间的动态关系进行分析。最后针对分析结构,给出进行薪酬结构与资本结构调整的相关建议。
The separation of ownership and management rights has caused the principal-agent problem of modern companies. Managers may use their own resources to make behaviors that harm the interests of shareholders. Based on this, firstly this paper introduces the related concepts and research contents of executive compensation and capital structure. Secondly, taking listed companies as an example,the paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between executive compensation incentives and corporate capital structure through data analysis and literature research. Finally, for the analysis structure, relevant suggestions for adjusting the salary structure and capital structure are given.
引文
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