银行业协会履职行为激励约束机制研究
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摘要
针对银行业协会履职行为的激励约束问题,在系统分析银行业协会履职过程中主体间关系的基础上,将会员机构与政府主管部门对银行业协会履职行为的声誉激励与监管威慑制约作用置于同一框架下研究,构建了不完全信息银行业协会履职行为激励约束多方动态博弈模型,并通过求解博弈精炼贝叶斯准分离均衡战略条件,分析并仿真研究了声誉激励与监管威慑两种激励约束机制对银行业协会履职行为的作用原理。研究结果表明,先期声誉、声誉激励、市场识别能力及远期收益贴现为声誉激励的主要构成要素,监管查处能力、监管处罚为监管威慑的主要构成要素;良好的先期声誉能够在一定程度上促进行业自律的形成,但协会负责人的固定任职期限会在一定程度上削弱声誉激励的有效作用;监管威慑在发挥自身约束作用的基础上,能够促进声誉激励作用的有效发挥,但需以畅通有效的信息机制建设为前提。结合研究结果及实际,分别从提升银行业协会内控机制建设,强化银行业信息互通机制建设及适度提升政府主管部门的监督力度等方面提出了政策建议。
Focusing on effectiveness of incentive and restraint mechanism for performance-duty behavior of banking industry association, this paper studies the reputation incentive from members of banking industry association and regulatory deterrence from government authorities based on systematic analysis of inter-subject relationship under the same framework. By building incomplete information multi-dynamic game, we get the refined Bayesian quasi segregation equilibrium strategic conditions of the game, analyze and discuss the impact mechanism of reputation incentive and regulatory deterrence by simulation analysis using Matlab. The results are as follows: the main indicators of reputation incentive include prior reputation, unit reputation incentive,market identification capability and forward yield discount; the main indicators of regulatory deterrence include investigation ability and regulatory penalties, which can impel or restrict the behaviors of banking industry association effectively. Good reputation can promote the formation of self-discipline, but the fixed service term of the head of association will weaken reputation incentive efficiency; regulatory deterrence can promote reputation incentive on the premise that build a smooth and effective information mechanism. Considering the results and the realities, we give suggestions on improving the construction of internal control mechanism of banking association, strengthening the construction of banking information exchange mechanism and enhancing the supervision of government departments moderately.
Focusing on effectiveness of incentive and restraint mechanism for performance-duty behavior of banking industry association, this paper studies the reputation incentive from members of banking industry association and regulatory deterrence from government authorities based on systematic analysis of inter-subject relationship under the same framework. By building incomplete information multi-dynamic game, we get the refined Bayesian quasi segregation equilibrium strategic conditions of the game, analyze and discuss the impact mechanism of reputation incentive and regulatory deterrence by simulation analysis using Matlab. The results are as follows: the main indicators of reputation incentive include prior reputation, unit reputation incentive,market identification capability and forward yield discount; the main indicators of regulatory deterrence include investigation ability and regulatory penalties, which can impel or restrict the behaviors of banking industry association effectively. Good reputation can promote the formation of self-discipline, but the fixed service term of the head of association will weaken reputation incentive efficiency; regulatory deterrence can promote reputation incentive on the premise that build a smooth and effective information mechanism. Considering the results and the realities, we give suggestions on improving the construction of internal control mechanism of banking association, strengthening the construction of banking information exchange mechanism and enhancing the supervision of government departments moderately.
引文
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[21]于涛,刘长玉.政府与第三方在产品质量监管中的演化博弈分析及仿真研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):90-96.
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[24]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.新1版[M].上海:格致出版社,2012:191.
[2]MILGROM P R,NORTH D C,WEINGAST B R.The role of institutions in the revival of trade:The law merchant,private judges,and the champagne fair[J].Economics&Politics,1990,2(1):1-23.
[3]孙春苗.论行业协会:中国行业协会失灵研究[M].北京:中国社会出版社,2010.
[4]郭薇.政府监管与行业自律:论行业协会在市场治理中的功能与实现条件[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2011.
[5]郭薇,秦浩.中国行业协会自律职能缺失的原因分析---基于角色冲突的分析框架[J].浙江社会科学,2012(5):73-77,158.
[6]王诗宗,宋程成.独立抑或自主:中国社会组织特征问题重思[J].中国社会科学,2013(5):50-66,205.
[7]张长东,顾昕.从国家法团主义到社会法团主义---中国市场转型过程中国家与行业协会关系的演变[J].东岳论丛,2015,36(2):5-13.
[8]梁鑫华,徐晓林,栾丽霞.新常态下行业协会关系网络转型研究[J].中国行政管理,2016(4):54-60.
[9]KUTEESA A,MAWEJJE J.Between the market and the state:The capacity of business associations for policy engagement in Uganda[J].Journal of Modern African Studies,2016,54(4):617-644.
[10]邓莉雅,王金红.中国NGO生存与发展的制约因素---以广东番禺打工族文书处理服务部为例[J].社会学研究,2004(2):89-97.
[11]汪锦军,张长东.纵向横向网络中的社会组织与政府互动机制---基于行业协会行为策略的多案例比较研究[J].公共行政评论,2014(5):88-108.
[12]张珺,胡婷.行业协会反倾销功能的影响因素研究---基于行业协会治理的视角[J].改革与战略,2016(9):34-39.
[13]梁昌勇,代犟,朱龙.行业协会承接政府职能转移的作用类型及其实现机制:一项多案例研究[J].管理工程学报,2016,30(1):228-234.
[14]王伟进.一种强关系:自上而下型行业协会与政府关系探析[J].中国行政管理,2015(2):59-64.
[15]李学楠.政社合作中资源依赖与权力平衡---基于上海市行业协会的调查分析[J].社会科学,2015(5):27-36.
[16]OSTROM E.Building trust to solve commons dilemmas:taking small steps to test an evolving theory of collective action[M]//Games,Groups,and the Global Good.Berlin Heidelberg:Springer,2009:207-228.
[17]FEREJOHN J.Reputation and power:Organizational image and pharmaceutical regulation at the FDA by Daniel Carpenter[J].Perspectives on Politics,2012,10(3):797-800.
[18]鲍威尔.组织分析的新制度主义[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2008:360-384.
[19]杨海涛.转型期中国行业协会的社会结构网络定位[J].中国经济问题,2011(6):96-102.
[20]赵永辉,李林木.威慑机制、遵从激励与面向高收入者的最优税收执法[J].当代财经,2014(2):29-39.
[21]于涛,刘长玉.政府与第三方在产品质量监管中的演化博弈分析及仿真研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):90-96.
[22]鲁篱,马力路遥.食品安全治理行业自律失范的检视与改革进路[J].财经科学,2017(3):123-132.
[23]中国银行业协会.中国银行业协会章程[EB/OL].(2013-09-16)[2017-07-17].http://www.china-cba.net/list.php?fid=77.
[24]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.新1版[M].上海:格致出版社,2012:191.