第三方中介平台参与的知识产权质押融资合作机制
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摘要
随着科学技术的发展和全球一体化进程的加快,科技型中小企业在实体经济中的地位愈发重要,但融资难问题一直是困扰中小企业发展的重要障碍。知识产权质押融资的发展给科技型中小企业提供了一种有效的融资方式。利用演化博弈模型,探讨在第三方中介平台的参与下商业银行与科技型中小企业的知识产权质押融资合作机制是如何建立的。研究发现,只有当企业信用风险水平越小、银行能取得贷款风险担保、第三方中介平台可以取得较客观的收益时,银行与企业以及第三方中介平台的合作才是最稳定的状态。最后结合知识产权质押融资现状提出相关对策建议。
With the development of science and technology and the acceleration of globalization, small and mediumsized enterprises of science and technology play an increasingly important role in the real economy, but the difficulty of financing has always been an important obstacle to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. The development of intellectual property pledge financing provides an effective financing method for small and mediumsized technology enterprises. This paper uses the evolutionary game model to discuss how to establish the cooperative mechanism of intellectual property pledge financing between commercial banks and small and medium-sized technology enterprises, under the participation of the third party intermediary platform. It is found that the cooperation between the bank and the enterprise and the third party intermediary platform is the most stable state, only when the credit risk level of the enterprise is smaller and the bank can obtain the loan risk guarantee, and the third party intermediary platform can obtain the more objective income, the cooperation between the bank and the enterprise and the third party intermediary platform is the most stable state. Finally, combined with the status quo of intellectual property pledge financing, relevant suggestions are put forward.
With the development of science and technology and the acceleration of globalization, small and mediumsized enterprises of science and technology play an increasingly important role in the real economy, but the difficulty of financing has always been an important obstacle to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. The development of intellectual property pledge financing provides an effective financing method for small and mediumsized technology enterprises. This paper uses the evolutionary game model to discuss how to establish the cooperative mechanism of intellectual property pledge financing between commercial banks and small and medium-sized technology enterprises, under the participation of the third party intermediary platform. It is found that the cooperation between the bank and the enterprise and the third party intermediary platform is the most stable state, only when the credit risk level of the enterprise is smaller and the bank can obtain the loan risk guarantee, and the third party intermediary platform can obtain the more objective income, the cooperation between the bank and the enterprise and the third party intermediary platform is the most stable state. Finally, combined with the status quo of intellectual property pledge financing, relevant suggestions are put forward.
引文
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[18]仇荣国,孔玉生.基于知识产权质押的科技型小微企业融资机制及影响因素研究[J].中国科技论坛,2017(4):118-125.
[19]丁锦希,李伟,王中.知识产权质押融资激励政策研究:基于北京贴息模式的实证分析[J].科技进步与对策,2012,29(21):94-98.
[20]杨扬,陈敬良.我国高新技术企业知识产权质押融资机制的演化博弈分析[J].工业技术经济,2014,33(7):43-48.
[2]于立强.科技型中小企业知识产权质押融资模式探究[J].科学管理研究,2017,35(10):91-94.
[3]朱佳俊,李金兵,唐红珍.基于CAPP的知识产权融资担保模式研究[J].华东经济管理,2014,28(5):95-98.
[4]宋光辉,田立民.科技型中小企业知识产权质押融资模式的国内外比较研究[J].金融发展研究,2016(2):50-56.
[5]程永文,姚王信.有限理性视角下知识产权质押贷款风险形成、评估与检验[J].科技进步与对策,2015,32(13):139-144.
[6]曾莉,王明.基于BP神经网络的科技型中小企业知识产权质押融资风险评价[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(23):164-167.
[7]鲍新中,王言,霍欢欢,等.知识产权质押融资风险动态监控平台构建与实现[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(20):170-174.
[8]杨帆,李迪,赵东.知识产权质押融资风险补偿基金:运作模式与发展策略[J].科技进步与对策,2017,34(6):99-105.
[9]李希义,朱颖.设立知识产权质押贷款专项基金的研究探讨:基于财政资金创新使用角度[J].科学学研究,2016,34(6):882-886.
[10]PAKES A.Patents as options:some estimates of the value of holding European patent stocks[J].Econometrics,1986,54(4):755-784.
[11]葛翔宇,赵翼,周艳丽,等.高新技术企业发展中的专利权价值问题:基于跳扩散实物期权定价的建模与模拟[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(3):355-364.
[12]刘小青,陈向东.基于复合期权模型的外国在华专利价值研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2009(11):57-62.
[13]REITZIG M.Valuing patents and patent portfolios from a corporate perspective[C].Geneva:United Nations,2003:66-82.
[14]杨思思,郝屹,戴磊.专利技术价值评估及实证研究[J].中国科技论坛,2017(9):146-152.
[15]苑泽明,李海英,孙浩亮,等.知识产权质押融资价值评估:收益分成率研究[J].科学学研究,2012,30(6):856-864.
[16]HARHOFF D,SCHERER F M,VOPEL K.Citations,family size,opposition and the value of patent rights[J].Research Policy,2002,32(2):1343-1363.
[17]赵蕴华,张静,李岩,等.基于机器学习的专利价值评估方法研究[J].情报科学,2013,31(12):15-18.
[18]仇荣国,孔玉生.基于知识产权质押的科技型小微企业融资机制及影响因素研究[J].中国科技论坛,2017(4):118-125.
[19]丁锦希,李伟,王中.知识产权质押融资激励政策研究:基于北京贴息模式的实证分析[J].科技进步与对策,2012,29(21):94-98.
[20]杨扬,陈敬良.我国高新技术企业知识产权质押融资机制的演化博弈分析[J].工业技术经济,2014,33(7):43-48.