农村集体经济股权分配制度变迁及绩效评价
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摘要
集体股份合作制是我国农村集体经济的一项重要的产权制度。其中的集体股权分配制度在不同的制度变迁动因下,具有不同的制度绩效。以广东省南海区为案例,分析股权分配制度产生及演变的深层逻辑。研究表明:股权分配制创立之初时的"确权到人"具有法律和实践依据,而后因利益激励导致集体经济组织内部的交易费用不断增长,诱发了集体股权分配形式向"固化到户"的制度完善,从而实现股权分配制度的新均衡;在制度均衡条件下,新型股权分配制度构建了集体产权明晰的正式约束,重构了农村保障资源配置和乡村治理秩序,同时实现了制度逻辑下的净收益最大化。然而,新均衡下的股权分配制度仍存在产权残缺问题,集体股权在市场机制的完整建构下,应当突破内部流动限制,以实现农村集体资产股权的自由配置与完全流动。
The collective shareholding system is an important property right system in China's rural collective economy.The collective equity allocation system has different institutional performance during different institutional changes.Taking Nanhai District of Guangdong Province as an example,this paper analyses the deep logic of the emergence and evolution of the equity allocation system.The research shows that the equity allocation system based on the person as a unit has legal and practical basis at the beginning of its establishment,and then the transaction costs within the collective economic organizations are increasing because of interest incentives,which induces the collective equity allocation.Under the condition of system equilibrium,the new equity distribution system constructs the formal restraint of collective property rights,reconstructs the rural security resources allocation and rural governance order,and realizes the maximization of net income under the system logic.However,there is still a problem of incomplete ownership in the equity allocation system;the article also points out that under the complete construction of the market mechanism,the rural collective equity should break through the internal flow restrictions to realize the free allocation and complete flow of rural collective equity.
The collective shareholding system is an important property right system in China's rural collective economy.The collective equity allocation system has different institutional performance during different institutional changes.Taking Nanhai District of Guangdong Province as an example,this paper analyses the deep logic of the emergence and evolution of the equity allocation system.The research shows that the equity allocation system based on the person as a unit has legal and practical basis at the beginning of its establishment,and then the transaction costs within the collective economic organizations are increasing because of interest incentives,which induces the collective equity allocation.Under the condition of system equilibrium,the new equity distribution system constructs the formal restraint of collective property rights,reconstructs the rural security resources allocation and rural governance order,and realizes the maximization of net income under the system logic.However,there is still a problem of incomplete ownership in the equity allocation system;the article also points out that under the complete construction of the market mechanism,the rural collective equity should break through the internal flow restrictions to realize the free allocation and complete flow of rural collective equity.
引文
[1]王小映.土地股份合作制的经济学分析[J].中国农村观察,2003(6):31-39.
[2]潘长胜,李明.江苏农村社区股份合作制的实践与思考[J].农业经济问题,2004(11):43-46.
[3]孔有利,刘华周.农村社区股份经济合作社产权分析——以江苏省村级集体经济组织股份合作化为例[J].中国农学通报,2010(23):420-426.
[4]王宾,刘祥琪.农村集体产权制度股份化改革的政策效果:北京证据[J].改革,2014(6):138-147.
[5]方志权.农村集体经济组织产权制度改革若干问题[J].中国农村经济,2014(7):4-14.
[6]张建,诸培新,王敏.基于内生交易费用的农村集体资产股份制改革[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016(5):11-19.
[7]戴维·菲尼.制度安排的需求与供给[M].北京:商务印书馆,1996:33-35.
[8]道格拉斯·C.诺思.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].杭行,译.上海:格致出版社,2014:51-53.
[9]中国社会科学院农村发展研究所.关于农村集体产权制度改革的几个理论与政策问题[J].中国农村经济,2015(2):4-12.
[10]罗纳德·H.科斯,等.财产权利与制度变迁[M].刘守英,等,译.上海:格致出版社,2014:22-26.
[11]李祖佩.项目进村与乡村治理重构—一项基于村庄本位的考察[J].中国农村观察,2013(4):2-13.
[12]林毅夫.制度、技术与中国农业发展[M].上海:格致出版社,2014:23.
[13]周其仁.产权与中国变革[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2017:33-34.
[14]申端锋.乡村治权与分类治理:农民上访研究的范式转换[J].开放时代,2010(6):5-23.
[15]盛洪.现代制度经济学(下卷)[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2009:169-170.
[16]杜赞奇.文化、权力与国家:1900—1942年的华北农村[M].王福明,译.南京:江苏人民出版社,2004:27-28.
(1)哈特指出,剩余控制权即以合同没有规定的方式控制资产的权利,本文中可以理解为除集体经济组织成员明确认知的集体资产权利(如土地承包经营权)以外的其他权利。
(2)调查显示,南海区集体经济发展好的地区,家庭年终分红最高的可达十万元以上。
[2]潘长胜,李明.江苏农村社区股份合作制的实践与思考[J].农业经济问题,2004(11):43-46.
[3]孔有利,刘华周.农村社区股份经济合作社产权分析——以江苏省村级集体经济组织股份合作化为例[J].中国农学通报,2010(23):420-426.
[4]王宾,刘祥琪.农村集体产权制度股份化改革的政策效果:北京证据[J].改革,2014(6):138-147.
[5]方志权.农村集体经济组织产权制度改革若干问题[J].中国农村经济,2014(7):4-14.
[6]张建,诸培新,王敏.基于内生交易费用的农村集体资产股份制改革[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016(5):11-19.
[7]戴维·菲尼.制度安排的需求与供给[M].北京:商务印书馆,1996:33-35.
[8]道格拉斯·C.诺思.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].杭行,译.上海:格致出版社,2014:51-53.
[9]中国社会科学院农村发展研究所.关于农村集体产权制度改革的几个理论与政策问题[J].中国农村经济,2015(2):4-12.
[10]罗纳德·H.科斯,等.财产权利与制度变迁[M].刘守英,等,译.上海:格致出版社,2014:22-26.
[11]李祖佩.项目进村与乡村治理重构—一项基于村庄本位的考察[J].中国农村观察,2013(4):2-13.
[12]林毅夫.制度、技术与中国农业发展[M].上海:格致出版社,2014:23.
[13]周其仁.产权与中国变革[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2017:33-34.
[14]申端锋.乡村治权与分类治理:农民上访研究的范式转换[J].开放时代,2010(6):5-23.
[15]盛洪.现代制度经济学(下卷)[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2009:169-170.
[16]杜赞奇.文化、权力与国家:1900—1942年的华北农村[M].王福明,译.南京:江苏人民出版社,2004:27-28.
(1)哈特指出,剩余控制权即以合同没有规定的方式控制资产的权利,本文中可以理解为除集体经济组织成员明确认知的集体资产权利(如土地承包经营权)以外的其他权利。
(2)调查显示,南海区集体经济发展好的地区,家庭年终分红最高的可达十万元以上。